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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1793, Edward Addison and Jessy Campbell were traveling to-
gether through Scotland, quite happily in love. The only bar to their
future happiness, however, was that they were already married-to
others. In fact, Jessy was Edward's sister-in-law. Edward was married
to Jane Addison, Jessy's sister, and Jessy was married to James Camp-
bell.' When James Campbell sought a divorce by private Act of Parlia-
ment for Jessy's adultery with Edward, it excited no controversy and
was readily granted.2 But when Edward's wife, Jane, sought a divorce,
there was no end of debate and delay. Eventually, Jane received her
divorce-the first granted to an English wife-but at great cost to the
social and legal norms surrounding the accepted sexual double stan-
dard.3 It was a well-understood legal fact in nineteenth-century En-
gland that wives who committed adultery could be divorced with little
effort, though some cost; husbands who committed adultery could do
so with impunity.4
Divorce in England has a complicated history. Despite the com-
mon belief that Henry VIII brought divorce to English soil, it was not
until a century after Henry's reign that the first English divorce was
granted, by private Act of Parliament, in 1670. 5 Between 1670 and
1857, 379 Parliamentary divorces were requested and 324 were
granted. 6 Of those 379 requests, eight were by wives, and only four of
1. Jane and Jessy were the daughters of (a different) James Campbell, a strong
supporter of William Pitt, and a hereditary usher of the white rod for Scotland. See
ALLEN HORSTMAN, VICTORIAN DIVORCE 20-22 (1985).
2. Sybil Wolfram, Divorce in England: 1700-1857, 5 OxioRD J. LEGAL STUD. 155,
174 (1985) (citing 41 Geo. 3, c. 119 (Eng. 1801)).
3. Id. (citing 41 Geo. 3, c. 102 (Eng. 1801)).
4. HoRSTmAN, supra note 1, at 20-22.
5. Id. at 1. Until 1857, divorce with the right to remarry could only be granted by
a private Act of Parliament. Horstman identifies the Roos divorce in 1672 as the first
divorce act. A Parliamentary return from 1857 placed the Roos divorce in 1670 and
identified two earlier divorces, one in 1540 and one in 1551, the latter one having
been repealed. See RETURN OF ALL MARRIAGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN ENGLAND
AND WALES FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACT 6 & 7 WILL. 4, c. 85, TO 31 DECEM-
BER 1855, reprinted in 3 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 117
(Irish Univ. Press 1969) [hereinafter RETURN OF ALL MARRIAGES]. Additionally, annul-
ments through papal dispensations had been available in the late sixteenth century.
See MARY PoovEy, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS: THE IDEOLOGICAL WORK OF GENDER IN MID-
VicroRIAN ENGLAND 55 (1988).
6. LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND, 1530-1987, 432 tbl.10.1 (1990)
[hereinafter STONE, RoAD TO DIVORCE]. It is easy to see how lawmakers assumed
there was a divorce epidemic. Nearly four times as many divorces occurred in the last
fifty years of the period (1800-1850), than in the first fifty years (1670-1720). Id; Wolf-
ram, supra note 2, at 181. Sybil Wolfram has also looked at these records and found
some differences in the numbers and costs that have been reported by other histori-
ans, though the basic conclusions are similar. See Wolfram, supra note 2.
[Vol. 19:211
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 212 2004
"WELL-BEHAVED WOMEN DONT MAKE HISTORY"
those were granted.7 It was firmly understood that a wife who commit-
ted adultery, possibly interposed spurious children into the bloodline,
and degraded her husband's honor, had committed the worst marital
sin next to treason.8 Once accepted as a legal remedy, divorce was
deemed appropriate only for a wife's adultery. A wife whose husband
had committed adultery, however, was expected to submit to his infi-
delities which did not threaten her or her children's legal status, and
if the behavior became too outrageous to tolerate she could receive a
divorce a mensa et thoro9 from the ecclesiastical courts that would allow
her to live separate and apart, with his support, though she could not
remarry.10
The Addison/Campbell adultery, however, threw a wedge into
the well-established law of marriage and divorce, as the English legal
tradition recognized that parties similarly situated should be treated
similarly by the law. 1 Yet the reluctance to grant Jane's divorce from
7. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 432 tbl.10.1. Wives succeeded in
their Parliamentary divorce acts at a rate of 50% while husbands succeeded in theirs
at a rate of 86%. Id.
8. A wife who killed her husband was not guilty of simple murder, but rather of
petty treason, the killing of her lord and master. SeeJOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 484 (4th ed., Butterworths LexisNexis 2002) (1971).
9. Divorce a mensa et thoro was the only separation available in the ecclesiastical
courts, other than an annulment. The former was based on a marital fault which
allowed the parties to live separate and apart, though they could not remarry. The
latter treated the marriage as never having been completed; thus, parties to annulled
marriages could marry again. SeeJ.E.G. De Montmorency, The Changing Status of a
Married Woman, 13 LAw Q. REv. 187, 190-91 (1897); BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 515 (8th
ed. 2004).
10. See, e.g., 144 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1702; 142 PAR.. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 1982. There was great consternation among lawmakers and commentators
about the appropriateness of putting aside one spouse and being permitted to take
another. The members of Parliament discussed at great length the propriety of al-
lowing remarriage for the innocent and/or the guilty spouse. See, e.g., 144 PARL. DEB.
(3d ser.) (1857) 1702; 142 PAR.. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1982. Margaret Oliphant, in
her early conservative years, believed innocent spouses should not remarry, but
should resolve themselves to a future life of loneliness and celibacy. See Margaret
Oliphant, The Laws Concerning Women, 79 BtACKWOOD's EDINBURGH MAG. 379, 386
(1856). See also RICHARD HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 100-
07 (1974) (on the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction over divorce a mensa et thoro).
11. English legal and political philosophers were quite generally agreed that laws
should apply equally to parties similarly situated. While they might not agree that
certain individuals were equally situated, they advocated equality under the law. And
they did not believe that husbands and wives were similarly situated, but the Jane
Addison divorce clearly challenged the accepted view that husbands and wives were so
differently situated that wives would never require the benefits or protection of a di-
vorce. The Utilitarians, the Chartists, and the Owenites all advocated equality and
they often touched upon the relations of the sexes. All viewed legal reform as impor-
tant in bringing England to the apex of legal rationality, though there were obvious
differences in the types of reform they advocated. SeeJEREmy BENTHAM, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789);JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich &
George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859); Robert Owen, A New View of Society,
20041
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Edward, which was presented on virtually the same grounds as James'
divorce against Jessy, revealed the depth of the judicial and legislative
acceptance of the double standard for adultery. This action also rein-
forced the view that husbands and wives were not similarly situated in
issues of marital fault. 12 In the end, Parliament could not sanction the
blatant injustice that would exist in granting relief to James and not to
Jane.'5 Jane received her divorce in 1801.14 However, to stem the
rising tide in what it saw as a "divorce epidemic," Parliament limited a
wife's grounds for a divorce to incestuous adultery.15 The narrow in-
cest exception was not expanded until 1838 when Ann Battersby re-
ceived a divorce from her husband, Arther, on the grounds of
bigamy.' 6 Before the mid-nineteenth century, wives had limited
grounds under which to obtain a full divorce: adultery aggravated by
incest or bigamy.17
in SELECTED WORKS OF ROBERT OWEN, VOL. 1: EARLY WRITINGS 23 (Gregory Claeys ed.,
Pickering & Chatto 1991) (1813). Lord Brougham, in the 1840s and 1850s, was an
influential advocate of legal reform who founded the Law Amendment Society in
1844 to follow through on many of Jeremy Bentham's reformist ideas. Additionally,
William Gladstone spoke before the House of Commons about the equality of men
and women and the importance of equal rights before the law. 147 PARL. DEB. (3d
ser.) (1857) 393.
12. Ironically, James' divorce was for simple adultery while Jane's was for incestu-
ous adultery (adultery with his wife's sister), which was deemed an even worse viola-
tion of the marital vow. Despite the aggravating circumstance of incest, however, it
was Jane's divorce that caused the most contention. See PoovEY, supra note 5 (regard-
ing gender in mid-Victorian England). See also Ann Sumner Holmes, The Double Stan-
dard in the English Divorce Laws, 1857-1923, 20 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995);
Rebecca Probert, The Double Standard of Morality in the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes
Act 1857, 28 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 73 (1999); Mary Lyndon Shanley, "One Must Ride
Behind": Married Women's Rights and the Divorce Act of 1857, 25 VICToRIAN STUD. 355
(1982); Margaret K. Woodhouse, The Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsr. 260 (1959).
13. 43 H.L. JouR. 101-04, 190, 290 (1801).
14. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 174 (41 Geo. 3, c. 102 (Eng. 1801)).
15. Ironically, had Edward and Jessy not been in-laws already, Parliament would
have granted James' divorce of Jessy and not Jane's divorce of Edward. Incest under
these rules was defined by the ecclesiastical court's position on the prohibited degrees
of relationship for marriage, which treated blood relations the same as affinal rela-
tions. See JAMES BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
140-41 (1987); HELMHOLZ, supra note 10, at 77-87.
16. HoRSTMAN, supra note 1, at 23-24. After their marriage, he had cohabited
with Ann for only three weeks, during which time he had frequented numerous
brothels and given her a venereal disease. Id. Arther deserted her six months after
the marriage and resurfaced more than ten years later in Newgate prison, remarried.
Id. After the conviction for bigamy, he was transported to Australia for seven years
and Ann received a full divorce. Id.
17. The law of Scotland differed dramatically from the unequal rules that gov-
erned in England. Since the late sixteenth century, under Scottish law husbands and
wives could seek a divorce on the grounds of simple adultery or desertion. JOHN Fos-
TER MACQUEEN, A PRACrICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND LECII-
MACy AS ADMINISTERED IN THE DIVORCE COURT AND IN THE HOUSE OF LoRDs 28-30 (2d
ed., London, W. Maxwell 1860). And they could do so by bringing suit in a civil court.
[Vol. 19:211
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In 1857 Parliament finally succumbed to public and political
pressure and passed a bill creating a domestic relations court: the
Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.18 This new court, for the
first time in common-law history, combined the following jurisdic-
tions: the ecclesiastical court's jurisdiction over marital validity and
separation; the Chancery court's jurisdiction over child custody and
equitable estates; the common-law court's jurisdiction over property;
and Parliament's jurisdiction over divorce and marital settlements. 19
Id. This made the process far less expensive and therefore open to the middle as well
as the upper classes. STONE, ROAD TO DrvoRCE, supra note 6, at 5, 357. In 1573, Scot-
land passed a law which allowed women the right to petition for a divorce on the
same grounds as men: simple adultery. Scot. Pal. Acts 1573, c. 55. Despite the
greater availability and lower cost, Scottish divorces were not rampant. Between 1847
and 1857, 174 divorce decrees were granted in Scotland, ninety-nine at the suit of the
husband, and seventy-five at the suit of the wife. RETURN OF ALL MARRIAGES, supra
note 5, at 117. During these same years, thirty-six Parliamentary divorces were
granted in England. Id As the nineteenth century progressed, there was quite a lot
of pressure to make the English law conform to that of Scotland and France, both in
terms of the equality of grounds and the access to civil courts. Yet, England had
resisted civil divorce for 300 years longer than Scotland, a tribute more likely to relig-
ious and social differences than to gender or class differences, even though the latter
formed the basis of most of the mid-nineteenth-century criticism. Although English
critics often referred to the law in France and Scotland for a model that was egalita-
rian in gender and class terms, it is not surprising that Parliament accepted the class-
based critique and thus instituted civil procedures for divorce, but not the gender-
based critiques that would equalize the grounds for men and women. When discuss-
ing the class issues, the law's critics often referred to Scotland as the model, but when
discussing the gender issues, they often referred to France or other countries on the
continent. See 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 530 (Bishop of Oxford referring to the
crisis in Prussia from a weakening of their divorce laws). Not surprisingly, the per-
ceived laxities in continental morality thus justified retaining the sexual double stan-
dard for women, while the perceived Anglo-Saxon restraint of the lower classes in
Scotland justified moving toward civil divorce. See 147 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857)
1643.
18. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85. (Eng.) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the 1857 Act). The term "domestic relations" court is a modem term that
I use here. Family law and domestic relations were terms not used in the nineteenth
century to refer to the kind of interdependent set of legal doctrines concerning mar-
riage, children, and families that evolved from the 1858 court. The law at the time
used the term baron andfeme to refer to marriage and custody of children, while prop-
erty matters associated with the family were subsumed under traditional property law.
The civil court in Scotland that granted divorces was not a specialized divorce court,
but was the Court of Session. See 13 & 14 Vict., c. 36, § 16 (1855) (Eng.); HUGH
BARcLAY, A DIGEST OF THE LAw OF ScoTLAND 286 (2d ed., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark
1855). Despite the modernity of the term, critics today often refer to the divorce and
matrimonial causes court as an answer to "family law reform." See, e.g., PoovEY, supra
note 5, at 54. I use the term "domestic relations court" and "divorce court" inter-
changeably to refer to the 1858 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court and where
necessary refer to modem family law courts as such.
19. For a history of the debates leading to the creation of the divorce court, see
HousTmAN, supra note 1, at 85-110; PoovEv, supra note 5, at 51-88; MARY LYNDON
SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VIcroRIAN ENGLAND 22-48 (1989);
DOROTHY M. STETSON, A WoMAN's ISSUE: THE POLrrICS OF FAMILY LAW REFORM IN EN-
GLAND (1982); STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 368-90; S.M. Waddams, En-
2004]
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Wives were given the legal right to seek a divorce or judicial separa-
tion in a court of law, receive custody of the children of the marriage,
and were allowed an order granting them independent property
rights. 20 Divorce could now be granted in a single civil court and the
costs would be substantially less than a Parliamentary divorce. 21 Such
action gave wives almost the same rights as husbands before the new
judge.
Until now, no one has studied the records of this court to see how
it responded to different types of petitioners or to uncover details
about the lives of the people seeking resolution before its bar. Histori-
ans of divorce have examined the rules that evolved from the court
and criticized the inequalities that the 1857 Act embedded in the
court's policies and procedures. 22 And family-law scholars often begin
their studies of family law with 1857, recognizing the importance of
civil divorce to modem family law.23 But what is notably absent from
the scholarship is a critical analysis of the role the court played, both
in terms of the rules it created and the outcomes of its cases, on the
intellectual project of writing the history of family law.
During my extensive research into the Victorian family I have be-
come intrigued by an historical problematic, a tension between four
things: 1) evidence that women reformers in general wanted extensive
reforms in the laws of coverture 24 and most particularly the disaggre-
gation of legal rights to property, custody, and divorce with themselves
gaining the right to use law and courts for their own personal benefit;
2) the creation of a court that instead aggregated these rights and
imprisoned women in very traditional subordinate roles within a nar-
rowly constrained domestic sphere; 3) a dominant historical narrative
that applauds the court as empowering women and yet also cites an
emphasis on legal rights and selfish individualism as fundamental
flaws with the family law of the late nineteenth and most of the twenti-
eth century;25 and 4) the fact that despite radical changes in family
law and the nearly complete dismantling of coverture, gender inequal-
glish Matrimonial Law on the Eve of Reform, 21 LEGAL HIsT. 59 (2000); Danaya C. Wright,
The Crisis of Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 175 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody].
20. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857) (Eng.).
21. Id. See also HoRSTMN, supra note 1, at 85.
22. See articles cited infra note 34 and accompanying text.
23. See articles cited infra notes 33 & 35 and accompanying text.
24. Coverture is a medieval doctrine that treats husband and wife as a single legal
entity. See discussion of coverture infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
25. By this I refer to the common complaint of conservative critics that women's
rights conflict with the interests of families and children, that when women leave the
home to work or compete with men for high-paying jobs, families suffer. See, e.g.,
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAw, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 147 (1989) (arguing that the increase in
individual rights has led to "alienation, powerlessness, and dependency"). See also
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAw AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE
(1999); Sanford N. Katz, Individual Rights and Family Relationships, in CROSS CuRRETrrrs:
[Vol. 19:211
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ity still remains very much alive for vast numbers of Anglo-American
women.
26
The centerpiece of this article is a critical analysis of what I have
termed the "liberalization narrative." 27 Historians and family-law
scholars have generally viewed the rise in family law as beneficial to
women because it recognizes their special interests in the family and it
rejects the hierarchical, male-dominated values of commercial and
public law that dominate the capitalist marketplace. 28 Family law
often rejects the rhetoric of legal rights in favor of very malleable
terms like interests or duties. And that is good, according to the liber-
alization narrative, because women are believed to be uncomfortable
asserting legal rights in the context of complex interrelationships that
are seen to be ultimately more meaningful to them than the property
or the agency that would accompany recognition and protection of
rights. The liberalization narrative asserts that because women are
gentle, build relationships, and have interests focused in the home, a
special law of the family is good for them; it reflects their way of inter-
acting with people and it protects the things they value. But in the
nearly 150 years since this first family-law court was created, no one
has looked at whether the women in the 1850s who were advocating
for legal reform wanted the particular legal rules that were enacted,
whether women as a class fared well under this new family law, or the
extent to which the family law that evolved from the 1858 court simply
replaced one patriarchal scheme with another. More importantly, no
one has analyzed how the new court, its subsequent history, and the
evolving family law that arose have constructed a narrative in which
legal rights for women within the family are viewed as unnatural, an-
tagonistic to the interests and needs of husbands and children, and
ultimately destructive of the social order. By examining the law that
preceded the new court, the reform debates, empirical data from the
court's first decade, and the historical narrative we have constructed
about the rise of family law, I argue that family law's role in perpetuat-
ing gender equality is occluded by the historical and intellectual he-
gemony of the liberalization narrative.
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 621-35 (Sanford Katz et
al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter CROSS CURRENTs].
26. Tying the modem family and its production through family law to funda-
mental gender inequalities today must remain for another project, though I suggest
certain links in infra Part VII.
27. The "liberalization narrative" is a term I have coined to represent what I see
as a generally accepted view that the development of family law has had a liberalizing
effect on women's lives. It contrasts the limits of coverture from the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries with the legal rights family law gives women in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries and asserts that women are better off now than before.
Of course, this is the heart of my argument, the uncritical acceptance of the liberaliza-
tion narrative, and I critique it in infra Part VII.
28. See articles cited infra note 35.
2004]
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Because this article combines empirical data from the first dec-
ade of the 1858 divorce court with a theoretical critique of the reform
of family law all in the context of the historical reform movement, its
structure is somewhat complicated. In Part II, I explain the theoreti-
cal conundrum underlying this project as well as its historical genesis.
In Part III, I set out the basics of the pre-reform law of divorce and its
relation to women's disempowerment under coverture. In Part IV, I
examine the reigning ideology of separate spheres that justified and
was perpetuated by the law of coverture. In Part V, I explore the dif-
ferent kinds of arguments for reform of the law of divorce, child cus-
tody, and married women's property. These nineteenth-century
critiques framed the reform debate of the 1850s and established the
parameters within which civil divorce would occur. In Part VI, I turn
to empirical data from the records of the court's first nine years to
explore the extent to which the legal reform answered these stated
needs of progressive reformers or frustrated the desires of female peti-
tioners. The data reveal some limited improvement as well as great
continuity in women's subordination within the family. In Part VII,
with the evidence of the court's performance, I then challenge the
historical claims that the shift from coverture to family law benefited
women. In discussing the liberalization narrative that posits family law
as good for women, I examine the reform debate and the reform itself
as establishing a narrative of law's innocence in the subordination of
women. I conclude by suggesting possible implications of the narra-
tive of law's innocence in contemporary family law and the lives of
men and women today.
II. PRELUDES, QUALIFICATIONS, AND FOUNDATIONS: THE HISTORICAL
CONUNDRUM OF REFORM AND FAMILY LAW
This article has been over ten years in the making and is a first
stab at a very theoretically complex argument. It uses empirical data
and narrative analysis to get behind the cultural and legal environ-
ment of the movement for divorce reform in the 1850s. It argues that
by looking at the historical precedents of the 1858 divorce court and
the family law that evolved from it, we can more clearly see how con-
temporary family law continues to carry within it the values and pre-
sumptions of gender subordination that prevailed at its creation. But
even as I talk about family law and the general role of law in gender
inequality, I am aware of the profound indeterminacy of law as an
institution separate from the people who write and enforce it.29 Law
has no independent existence separate from the people of the time
who interact with it as subjects and objects. Similarly, history cannot
be separated from the historians who write it. Thus, even as I attempt
29. I am indebted to Walter Weyrauch for his work on the indeterminacy of law
and his helpful comments on a draft of this manuscript.
[Vol. 19:211
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to write a history of the origins of English family law, I am conscious of
the contradictions inherent in the very project.
If law has little meaning outside the lives of those affected by it,
then it is critical that I examine the lives of those people who brought
their disputes to the new court. At the same time, however, the court
records are not reliable narratives of the true events that occurred
because they are the products of the people who lived those events.
They are also necessarily incomplete. Yet they are the only records we
have and to ignore them would be to ignore a valuable piece of the
puzzle. The court data, along with periodical articles, novels, reform
debates, and legal and institutional contexts of the period must all be
fitted together, like a multi-layered puzzle, to produce a narrative that
resonates with the reader of today. My own discomfort with the diffi-
culties of writing history in a post-modem world is exacerbated by the
awareness that I am doing precisely what I criticize other historians for
doing. In the end, however, I hope that the reader will view history,
law, the family, divorce, gender, rights, and equality more critically.
In particular, I hope the reader will view legal change and reform with
a new eye-an eye that constantly picks at, turns over, and questions
the appearance of legal and historical claims.
To understand how I am challenging the traditional versions of
family-law history, I must first explain how historians and legal schol-
ars have constructed the narrative linking family law and women's
equality. Notably, they argue the divorce laws emanating from the
1858 court fundamentally changed the law of domestic relations by
forging a path toward equality of rights. 30 These scholars cite the cre-
ation of the divorce court and the liberalization in a wife's ability to
seek a divorce, custody of her own children, and protection for her
separate property as critical to improving the legal status of women. 31
Women's improved legal status is then believed to equalize the bal-
ance of power between husbands and wives within the domestic
realm. 32 The court, one of the first true family law courts in the mod-
em world, is credited with improving women's lives, softening the
harsh results of patriarchal legal rules, and recognizing the impor-
tance and separateness of the domestic realm.33
30. See discussion of the liberalization narrative, infra Part VII.
31. Historians have argued that by giving women a right to a divorce they would
have more power to disagree with their husbands and hence determine their own
futures, thus improving their own lives. Elaine Showalter, Family Secrets and Domestic
Subversion: Rebellion in the Novels of the 1860s, in THE VICroRIAN FAMILY 107 (Anthony
Wohl ed., 1978) (stating that the Divorce Act "caused a minor social revolution in
England" (citing Margaret Maison)); STETSON, supra note 19; STONE, ROAD TO Di-
VORCE, supra note 6, at 388-90.
32. Showalter, supra note 31; STETSON, supra note 19; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE,
supra note 6, at 388-90.
33. STONE, RoAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6. See also GEORGE BEHLMER, FRIENDS OF
THE FAMn. THE ENGLISH HOME AND ITS GuARDLANS, 1850-1940, at 190 (1998) (calling
it "a watershed in English social legislation"); R. H. GRAVESON & F.R. CRANE, A CEN-
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Of course, no single piece of legislation ever truly revolutionizes
complex human relationships. Scholars have been quick to note that
the promises of the 1857 law were perhaps overstated. 34 It is not sur-
prising that this new court perpetuated the sexual double standard
and women's inequality, given the extreme gender differences inher-
ent in Victorian society and the corresponding legal sanctioning of
differential treatment. Even though the legislation sought to amelio-
rate the harsh effects of wives' legal non-existence, I argue that this
new law made matters worse, not better, for women.
But most people, including historians, lawyers, and feminist
scholars, endorse the fundamental importance of the new court as the
first major step toward giving wives the right to civil divorce and legal
agency. And there is a naturalness in recognizing the special realm of
the family as a domain of particular interest to women, deserving of its
own unique legal rules and procedures. The project of family law, if
not the particular manifestation of it, is widely accepted by historians,
scholars, lawyers, and laypeople, as an important legal reform as well
as a critical component in women's struggle for legal rights.3 5
However, I am skeptical of the overall acceptance of family law,
for I am unclear how, if at all, it has improved women's lives. 36 This
does not mean that the pre-1858 law virtually prohibiting divorce for
women was better than what was available after 1858, especially for
TURY OF FAMILY LAW, 1857-1957, at 11 (Sweet and Maxwell 1957) (calling the Divorce
Act "a triumph of individualistic liberalism"); SHANLu, supra note 19, at 47 (claiming
that the Act is usually "hailed in histories of English jurisprudence as a watershed
statute that created both the action for civil divorce and the new Court of Divorce").
34. See W.R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAw AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND: 1750-
1950, at 386-90 (1989); STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 388-90; Holmes,
supra note 12; Probert, supra note 12; Shanley, supra note 12; Woodhouse, supra note
12.
35. This is not to say that modern scholars think any current instantiation of
family law is perfect, or that they do not critique the patriarchal family from a femi-
nist, a Marxist, a radical, or a post-modern perspective. Rather, they take family law as
a given, as a logical and generally sensible subset of law centered around a coherent
and pre-existing social unit. And then they critique the failures of certain rules within
family law to relieve the subordination of women. But at heart, most family-law schol-
ars believe the enterprise is logical and sensible. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 25, at
85-94; Michael Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States:
1950-2000. in CROSS CURRENTS,. supra note 25, at 4-12. See generally JOHN EEKELAAR,
FAMILY LAw AND SoCiAL Pouicv (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 2d ed. 1984); KATHERINE
O'DoNoVAN, FAMILY LAW MATTERS (1993) [hereinafter O'DoNovAN, FAMILY LAW MAT-
TERs]; RETHINKING THE FAMILY- SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn
Yalom eds., Northeastern Univ. Press 1992) (1982); THE STATE, THE LAw, AND THE
FAMILY- CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael DA. Freeman ed., 1984). What they do not
question is the role of family law itself in constructing the subordination of women.
36. See Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of
Custody Law Under Patriarchy, 17 LAw & HIST. REv. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Wright, De
Manneville]; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19; Danaya C. Wright, From
Feudalism to Family Law: Inter-spousal Custody Disputes and the Repudiation of
Mother's Rights (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University)
(on file with author).
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women who wanted out of abusive and intolerable marriages. Laws
purporting to aid some women can harm the collective goals of wo-
men as a class. Additionally, laws written by men with the stated aim
of helping a disenfranchised class like women should make us look
closer at whether they were designed to improve women's lives or
rather help those in power remain in power. I caution against uncriti-
cal praise of change which looks progressive in light of the previous
legal rules, but which may be less progressive when viewed within a
broader perspective of the more expansive changes being requested
and the long-term constraints of the limited change that did occur.3 7
It is not entirely clear that the direction of the reform-toward family
law-has brought us or will get us any closer to gender equality than
other avenues that were conceived of and advocated for at the time.
I approach the subject of this article, therefore, with less focus on
the obvious need for reform, and more on the uncritical acceptance
of family law as the answer to infidelity, violence, and desertion within
marriage. Though some scholars have criticized the particular con-
tours of family law, as noted above, it is the widespread belief that
reform of divorce law and the creation of a unified family law would
solve the perceived social problems that I wish to unpack. To do so,
we must understand what the reformers wanted, what they obtained,
and how, if at all, the reform brought about significant change. And it
certainly did bring about significant change in the procedures of ob-
taining a divorce. In a sense, it also opened the door to more signifi-
cant reforms in the twentieth century. But was the change
meaningful for those most immediately affected-the men and wo-
men of the late 1850s and 1860s? Did the new family law help women
achieve some level of equality within their private lives? I think not.
The family law of the late nineteenth century differed very little from
the pre-1858 law of coverture that erased women's legal existence.
Family law has rearranged the power dynamic within families, but it
has done very little, I suggest, to empower women in the full range of
their lives. I do not believe family law is such a radical change from
37. New social histories have shown that women were not so completely disabled
under coverture as one might think. Similarly, they have shown that the reforms were
not so extensive and revolutionary as to dramatically change women's lives. Not sur-
prisingly, studies of individual families have shown that women did participate in the
public sphere, did exercise some power within their families, and did act as somewhat
autonomous actors both before and after the mid-century legal reforms, thus indicat-
ing that the effect of legal change in people's lives is piecemeal and not dramatic. See,
e.g., NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERA-
TION TO THE VICTORIANS (1999); JOHN GILLS, FOR BETTER, FOR WORSE: BRITISH MAR-
RIAGES, 1600 TO THE PRESENT (1985); HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (2000); LOUISE TiLLY &JOAN SCOTT, WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY (1978). My
critique of the historical narrative of family law challenges not only the claims of revo-
lutionary change in women's lives, but also the acceptance of the general direction of
reform which I see being applauded simply because of its divergence from coverture
rather than because it is heading in a direction that will yield gender equality.
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early nineteenth-century coverture, nor do I believe it is necessarily
the right change. I do believe strongly, however, that change was
quite necessary.
Let me also clarify what I mean by "family law." Prior to the twen-
tieth century, the legal relationships we associate with marriage and
family were disaggregated and subsumed into more general categories
of laws. Thus, there was the law of baron and feme dealing with mar-
riage, the law of wardship and custody of children that dealt with or-
phans, the law of trusts and settlements for marital property, the law
of master and apprentice that addressed parents who apprenticed and
educated their children, and the like. These relationships were lo-
cated in broader contexts of property, contract, and equity law. To
some extent, each relationship was governed by a separate court, us-
ing separate substantive and procedural rules. Marital validity and
separation were governed by the rules of the ecclesiastical courts.
Child custody and trust law were products of the Chancery courts.
Most property disputes would be settled in the courts of Common
Pleas or King's Bench. The idea that there was a core set of relation-
ships, centered in the family unit, was unknown until well after the
creation of the 1858 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court. The
term "family law" did not come into regular usage until the twentieth
century.
Today, however, the term "family law" refers to a coherent set of
legal doctrines that traditionally center on the marital unit and its sup-
port.3 8 Marriage/divorce, custody of children, and marital property
form the triad of most family-law casebooks. Additional issues like
adoption, guardianship of the property of minors, inheritance, mari-
tal rape, change of name upon marriage and divorce, and education
of children also typically come into play in family law. But these are
clearly subordinant to the traditional three that are at the center of
the ideology of the private Victorian family.
Despite some expansion beyond the traditional triad of divorce,
custody, and property, family law ignores many persons living as a
nontraditional family unit, such as children being raised by grandpar-
ents, adult children returning to their elderly parents' homes, and
same-sex coupling or parenting. It also ignores outside pressures and
conflicts like elder care for dying parents or extended family, hus-
bands and wives living in separate states, contradictory expectations
about how to use marital property, adoption and step-parenting, and
taxation of estates. Even homelessness and a living wage are all legiti-
mate aspects of family formation and function that are more or less
outside the umbrella of traditional family law and are governed to a
great extent by how much these non-traditional relationships resem-
ble the traditional parent-child or husband-wife relationships and ex-
38. See P.M. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAw 1-2 (5th ed. 1976); STEPHEN CRETNEY ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAw (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 4th ed. 1984) (1974).
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pectations. Despite these legitimate aspects of family life, family law
has remained mired in the traditional triad that grew out of the 1857
law and it continues to conceive family life in truly nineteenth-century
ways.
I use the term "family law," therefore, in this traditional sense of
centering the rights and duties of the parties around the heterosexual
marriage of a man and a woman. And the origins of the marriage-
children-property triad is easily seen in the 1858 divorce court's ena-
bling legislation. 39 It is the bringing together of these three subjects
within the traditional heterosexual marriage that arguably began the
movement toward what later came to be called family law. Thus, for
this article, I discuss the project of family law in terms of the tradi-
tional aggregation of marriage, marital property, and custody of chil-
dren into a single legal category, and the simultaneous exclusion of
other relationships and values. Moreover, I am especially interested
in whether the aggregation of these relationships and values in a uni-
fied family law benefits women as a whole and adequately protects
those things they most value.40
Yet if we perhaps went in the wrong direction, how do we know it,
how did it happen, and why do we not turn around? It is certainly
impossible to go back to the early nineteenth century and begin
again. And most men and women would not wish to do so. Despite
the rather obvious evidence that women and men remain quite une-
qual today and that family law has been in existence for nearly 150
years, uncovering a course that might have worked better, if there
even is one, is rather a waste of time precisely because we cannot go
back and start over.41 In a sense we are left with the typical historical
enterprise of trying to uncover what happened in the past so we can
39. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857) (Eng.).
40. I do not pretend to believe that all women's interests are the same, nor
would I claim an essential female perspective. To the extent I talk about the interests
of women, I do so with full awareness that not all women's interests are the same and
that in many instances women's and men's interests may coalesce. As a general state-
ment, however, I believe the court and the family law that evolved envisioned a tradi-
tional white, middle- or upper-class woman who came from and sought to participate
in traditional nuclear family formations. I recognize the tension in talking about "wo-
men's interests" and "women's values" as though they are monolithic and identical for
all women and also saying that women's interests and values differ. Butjust as I em-
brace the contradiction in the law, that it is transformative and impotent, I also em-
brace the contradiction in saying women's interests are multi-faceted and diverse and
at some level the same.
41. A wide range of studies show the continuing inequalities that exist today be-
tween men and women, especially in areas related to families. See, e.g., Z. Fareen
Parvez, Women, Poverty, and Welfare Reform, at http://newmedia.colorado.edu/
-socwomen/socactivism/factwelfare.pdf (Aug. 15, 2002); Sandy Smith, Family and
Work, at http://newmedia.colorado.edu/-socwomen/socactivism/factlabor.pdf
(Sept. 15, 2002). See also Stephanie Coontz & Nancy Folbre, Marriage, Poverty, and
Public Policy, at http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/public/briefing.html (Apr. 26-
28, 2002).
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avoid certain mistakes in the future. However, using history to guide
us in the future is only one of its valuable purposes. Understanding
how the history of family law has been written may encourage us to
think more critically about the project of writing history in a period in
which nearly every historical truth we have clung to has been ques-
tioned. It may also encourage us to think more critically about family
law and the continuing disempowerment of women. This article is
very much an exploration of an historical conundrum about women's
role in the family that has bothered me for many years.
Determining the attitudes of nineteenth-century British men and
women toward family law, especially when there was no formal institu-
tion or legal category, is a task of untangling the nineteenth-century
worldviews of the intersection of family life and the law. Like most
other historians, I began by reading what others had said about the
subject. Then I began to explore what evidence I could find about
the lives and practices of the different men and women who sought
assistance in the court, including why marriages failed and custody
battles ensued, and I examined the court's unpublished records and
printed case reports. 42 As I studied these unfortunate experiences of
family conflict in the nineteenth century, I could not escape the ef-
fects of the legal and social history that interpreted and filtered the
documents I examined. It then became necessary to go back to the
prior histories to study how they seemed to produce a narrative of
liberalization about the rise of family law that masked the underlying
role of coercive legal mechanisms in producing and maintaining gen-
der inequality.43 Although women in the twenty-first century can now
receive a divorce, when before they could not, I am not comfortable
42. The preliminary results of the primary records are published in another arti-
cle. Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and Matrimo-
nial Causes Court Records, 1858-1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 903 (2004) [hereinafter
Wright, Untying the Knot]. That article details the methodology used to analyze the
data and offers far more detail about the court than could be included here. This
article draws some conclusions from that data to analyze the role of the court in its
historico-legal context.
43. Keith Jenkins argues that post-modern historians should be focusing on the
sources of the past and should be constructing histories from different perspectives,
but that they should also be conscious of the changes in history(ies) over time to
understand how the project of doing history serves a particular dominant power struc-
ture. KEITH JENKINS, RE-THIMNNG HISTORY (1991). In that vein, I have tried to ana-
lyze the different histories of nineteenth-century English family law to see how the
changes in histories reveal different things about each historian's generation. See, e.g.,
CRoss CURRENTS, supra note 25; Ruth Deech, Matrimonial Property and Divorce: A Cen-
tury of Progress, in THE STATE, THE LAW, AND THE FAMILY. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 35, at 245; SUSAN MAIDMENT, CHILD CUSTODY AND DIVORCE (1984); O'DONOVAN,
FAMILY LAw MATTERS, sup-a note 35; Katherine O'Donovan, Protection and Paternalism,
in THE STATE, THE LAW, AND THE FAMILY CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 79;
KATHERINE O'DoNOVAN, SEXUAL DrvSIONS IN LAw 81-134 (1985) [hereinafter
O'DoNOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw]; Carol Smart, Marriage, Divorce, and Women's
Economic Dependency: A Discussion of the Politics of Private Maintenance, in THE STATE, THE
LAw, AND THE FAMILY-. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 9.
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with the traditional narrative applauding the 1858 court for making
the weaker sex, as Blackstone phrased it, a "favorite of English law."
4 4
But I must qualify my characterization of the historical affirma-
tion of the new court. While some historians viewed the 1858 court as
revolutionary, others have written extensively about its limitations, es-
pecially concerning women's rights and interests.45 However, skepti-
cism of the legal rules that created and governed the court is generally
attributed to the substantive rules and procedures of the court and is
accompanied by a relatively uncritical acceptance of the overall pro-
ject of creating family law. Thus, while some historians have criticized
the specific family laws that arose, they tend not to analyze the under-
lying assumptions behind the appropriateness of a separate family law
court.46 The liberalization narrative I identify in this article is the
larger acceptance of family law and domestic relations courts in gen-
eral and not so much the specific manifestation expressed in the par-
ticular 1858 court.
Like the family law it studies, this article has an inherent tension
between macro-level conclusions about law's role in constructing pa-
triarchy and micro-level conclusions about individual differences
among the litigants before the new court. First, it seeks to explore the
way in which legal institutions reinforce gender inequality through
the creation and regulation of a domestic sphere. Law is ultimately
coercive, and when it regulates family relationships it profoundly af-
fects women's daily lives, especially when women are prohibited from
having lives outside the family. Second, this article explores a few of
the social and behavioral differences identified in the 1858 court's
records among different female petitioners to get a better sense of
how the new court and the laws it created may have operated differ-
ently over different groups of women. Differences between young
and old, women with and without children, and upper-class and mid-
dle-class women appear rather stark in the data, which suggests that
the law did not operate uniformly nor were women equally well situ-
ated to take advantage of the benefits the law provided.47 In many
44. After discoursing at great length on the legal disabilities of married women,
Blackstone then remarked that "even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are
for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a favorite is the
female sex of the laws of England." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 445 (St. George Tucker ed., Birch & Small 1803). Although Black-
stone wrote this nearly a century before the creation of the divorce court, his interpre-
tation of the law's relation to women was reproduced by the legal reformers of the
mid-nineteenth century who viewed the creation of civil divorce as helping those few
English women who, because of particularly abusive husbands, found their otherwise
comfortable legal existence inadequate to their needs.
45. See supra note 34 and accompanying text and infra notes 406-408 and accom-
panying text.
46. See, e.g., GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33, at 11; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at
47.
47. For a discussion of court data, see infra Part VI. For a more detailed discus-
sion of my findings, see Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42.
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respects, the change in the law may have had less impact on their lives
than other social conditions like age, class, or domicile. Seeing legal
change as embedded in a social context forces us to think more criti-
cally about the effect of the legal rules of coverture and marriage on
women's lives. 4
It may seem that I am saying on the one hand that law does not
matter because other differences overshadow legal changes and legal
rights, and on the other that law does matter because it reinforces
gender inequality through the legalization of patriarchy. I am indeed
saying both, and I embrace the contradiction. But the two views are
not inconsistent when understood in their less absolute forms. I ar-
gue here that while legal changes resulted in different effects in differ-
ently situated women's lives, the changes also worked, institutionally,
to maintain a gender hierarchy that is both socially and legally con-
structed and within which the differences in individual choices show
the inadequacy of law for resolving complex human problems.
III. Ti LAw OF DIVORCE AND COVERTURE BEFORE MID-CENTURY
There is little doubt that the pre-1858 law of domestic relations
had a terrible impact on women. These laws erased married women's
legal existence, maintained patriarchy, treated wives and their prop-
erty as the husband's chattel, and legalized the sexual double stan-
dard. Prior to 1858, a husband seeking a divorce had to sue his wife's
lover for damages in a criminal conversation action,49 and then seek a
48. At the same time, we must realize that there are numerous axes along which
the data can be analyzed and my choice to use particular data is premised on explor-
ing the tensions I have seen elsewhere in the literary and historical record. Analysis of
the data along other lines is undertaken in my earlier work. See Wright, Untying the
Knot, supra note 42. The wealth of information available in these court records, and
their sheer size, allow the researcher the luxury of successively breaking down data
sets by a variety of criteria to explore how even subtle differences in demographic
categories can affect the outcome of these cases. For instance, most studies, like the
pathbreaking book by LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, merely ana-
lyze the cases along gender and success rate, without looking at whether the presence
or absence of children might affect the outcome, or whether the frequency of the
adultery or cruelty affected the case in any way. There are additional axes as well
upon which the data can be analyzed which I leave for another article-namely the
court's procedures. I have determined that, overall, women's petitions took less time
to complete than men's, which would indicate the court was more lenient toward
women. But that simple statistic occludes the fact that a significant portion of wo-
men's petitions were for judicial separation which did not require hearings before the
full court. Understanding the procedures and the different substantive rules forces us
to account for those differences when analyzing this data and inevitably makes the
statistical analyses much more complex than those that were undertaken in the BRrr-
ISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 5, or in general histo-
ries like STONE, ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 6.
49. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 233. See also LAuRA HANrr
KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS: SENTIMENTALITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY LE-
GAL STORIES OF ADULTERY (1998); Susan Staves, Money for Honor: Damages for Criminal
Conversation, 11 STUD. IN 18TH-CENTURY CULTURE 279 (1982). The criminal conversa-
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legal separation (a divorce a mensa et thoro) in the ecclesiastical courts
on the grounds of her adultery. 50 Then the husband would petition
both houses of Parliament by private bill for an absolute divorce that
would allow him to remarry. 51 The cost in the early to mid-nineteenth
century was well over £1000, and could easily rise to £5000 if the case
were contested. 52 Due to his wife's adultery, a divorced husband
would have absolute rights to custody of the children of the marriage
and he would be relieved of paying his wife any alimony or support
because of her breach of marital obligations.53 As an added boon, the
husband would not be required to return any of the property his wife
brought to the marriage. Although real property she brought would
likely be readjusted to pass to their children upon his death, and Par-
liament often readjusted the property to protect family legacies, the
courts showed little concern for the financial well-being of discarded
wives. 54
In contrast, a wronged wife could only request a legal separation
in the ecclesiastical courts on the grounds of her husband's cruelty,
desertion, or adultery. 55 If she won, she might be granted alimony by
the court, but her right to financial support would be unenforceable
as the ecclesiastical courts had no enforcement powers. The wife
tion action was an extension of the law of trespass in the late seventeenth century into
the gap left by the decline of the ecclesiastical courts in enforcing moral codes of
behavior. KOROBKIN, supra; STONE, ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 233; Staves,
supra. Although neither criminal nor a conversation, the cause of action was almost
exclusively litigated in the Court of King's Bench. KOROBKIN, supra; STONE, ROAD TO
DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 233; Staves, supra.
50. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 183-230.
51. Id. at 301-46.
52. For the sake of comparison, an income of £150 to £300 per year indicates a
lower-middle-class existence in the nineteenth century; a family in this range could
eat well and employ a servant. In London, however, where costs were notably higher,
a typical middle-class family would have two to three servants and require an income
of £500 to £2000 per year. See LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FOR-
TUNES: MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS, 1780-1850, at 23 (1987);JOHN
ToSH, A MAN'S PLACE: MASCULINITY AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS HOME IN VICTORIAN EN-
GLAND 12 (1999). In one particularly bitter divorce in the 1820s, the costs exceeded
£30,000. See LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN LIVES: SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND,
1660-1857, at 284-346 (1993) (discussing the Westmeath battles) [hereinafter STONE,
BROKEN LIVES]. Sybil Wolfram has challenged the claim that this number is so high,
but she readily acknowledges that there are hidden costs impossible to accurately con-
firm. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 166-67.
53. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at Book 1, Ch. xv, at iii; STONE, ROAD
TO DIVORCE, supra note 6.
54. Husbands were given legal life estates in the real property brought by wives
to a marriage and they generally retained full control over such property in the event
of divorce. See LEE HOLCOMBE, WIVES & PROPERTY. REFORM OF THE MARRIED WOMEN'S
PROPERTY LAw IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 20-23 (1983). For a discussion of
Parliament's readjustment of property rights, see the discussion of the Ladies' Friend
in Wolfram, supra note 2, at 161 n.22.
55. See HELMHOLZ, supra note 10, at 100-07; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note
6, at 192-94.
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would then need to petition the equity courts for enforcement of any
alimony order.56 Moreover, the wife would have a further burden if
her husband was a peer of the realm. 57 His title guaranteed that the
order would be unenforceable by any court; only a private Act of Par-
liament would be binding on her husband.58 The ecclesiastical courts
had no power to order custody of the children be given to the mother;
she would need to bring a separate suit in Chancery for custody,
though she would most definitely lose unless the father was shown to
pose a danger to a child's life and limb.59 Violence to the wife, even
life-threatening violence, would not justify removal of children from
their father if there was no evidence that he had visited such violence
on the children. 60 A legally separated wife had limited control over
money she acquired after the separation, and no control over any
property brought to the marriage, which had vested in her husband
on the date of marriage. 61 And the ecclesiastical courts had no power
to modify or adjust the property rights of the parties upon separation.
A husband or wife who could not afford the fees and costs of
these legal remedies, or eschewed the public nature of such proceed-
ings, could opt instead for a private separation agreement to settle
their conjugal disputes.62 In such an instance, the husband, and trust-
ees on behalf of the wife, would enter into a contract which would
56. SeeWestmeath v. Westmeath, 162 Eng. Rep. 987, 1010 (1829). See also STONE,
BROKEN LIVEs, supra note 52, at 284-346.
57. Peers were members of the House of Lords who, by virtue of their titles, were
not subject to orders of the regular courts, much as foreign diplomats today are ex-
empt from legal process in United States courts. Peers included dukes, marquis,
earls, viscounts, and barons.
58. See STONE, BROKEN LwES, supra note 52, at 331 (describing how enforcement
of the Westmeath alimony order led to the passage of the Ecclesiastical Court Powers
Act).
59. See Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36 (describing the development of the
law of inter-spousal custody and almost uniform denial of custody or access for wives
unless the father had endangered the children's lives or morals).
60. In re Fynn, 64 Eng. Rep. 205 (1848); Ex parte Bartlett, 63 Eng. Rep. 906
(1846). It even took excessive cruelty directed toward the children to cause the court
to intervene. See Blake v. Lord Wallscourt, 7 L.T.O.S. 545 (V.C. 1846).
61. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 54; SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE
PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833 (1990). The only control she had came from her
husband's choice not to exercise his legal rights to control her earnings. See PoovE',
supra note 5, at 65-67, 82. Caroline Norton's own stories are a classic example of a
husband's control over his wife's earnings and the length of her efforts to restrain
him. See CAROLINE NORTON, A LETTER TO THE *QUEEN ON LORD CHANCELLOR CRAN-
WORTH'S MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE BILL 9 (3d ed., London, Longman et al. 1855) [here-
inafter NORTON, A LETrER TO THE QUEEN]; CAROLINE NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS FOR
WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (London, 1854) [hereinafter NORTON, ENGLISH
LAws].
62. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 149-82. Many also eschewed
legal forms altogether and engaged in informal wife sales, committed bigamy, or de-
serted to the colonies. See generally RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY
OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 279-313 (1988); E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COM-
MON (1991).
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usually provide that each party could live separate and apart from the
other; that neither would bring a restitution of conjugal rights action
or otherwise annoy the other; and that the husband would be free of
liability for his wife's debts.63 This last was usually in exchange for
alimony amounting to one-third of his income, payable to the trustees
and not directly to his wife.64 Neither could remarry and courts would
not enforce custody provisions that placed the children with the
wife. 65 The husband could claim all earnings or property his wife ac-
quired after the separation, and any lawsuit by a creditor would have
to be filed against the husband or the wife's trustees, because the wife
had no legal right to bind herself in debt.66 A wife who had begun
her own business generally could not sue to collect debts owed to her,
nor could she sue on her own behalf for slander or libel. 67 For most
of the early nineteenth century, any contractual provisions that dero-
gated from a husband's common-law rights were unenforceable. For
example, a promise by a husband that the children would be raised in
a particular religion was unenforceable. 68
The courts generally enforced private separation agreements only
to the extent they replicated the results that could be achieved by a
legal separation. 69 Separations often left the parties worse off than
either married or divorced couples. 70 The parties were still legally
married and their rights and duties continued unchanged as though
63. In re Besant, 11 Ch. D. 508 (1878); Vansittart v. Vansittart, 70 Eng. Rep. 26
(Ch. App. 1858); Westmeath v. Westmeath, 37 Eng. Rep. 797 (1821). See also STONE,
ROAD TO DiVORCE, supra note 6, at 149-82.
64. See STONE, RoAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 149-82.
65. See In re Besant, 11 Ch. D. 508 (1878); Vansittart, 70 Eng. Rep. at 26.
66. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 160-61.
67. There was some limited right by custom of wives who owned their own busi-
nesses and resided in London to sue for business contracts. See BAKER, supra note 8, at
484; Beard v. Webb, 126 Eng. Rep. 1175 (Ex. Ch. 1800). See also Richard Chused,
Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1388 & nn.129-31 (1983).
Slander and libel were also important issues because many women were accused by
their husbands of having committed adultery in criminal conversation actions against
their purported seducers. If the suit failed, the wife would have no way to clear her
besmirched reputation. Both Caroline Norton and Emily Westmeath protested the
state of this law in their pamphlets. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note
61, at 77; NORTON, ENGLISH LAws, supra note 61, at 55; EMILY WESTMEATH, A NARRA-
TIVE OF THE CASE OF THE MARCHIONESS OF WESTMEATH 122-28 (London, Ridgway
1857).
68. Re Agar Ellis, 39 L.T.R. 380 (1878).
69. Vansittart, 70 Eng. Rep. at 26; Westmeath, 37 Eng. Rep. at 797. Susan Staves
has written of the evolving nature of the private separation deeds, from more relaxed
and contractual in the eighteenth century to highly rigid in the nineteenth century.
Susan Staves, Separate Maintenance Contracts, EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE, May 1987, at
78. It may have been that the eighteenth-century courts would enforce custody provi-
sions in private separation deeds but there is little case law to that effect. See Tammy
Moore, Common Sense and Common Practice, Custody Provisions in Deeds of Sepa-
ration: England 1705-1873 (2002) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of New Brunswick)
(on file with author). See also Guth v. Guth, 29 Eng. Rep. 729 (1792).
70. STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 181-82.
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they were a fully functioning family, but by living apart they had two
households to support. The wife often could not obtain credit to pro-
vide herself with necessaries, and acrimony prevented alimony or cus-
tody from operating smoothly. Wives also had to sign deeds to release
their dower rights in land and husbands had to enter into contracts
on their wives' behalf, thus prolonging the contact and the legal
relationship. 71
To say that the law of divorce was inequitable and gender biased
is an understatement. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, both women and men criticized the law, though for different
reasons. Many evangelicals thought divorce was a sign of modem de-
cadence-the failure to live up to the God-fearing, upright, and virtu-
ous dictates of Christian morality. 72 They thought divorces should
never be allowed because of the weaknesses they would impose in the
social fabric. 73 Some evangelicals argued that the wife was nearly as
great a sinner as an adulterous husband, and the clergy felt that
neither should be rewarded by a divorce.7 4 Clerics preached in the
pulpit and articulated to the judiciary that both men and women were
to restrain their sexual appetites. 75 On the other hand, progressives
believed that the way to circumvent the sexual double standard was to
provide wives equal rights to a divorce, even if that meant possibly
allowing collusion and contributing to the "divorce epidemic." 76 Di-
71. This type of post-separation contact was, and continues to be, cited by many
husbands as a reason for refusing to pay child support; contact with the ex-wife often
arouses feelings of anger and resentment that does not allow the parties to move
toward more amicable relations. See Carol Smart, Marriage, Divorce, and Women's Eco-
nomic Dependency: A Discussion of the Politics of Private Maintenance, in THE STATE, THE
lAW, AND THE FAMvILY CRITICAL PERSPEcrIVES, supra note 35, at 9-24. Caroline Norton
spends the vast majority of all of her pamphlets complaining about the interpersonal
animosity that is encouraged by the unjust laws. See infra note 187.
72. HORSTmAN, supra note 1, at 21.
73. 144 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1704-07; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856)
1981-82; 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 232.
74. They often believed that the wife was at fault for the husband's lapse. See 139
PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1837) 1091 (regarding the Custody of Infants Act); 144 PARt.
DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1715 (regarding the Divorce Act of 1857); Edwin Hill Handley,
Custody ofInfants'Bill, 7 BRIT. & FOREIGN Rv. 269, 296 (1838) (envisioning that wives
who are deceitful and want to separate will act innocent and blame their marital trou-
bles on husbands' false tyranny).
75. HoRsTmAN, supra note 1, at 51.
76. Equal rights were advocated by HARRIET TAYLOR MILL & JOHN STUART MILL,
ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN & THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Virago Press 1983)
(1869), and progressive Lords Lyndhurst, 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 408-18, and
Brougham, 142 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 419-23. Members of Parliament, espe-
cially Lord Chancellor Cranworth, believed that the court would sit idle much of its
tine for lack of business, and that the pre-Act rate of four to five cases per year would
increase perhaps to as high as eighteen to twenty per year. 142 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 404. When the first year saw 340 petitions for divorce and judicial separations,
people were stunned. See HoRrsMAN, supra note 1, at 85.
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vorce at the very least, and equal divorce at best, would allow married
women a modicum of legal agency in their lives.77
Critics of the law addressed perceived injustices at many levels of
daily existence. Women who were deserted wanted their property
protected from deserting husbands who might return and raid their
savings. Husbands wanted to be free of the debts of adulterous wives,
and wanted to remarry, especially if there had been no children of the
first marriage. Poor men wanted the same right to divorce and re-
marry as wealthy men. Creditors wanted to be able to attach the assets
of working women to whom they had extended credit without the
property being snatched from under them. Wives wanted to get free
of husbands who were unfaithful, who infected them with venereal
disease, who were violent, or who had deserted them. Mothers
wanted the custody of their children to be protected, especially when
their husbands were at fault for the marital breakdown. Wives wanted
the property they brought to the marriage to be returned to them
upon the breakdown of the marriage. Fathers wanted to protect prop-
erty that would be inherited by their daughters from spendthrift sons-
in-law without having to use the trust mechanisms established by the
equity courts. 78 In other words, the parties wanted a way to renegoti-
ate the legal system of coverture, which merged the legal identities of
husband and wife into a single person: the husband. Coverture gave
husbands control over all the property their wives brought to the mar-
riage, made them liable for all debts, gave them near-absolute rights
to custody of the children, made them the representative of the
couple in court, and allowed husbands to commit adultery with
impunity.79
Coverture, however, was a firmly entrenched doctrine in the
nineteenth-century Anglo-American legal system. As Blackstone sum-
marized it:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she per-
forms every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-
77. NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61, at 59; SHANLEY, supra note
19, at 43-44.
78. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Chancery developed a process
of allowing property to be settled in trust, with unrelated male trustees, for the benefit
of women soon to be married. This allowed women to remain economically indepen-
dent and prevented estates from falling in the hands of spendthrift sons-in-law. See
GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33, at 14; STAVES, supra note 61.
79. De Montmorency, supra note 9. Although the law of coverture did not ex-
pressly allow husbands the legal right to commit adultery, a wife's complete lack of
power meant she had very little ability to demand that her husband alter his behavior
in any way. Unless he was physically violent and she could charge him with breach of
the peace, however domineering and tyrannical he was, he feared no legal
repercussions.
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covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covert baron, or under the
protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and
her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this
principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend al-
most all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them
acquire by the marriage.
8 0
Under coverture, wives' legal identities were merged in that of their
husbands. They could not own their own property, collect their own
wages, sue or be sued, enter into contracts, write wills, have custody of
their own children, or be prosecuted for certain crimes. 81 At its heart,
coverture was centered in the private family but it radiated into the
public sphere by denying married women any public legal existence.8 2
Like minors, lunatics, and idiots, married women were incapable of
making legally binding decisions, except of course the ultimate deci-
80. BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at ch. xv, at iii. A feme-covert was, literally, a wo-
man who was "covered" by her husband under the law. She was to be distinguished
from a feme-sole who, as an unmarried woman, had many of the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities of men. She could not vote, attend many educational institutions, or
engage in numerous professions, but afeme-sole could own property, make a will, enter
into contracts, have custody of her illegitimate children, and sue in her own name.
Id. See also A TREATISE OF FEME COVERT: OF THE LADY'S LAW (reprint 1978) (1732).
Many women who married and became covered found that being stripped of their
property and legal existence was profoundly upsetting. The doctrine of coverture
made a certain amount of sense in that it treated the marital couple as a single entity,
a legal fiction the law continues to enforce with such doctrines as the tenancy by the
entirety and spousal immunity against testifying against one's spouse. The criticisms
of coverture, however, are legion. By assuming a model of a breadwinner husband
and a domestic wife, coverture did not protect the earnings of working women, made
it difficult for married women to own their own businesses, and did not allow couples
who wanted the wife to have legal independence to structure their marriages accord-
ingly. In many respects, our laws continue to reflect the ideal represented by cover-
ture in a functional family, where the property is commingled marital property and
the couple, as an entity, functions like a business partnership. But today's laws on
family custody and property have attempted to remove the bias in favor of the hus-
band and promote marketability of property, while leaving adequate protections for
spouses through intestacy and elective share laws, as well as equitable distribution and
best interests custody standards. For an excellent bibliography of scholarship on cov-
erture, see Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A
Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAw LIBR. J. 459 (2002).
81. BLAcKsTONE, sup-a note 44, at ch. xv.
82. It is important to realize the disjuncture between the law that gave married
women no legal rights in the public sphere and the reality of most wives' lives, which
was that they did operate, sometimes significantly, in public. By custom, in London
married wives who owned certain types of businesses could enter into contracts and
use the legal system to protect their business interests. See Beard v. Webb, 126 Eng.
Rep 1175 (Ex. Ch. 1800); BAKER, supra note 8, at 484. Other women, in England and
the United States, were attorneys, ran businesses, owned property, made deals on be-
half of their husbands, negotiated with their own publishers, and the like. But when
business deals fell into dispute, these women needed a male figurehead to bring suit
on their behalf. For a traditional study on married women working outside the home,
see TILLY & ScorT, supra note 37. And for the subtle ways in which married wives
functioned quite well in the U.S. under coverture, see HARTOG, supra note 37.
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sion they made to strip themselves of all legal rights when they de-
cided to marry.8 3
The law of coverture may have made a certain amount of sense in
a world that was primarily agricultural, in which the majority of prop-
erty consisted of land and household furnishings, and in which mar-
riage was primarily a commingling of family patrimonies.84 But by the
beginning of the nineteenth century, England was no longer a
predominantly rural economy, and many husbands and wives had ac-
cepted the romantic ideal of companionate marriage. 85 This meant
that for most couples, a partnership of property interests was not the
foremost motive for their marriage. The legal system, however, was
still dominated by the interests of landed property holders.86 The law
of baron and feme had not changed significantly since the medieval pe-
riod. Those changes that had occurred were principally grounded in
the relationship between the individual family head (the husband)
and the state.8 7 Thus, certain Interregnum laws designed to restrict
83. There was significant philosophical debate over whether or not a sixteen-
year-old woman should be able to enter into a marriage contract that would be bind-
ing for the duration of her life, and would disempower her ability to make any future
contracts. In other words, could she bind herself to a status that precluded any future
legal contract rights? CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 154-88 (1988).
84. English seventeenth and early eighteenth-century life was primarily rural ag-
ricultural, with extended families living together under a single roof, and architec-
tural styles that reflected rural over urban lifestyles. During the eighteenth century,
manufacturing and industrial centers were growing, and by the end of the century,
egalitarian revolutionary ideas were challenging the aristocratic basis of natural law.
See Peter Laslett, Mean Household Size in England Since the Sixteenth Century, in HousE-
HOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME 125 (Peter Laslett ed., 1972); SHANLEY, supra note 19,
at 6-7; LAWRENCE STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 (1977)
[hereinafter STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE]; Richard Wall, Mean Household Size in
England from Printed Sources, in HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY IN PAST TIME, supra at 159.
85. See STEPHEN PARKER, INFORMAL MARRIAGE, COHABITATION, AND THE LAW, 1750-
1989 (1990); STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 84, at 325-36. See also ALAN
MACFARIANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND So-
clAL TRANSITION (1978).
86. However, eighteenth-century reforms in commercial law, especially those led
by Justice Mansfield, had made law reform in some areas an acceptable enterprise. See
generally DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1989).
87. See discussions in 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MArTAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 400-47 (2d ed. reprint
1952) (1899) and 6 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 606-07 n.15 (2d
ed. reprint 1966) (1914), regarding the relative continuity in the law of baron and feme
over 700 years. See also Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36, at 271-73 (discussing the
different ways the law treated inter-spousal child custody disputes and the importance
of the Interregnum years (1646-1680) for restructuring the relationship between fa-
thers and the state without concern for the rights of mothers). The Abolition of Ten-
ures Act, 12 Car. II, c. 24, § VII (1646, reaffd 1660), for instance, gave fathers the right
to appoint testamentary guardians over their children, to the complete exclusion of
mothers. This was a deviation from the medieval guardianship rules that gave or-
phaned children to their mothers if they inherited land in socage tenure or to their
overlords if they inherited land in military tenure. See Sara Abramowicz, English Child
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 233 2004
WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
the King's power had expanded the power of the father in family af-
fairs, further exacerbating the inequalities between husbands and
wives created by coverture.8 8 With industrialization, shifts of popula-
tion to urban centers, the rise of the ideal of domesticity, the move to
wage labor, and the growth of the middle class, marriage and children
began to function for many English families in ways not compatible
with the medieval law of baron andfeme.89 Change was inevitable, and
the family the logical locus of that change.
IV. MID-CENTURY IDEOLOGY. FROM COVERTURE TO FAMILY LAW IN
THE SHADOW OF SEPARATE SPHERES
Law reform does not occur in a vacuum. It is a result of changing
attitudes toward the law itself, and changing views of the appropriate
interplay of law and social norms, as well as new beliefs about human
nature. The mid-century adoption of civil divorce occurred in a con-
text of changing family structure due to urbanization and industriali-
zation, conflicts over changes in women's roles, a political backdrop of
liberal individualism, and a middle-class ideology of separate
spheres.90 The role of law in creating the mid-Victorian culture of
domesticity was a topic of some debate in the literature of the day.91
And the interplay of law and culture is critical to understanding the
goals and outcomes of the reform. Separate spheres ideology was the
prevailing backdrop of the reform, and the law of coverture helped
construct and maintain that divide.
However, in the end, law changed and separate spheres did not.
Even though the 1857 judicial changes were mindful of separate
spheres, the legal reform did not endanger the well-accepted ideol-
ogy. The paradox is that the reform legacy was to ultimately reinforce
separate spheres and women's subordination despite the attempts of
some progressive reformers and the hopes and fears of some
lawmakers that the reform would challenge the ubiquity of coverture
and separate spheres.
Separate spheres is a social construct that genders Anglo-Ameri-
can space into a male-dominated public sphere and a female-oriented
Custody Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1344 (1999).
88. See Abramowicz, supra note 87.
89. See DAvioDFF & HALL, supra note 52, at 321-56; ToSH, supra note 52, at 1-50.
90. Separate spheres was simply a prevailing belief, that has yet to disappear, that
the proper sphere of women's activities was the home, while the proper sphere of
men's activities was the public marketplace.
91. See generally NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS, supra note 61; NORTON, A LETrER TO
THE QUEEN, supra note 61; BABARA LEIGH SMITH BODICHON, A BRIEF SUMMARY IN
PLAIN LANGUAGE, OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LAws CONCERNING WOMEN, TOGETHER
WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS THEREON (London, J. Chapman 1854); TAYLOR MILL &
STUART MILL, supra note 76; WESTMEATH, supra note 67.
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private sphere.9 2 Under separate spheres, women are identified with
their domestic abilities and their lives are constrained in a private
sphere regulated and policed by men. The nineteenth-century Anglo-
American social landscape has been viewed by many historians as the
most perfect manifestation of separate spheres ideology: an ideal that
logically indicated the rise of family law because a separate law of the
family reflected the naturalness and importance of the separate do-
mestic sphere-a domestic sphere comprised only of a husband, a
wife, and their natural children.93
The dominant historical narrative about the rise of the modem
family and its production in an insular, separate sphere centered
around women and children, attributes domesticity to industrializa-
tion and the capitalist marketplace. 94 In seventeenth-century, pre-in-
dustrial England, so the traditional history goes, men and women
married for business reasons, women and children were deemed the
property of their husbands and fathers, and childhood did not exist as
a separate stage of innocent learning. The household was a unit of
production, and the most likely composition of the household was an
extended family, with a variety of interconnected consanguineal and
affinal relationships. 95
By the mid-nineteenth century this model had been changed by
industrialization that moved the male breadwinner outside the home
and turned the household into a unit of consumption. Childhood,
especially among the growing middle class, was viewed as a special pe-
riod of innocence in which education and nurturance fell more and
more to the mother, both as a moral guide and spiritual teacher.
Family life became more companionate and conjugal while the home
became more private and nuclear. Women were more and more asso-
ciated with the private, domestic sphere as sex role differentiation be-
came greater. The law of coverture, which erased married women's
legal existence, reinforced the separation of the private world of wo-
men from the public world of men. 96
92. See generally ANN DALLY, INVENTING MOTHERHOOD: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN
IDEAL (1982); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BE-
SIEGED (1977); O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW, supra note 43; PoovEy, supra
note 5; SHANLEY, supra note 19; Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Wo-
men's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75J. AM. HIsT. 9 (1988); Barbara Laslett,
The Family as a Public and Private Institution: An Historical Perspective, 35 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 480 (1973).
93. See, e.g., DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 52.
94. See DEBRA FRIEDMAN, TOWARDS A STRUCTURE OF INDIFFERENCE: THE SOCIAL OR-
IGINS OF MATERNAL CUSTODY (1995); O'DONOVAN, FAMILY LAW MATTERS, supra note
35; PATEMAN, supra note 83; PoovEY, supra note 5; SHANLEY, supra note 19.
95. See PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SoCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY
LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1962); STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE,
supra note 84, at 4-9.
96. This dominant narrative is summarized in FRIEDMAN, supra note 94, at 37-51.
For histories and studies that contributed to this narrative, see ARIES, supra note 95;
J.A. BANKS & OLIVE BANKS, FEMINISM AND FAMILY PLANNING IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND
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Separate spheres in its most absolute form is a myth describing an
ideal Victorian society-women and children remaining at home and
men pursuing the tedious task of earning a living and representing
the family in all public affairs. Domesticity was an ideology of social
order that arose out of a particular social milieu, but it was backed by
legal force. Of course, as a myth it only partially described nine-
teenth-century English society, as many women stepped outside their
allotted sphere to labor, speak, or engage in the political life of the
day.97 Despite being a myth, separate spheres remains one of the
most powerful tropes of modern society, and it continues to describe
an ideal to which many Anglo-American couples ascribe.98 For wo-
men, it represents both a liberation from the cares of outside produc-
tion, as well as a limitation on their political agency and a narrowing
of their identities to their biological child-bearing and child-rearing
function. Separate spheres denies women public rights and a public
role by asserting the naturalness and limited scope of their domestic
abilities; it goes beyond a mere ordering of social relationships to
claim a biological appropriateness and necessity. The Victorian nu-
clear family was seen as the most natural form of intimate relations;
women were biologically identified with the family, and separate
spheres was the celebration of women's true natures as domestic
caregivers.
Separate spheres was not just a social ordering reflecting middle-
class values; it was a legal ordering as well. The law of coverture was
critical in creating and maintaining separate spheres. The legal barri-
ers married women faced in functioning in the public sphere leant
credence to the ideology of separate spheres. Unmarried women who
retained their legal status in the public world were seen as problem-
atic to the social order and quickly labeled "redundant women."99
(1964); CHILD CUSTODY AND THE POLITICS OF GENDER (Carol Smart & Selma
Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989); GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33; MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN 19TH-CENTuRY AMERICA (G. Edward
White ed., 1985); THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD (Lloyd DeMause ed., 1974); MAID-
MENT, supra note 43; EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1975);
STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 84; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra
note 6; Jamil Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 1038 (1979).
97. Histories too numerous to cite discuss women who were writers, who were
politically active, and who were employed outside the household. See, e.g., MARTHA
VICINUS, INDEPENDENT WOMEN: WORK AND COMMUNITY FOR SINGLE WOMEN, 1850-1920
(Catharine R. Stimpson ed., 1985).
98. It is even alive and well in the feminist movement with the work of Carol
Gilligan, In a Different Voice, and the countless works that build off her thesis of men
and women's different moral development that correspond to women's domestic
characters and men's political ones. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
99. SUFFER AND BE STILL: WOMEN IN THE VICTORIAN AGE (Martha Vicinus ed.,
1972). There has been a tremendous amount of work done by women's historians
about their role in the social and cultural events of the Victorian period. Some of the
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Women were to marry as soon as possible and re-enter the purely pri-
vate realm. Coverture reinforced a circular logic that asserted women
belonged in the home because they had no legal power outside that
realm, and women were given no legal power because no one believed
they wanted or needed to leave their safe domestic havens. The laws
of coverture were both a product of, and a contributor to, the erasure
of women in the public sphere. Once a woman married she was to
leave the protection and home of her father for that of her husband,
with no tarrying in the outside, public world. Her lack of legal rights
in the public sphere, supposedly corresponding to her natural infirmi-
ties, ensured that she remained firmly in her proper place-at home.
Legal as well as social sanctions attached to those women who rejected
separate spheres. 100
The logic of separate spheres implied that women did not need
public power because they truly were passive, timid, powerless crea-
tures who required the leadership of their head and lord. The law of
coverture simply reflected the natural order. It did not create it. It
was assumed that if women were truly masters of their own domestic
domain, then coverture did not deny women any power they needed
because coverture concerned the public world of men and law, and
not the private world of women's domesticity.
Yet even critics as early as the eighteenth century viewed the law
of coverture as institutionalizing and reproducing the powerlessness
and passivity it supposedly reflected to keep women in the home.10'
Although the laws of coverture were directly aimed at women's power
in the public sphere, those legal disabilities inevitably translated into
more foundational works include DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 52; GILUS, supra note
37; DEBORAH GoR1,IAM, THE VICToRLAN GIRL AND THE FEMININE IDEAL (Indiana Univ.
Press 1982); HOLCOMBE, supra note 54; MARGARET R. HUNT, THE MmDtING SORT:
COMMERCE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY IN ENGLAND, 1680-1870 (1996); KARL IrmANN,
WoRK, GENDER, AND FAMILY IN VicroRIAN ENGLAND (New York Univ. Press 1995);
MACFARLANE, MARRIAGE AND LOVE IN ENGLAND: MODES OF REPRODUCTION 1300-1840
(1986); Poovrx, supra note 5; SHANLEY, supra note 19; STONE, BROKEN LIVES, supra
note 52; TosH, supra note 52; Margot Finn, Women, Consumption and Coverture in En-
gland, c. 1760-1860, 39 THE HisTovicAIJ. 703 (1996).
100. For example, see Caroline Norton's narrative in which she details all the
ways her husband used legal means to frustrate her attempts at independence, NOR-
TON, ENGLISH LAws, supra note 61, and the case studies detailed by STONE, BROKEN
LIVES, supra note 52. See also ReAgar-Ellis, 50 L.T.R. 161 (1884); In re Besant, 11 Ch.
D. 508 (1878); Vansittart, 70 Eng. Rep. at 26.
101. SeeANON., THE HARDSHIPS OF THE ENGLISH LAWS IN RELATION TO WIVES WITH
AN EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGINAL CURSE OF SUBJECTION PASSED UPON THE WOMAN
(London, J. Roberts 1735). Similarly, Katherine O'Donovan has written that
structures outside the family fundamentally affect what happens in private.
One sphere is not, and cannot be, insulated from the other;... "[W] hile the
exclusion of women from the public sphere does not cause, but logically
entails, their confinement in the domestic sphere, this confinement has con-
sequences for the behaviour of males in the domestic sphere which, in turn,
affects their behaviour in the public sphere."
O'DoNoVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW, supra note 43, at 133.
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similar disabilities in the private sphere. 10 2 Despite the so-called natu-
ralness of women's separate domestic aptitudes, a woman had no legal
rights that could be asserted in her domestic world. She was like an
infant, a lunatic, or an imbecile, who had no will or agency of her
own. She owned no property, had no control over her wages, nor
could she make religious, educational, or medical decisions for her
children. 10 3 She lost her name, control over her domicile, and even
control over her own body. 10 4 To the extent the wife "governed" her
household, that power was firmly within the dictates set by her hus-
band. She could expect no legal assistance if her husband failed to
live up to his corresponding responsibilities: financial support and
protection from the perils of a dangerous age. If he drank or gam-
bled the family wages, deserted them, or led them toward ruin, there
was very little a wife could do.'0 5 Legal rights were the currency of the
public sphere, and women's absence from that sphere implied, under
102. Of course, a lot of research has been done on the upper and lower classes to
disprove the claim of women's absence from the public sphere. See, e.g., LEONORE
DAVIDOFF, WORLDS BETWEEN: HisToPcJAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND CLASS 151-79
(1995); KATHRYN GLEADLE, BRITISH WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001). Wo-
men functioned at all levels in informal ways, both in the drawing rooms and the
bedrooms of the powerful elite. GLEADLE, supra, at 71-78, 154-71. They also owned
shops, ran boarding houses, owned taverns, performed wage labor, and contributed
to their family's financial resources. Id. at 75-110. But except for a few laws, like the
custom in London of allowing women who owned their own shops to enter into con-
tracts, there were few legal protections to women's activities in the public sphere, and
many barriers. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 479-99; sources cited supra note 37.
103. But even as critics have decried the powerlessness of women, the reality of
most women's lives may not have been so bleak. Numerous studies show women en-
gaging actively in the public market, making critical decisions for their family, and
exercising control over their husbands and their property. See, e.g., DAVIDOFF, supra
note 102; GLEADLE, supra note 102. Their lack of legal power did not necessarily strip
women of all agency, at least when their husbands and male relations were reasonable
men. That very fact went a long way toward providing fodder against the reform
movement. Why, asked some lawmakers, should Parliament change the law to ad-
dress the needs of a few women when so many had no need of legal rights? 144 PARE.
DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1705. In the battle against their lords and masters, all women
were to be denied rights because most did not challenge their husband's authority.
104. One of the modern vestiges of coverture is that married women change
their names to that of their husbands. But it has only been in the last thirty years that
married women have been permitted to have a separate domicile from that of their
husbands. Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, c. 45, § 1(2) (Eng.).
Husbands were able to lock their wives in the home until the advent of stricter com-
mitment laws in the late nineteenth century. It has taken women reformers over a
century and a half to remove the incapacities of coverture, and each step has taken
tremendous work to persuade a predominantly male Parliament that coverture is in-
deed a medieval relic. See In re Cochrane, 8 Dowling's P.C. 630 (Q.B. 1840) (regarding
a husband's right to lock his wife up on his own authority); SHANLEY, supra note 19, at
156-88 (regarding a husband's right to his wife's body).
105. Some commentators have concluded that changes in the law of married
women's property were not motivated by a desire to give women more control, but to
keep the families of drunken, profligate men off social welfare. Giving women con-
trol over some property was a form of social insurance because it was believed, not
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the logic of separate spheres, that she did not need rights. But with-
out them, she had no power in the private sphere either.
Unlike the image of the Victorian family presented in novels and
domestic literature portraying men and women as equal masters of
their own separate domains, 10 6 women's disempowerment in the pub-
lic sphere was not accompanied by power in the domestic sphere, but
only, as Blackstone acknowledged, by her limited influence.10 7 A wo-
man's place in the home was always subordinate to her husband's
power to govern the family as lord and master.108
Moreover, separate spheres was a middle-class ideal. 10 9 The val-
ues of privacy of home, intellectual autonomy, individual rights and
freedoms, and political responsibility were exclusively male and
predominantly middle class. 110 They were premised on male author-
ity in the private sphere, accompanied by subservient acceptance of
male power by women, all in the name of social order and natural
law."' Women were "angels of the house" who made the home a do-
mestic "haven in a heartless world," a man's castle, a place where he
could be lord and master." 2
unreasonably, that women would use their money for the support of their family and
not drink or gamble it away. See Chused, supra note 67.
106. For example, in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, Mrs. Bennet is quite
clearly the authority in all matters domestic and Mr. Bennet simply withdraws into his
library, refusing to participate in the women's world of love and ritual. In novels by
Anthony Trollope and Charles Dickens it is usually the women who mastermind not
only the romantic affairs of the books, but also keep the servants in line and run a
functioning household. Consider David Copperfield, Bleak House, or Great Expectations
by Dickens, or Lady Anna or any of the Palliser novels by Trollope. The women have
firm control over the functions and concerns of the domestic sphere while men go
into Parliament, run successful law firms, or live the lives of aristocrats. It is usually
only in the working classes that one sees a blending of the public and private, as in
Pip's sister's family in Great Expectations where the sister is the hardened disciplinarian,
and Joe, her blacksmith husband, is the soft, gentle advisor. Elizabeth Gaskell's novel
Wives and Daughters is an excellent example of women's control of the private sphere.
In that novel the grandfather's attempts to oust his deceased son's new bride and
keep the grandson as part of the patrimony are slowly overcome by the behind-the-
scenes negotiating of the women of the neighborhood. The novel portrays a gradual
acceptance of the interconnectivity and relationship building of the women's world,
even in matters that have public import.
107. BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at ch. 16, §2, 441 (referring to married women's
power in the home as influence, not legal rights).
108. See PoovEY, supra note 5, at 79-80.
109. DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 52; O'DONOVAN, FAMILY LAW MATTERS, supra
note 35; Kerber, supra note 92.
110. See PATEmAN, supra note 83, at 75-115.
111. Id. See also FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY,
AND THE STATE (Alec West trans., Int'l Publishers 1972) (1884) (arguing that women's
subordination is necessary to the rise of capitalism).
112. See LASCH, supra note 92; Laslett, supra note 92. The Angel in the House was a
famous poem by Coventry Patmore that echoed the sentiments of separate spheres.
COVENTRY PATMORE, THE ANGEL IN THE HOUSE TOGETHER WITH THE VICTORIES OF
LoVE (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1905).
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Not surprisingly, numerous critics perceived a contradiction in
the idea of the home as a man's castle, where he reigns supreme, and
at the same time the sphere within which women's true natures and
domestic talents held sway. 113 If man was the lord, woman's agency
within that sphere was, as Caroline Norton said, little more than head
servant.1 4 It was certainly not her own co-equal domain in which she
ruled her household as men ruled the state. The laws of coverture
helped keep women's domestic interests subordinate to men's domes-
tic interests.
A few progressive writers, like Mary Wollstonecraft, had begun
criticizing the law of coverture as early as the late eighteenth century,
claiming that the absence of legal rights turned women into the pas-
sive, insipid creatures the law claimed them to be.115 But there was
little criticism of separate spheres until the twentieth century.1 16 Most
importantly, nineteenth-century advocates of legal reform believed
that coverture could be changed while leaving separate spheres in-
tact.117 Changing coverture could address blatant injustices in individ-
ual marriages while still permitting the separate spheres and
naturalized gender differences that were central to the idealized Vic-
torian family to operate.118 It was believed by many that changing
these laws-to protect women's rights to custody of their children,
ownership of their own wages and personal property, and the right to
divorce violent and adulterous husbands-would give them agency
that would in turn help them protect their naturalized and sacred du-
ties as child-rearers and domestic managers without challenging male
dominance in the public sphere. 119 Separate spheres would be
113. Probably the most famous critique was made by Harriet Taylor Mill and
John Stuart Mill. TAYLOR MILL & STUART MILL, supra note 76. However, Caroline
Norton, Barabara Leigh Smith Bodichon and Emily Westmeath also criticized the
idea that women were domestic queens, yet had no real power in the home. NORTON,
A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61; SMITH BODICHON, supra note 91; WESTMEATH,
supra note 67.
114. NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supa note 61, at 28 (referring to the
fiction of man and wife being one "when they are about as much 'one' as those inge-
nious twisted groups of animal death we sometimes see in sculpture; one creature
wild to resist, and the other fierce to destroy"). See also J.S. Mill, The Subjection of
Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 217 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (writing in 1869 that
"[t]here remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house").
115. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1975) (1792) [hereinafter WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF WOMAN]; MARY WOLLSTONECRAFTr, MARIA, OR THE WRONGS OF WOMAN
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1798) [hereinafter WOLLSTONECRAFr, MARIA, OR THE
WRONGS OF WOMAN].
116. See, e.g., VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (Harcourt 1929).
117. PoovEY, supra note 5, at 79-80.
118. NORTON, ENGLISH LAws, supra note 61; Anon., The "Non-Existence" of Women,
23 N. BRIT. REv. 536 (1855); T.H. Lister, The Rights and Condition of Women, 73 EDIN-
BURGH REv. 99 (1841).
119. Giving women some limited power was not believed to undermine separate
spheres and male power because of women's greater passivity and reluctance to exer-
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strengthened by breaking down coverture because women would then
have power within their own domain to make their world truly auton-
omous and equal to that of men. 120 Ultimately, it was hoped by some
lawmakers, conservatives, and even a few women reformers that power
in the domestic realm would render unnecessary the yielding of
power in the public realm. 121
Legal challenges to coverture began in 1839 with the passage of
the Custody of Infants Act.122 That Act allowed married women to sue
their husbands for custody of or access to their children, even though
the law treated husbands and wives as a single legal entity. 123 The Act
was precipitated by a series of custody disputes between wives and hus-
bands in which the courts dismissed the actions on the ground that
wives under coverture could not sue their husbands; it would be like a
husband suing himself.124 Even after wives learned to get an ecclesias-
tical separation before petitioning for custody, the Chancery was noto-
riously unsympathetic to interspousal custody disputes precisely
because they pitted the husband against the wife, threatening the pre-
carious balance of separate spheres and male domination over chil-
dren. 125 The 1839 Act simply allowed wives the right to enter the
courthouse; it did not grant them any rights to their children.' 26 But,
significantly, it was one of the first pieces of legislation to recognize
that married women needed the legal right to challenge their hus-
cise those rights. See 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 502; Wright, The Crisis of Child
Custody, supra note 19, at 216-20.
120. While there was great consensus on abolishing certain aspects of coverture
and giving wives some legal identity, there was great disagreement on what would be
accomplished by doing so and the extent the reform should take. For instance, all
the legislators agreed that a wife who was abused should have the legal fight and
social autonomy to separate herself from her husband. But this consensus lay only for
families already disrupted by violence or adultery. HoRsTMAN, supra note 1, at 80-84.
Most reformers of the nineteenth century believed that the laws of coverture could be
changed and the legal inequalities eliminated, while still allowing and/or expecting
women to function in a predominantly domestic sphere because the reform would
not operate in functional marriages, only in dysfunctional ones, and those would be
few in number. A few critics, however, sensed that destruction of the legal incapaci-
ties faced by women would result inevitably in their gradually gaining equality. SHAN-
LEY, supra note 19, at 15. Although reformers did not envision the wholesale
destruction of marriage law, they did intend to do away with the legal support that the
rules of coverture gave to patriarchal authority in the home. In many respects the
feminists and their strongest opponents understood one another better than the fem-
inists and their parliamentary allies did, for feminists and their opponents debated
the issue of domestic authority head-on, while many of the feminists' friends in Parlia-
ment avoided that issue. Id.
121. See, e.g., 145 PAre. DEn. (3d ser.) (1857) 800; SHANtEv, supra note 19, at 47.
122. 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54 (1839) (Eng.).
123. Id.
124. See De Manneville v. De Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804).
125. See Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody,
supra note 19.
126. 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54 (1839) (Eng.).
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bands in order to maintain the safety and welfare of themselves and
their children within their allotted sphere.
When the 1839 Act proved of little assistance to wives who were in
deteriorating marriages, especially marriages fraught with adultery or
violence, the need for more extensive legal reforms became clear. 127
From 1840 to 1850 there was a constant debate about the inability of
wives to control abusive husbands or protect themselves or their fami-
lies. 128 Legal disabilities took center stage in the critiques by progres-
sive feminists even though the appropriateness of women's domestic
limitations was fully accepted. 129 Within separate spheres, women like
Caroline Norton and Emily Westmeath advocated for narrow legal
changes to a wife's position in the family because the family was
deemed to be her appropriate sphere.130
The focus of upper- and middle-class reformers was logically the
family because it represented the middle-class ideal of women's social
position. 131 These early reformers were not yet interested in the
wages of working-class women, work conditions, access to jobs, or ade-
quate housing. In the early 1850s it was only the radical fringe of the
women's movement that advocated for public sphere reforms like
control of wages or the vote.132 Most feminists advocated primarily for
changes in coverture because coverture affected women's natural
place in the order of things. 133 The reform focused on the family
because that was the realm of the middle-class wife. As the century
progressed we began to see far more critical discussions of the issues
of working-class women, like temperance and wages, as well as non-
127. See Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody,
supra note 19.
128. See Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody,
supra note 19.
129. See Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody,
supra note 19.
130. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61, at 129, 146-51; WEST-
MEATH, supra note 67, at 118.
131. See, e.g., HOLCOMBE, supra note 54; S-A'lEv, supra note 19; STONE, FAMILY,
SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 84.
132. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon wrote numerous political pamphlets. SMITH
BODICHON, AUTHORITIES AND PRECEDENTS FOR GIVING THE SUFFRAGE TO QUALIFIED WO-
MEN (1867); SMITH BODICHON, BRIEF SUMM.ARV (1854) (focusing on coverture); SMITH
BODICHON, OF THOSE WHO ARE THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS, AND OF THE GREAT POWER
THAT HOLDS OTHERS AS PROPERTY (1863) (focusing on slavery); SMITH BODICHON, WO-
MEN AND WORK (1857). Smith Bodichon was one of the more radical feminists of the
mid-nineteenth century to ultimately prevail, though not until she and other reform-
ers of the Langham Place Group had persuaded public opinion in their direction.
For reproductions of Smith Bodichon's major writings as well as those of many of her
radical peers, see BARBARA LEIGH SMITH BODICHON AND THE LANGHAM PLACE GROUP
(Candida Ann Lacey ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE LANGHAM PLACE GROUP].
133. Caroline Norton and Emily Westmeath focused on reforms of coverture,
while even the more radical members of the Langham Place Group wrote about cov-
erture as part of their wider reform efforts. THE LANGHAM PLACE GROUP, supra note
132.
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family-based issues like suffrage.13 4 But in the 1840s and 1850s, legal
critiques were most often based in the family, and the acceptance of
separate spheres made the creation of family law a logical answer to
the disabilities and unfairness of coverture.'3 5 But with the new family
law, as wives were given a modicum of legal rights, those rights would
be institutionally constrained within the legal equivalent of the private
sphere-a domestic relations court.
V. MID-CENTURY LEGAL REFORM: THE PROMISE OF FAMILY LAW
It came as no surprise to the public when Parliament, in 1850,
ordered a law commission to investigate the legal aspects of divorce
and make recommendations for change.1 36 Most everyone disap-
proved of the law in some way or other, though they did not generally
agree about the solution. There were those who felt that divorce had
become a remedy only for the aristocracy and that such class-based
inequity was unfair.137 Others felt that England had become the
laughing stock of European countries because it still retained the dis-
reputable criminal conversation action. 138 Progressive men and wo-
men disagreed with the gender-specific distinctions in the law, while
some evangelicals disapproved of the availability of divorce alto-
gether.139 The majority of the population apparently agreed with the
law treating male and female adultery differently, but there was wide
divergence as to how the law should best create disincentives to sepa-
ration and adultery. 140 The British generally decried the prohibitive
cost of divorce and sought measures to make it unattractive.14 1
When Parliament finally ordered an investigation into the state of
the law in 1850,142 it was, as such institutions often are, behind the
times. Editorials and commentaries blasted the divorce laws.1 43
There had already been a decade of harsh criticism in the periodical
literature that had addressed questions of divorce, adultery, women's
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., HOLCOMBE, supra note 54; SHANLEY, supra note 19; STONE, ROAD TO
DIVORCE, supra note 6;.
136. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY HER MAJESTY TO EN-
QUIRE INTO THE LAW OF DIVORCE, AND MORE PARTICULARLY INTO THE MODE OF OB-
TAINING DIVORCES A VINCULO MATRIMONII, reprinted in 1 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS - MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (Irish Univ. Press 1969) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT
OF THE COMMISSIONERS]; PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 418.
137. See infra Part V(D) on class.
138. See 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 912-30; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856)
1970.
139. See infra Part V(A) on divorce and the sexual double standard.
140. Id.
141. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 986-88.
142. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 136, at 1-2.
143. See HoRSTMAN, supra note 1, at 70-75; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 29-35;
PoovEy, supra note 5, at 54.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 243 2004
WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
rights, and law reform. 144 And much of the progressive commentary
directly tied issues of divorce to the law of coverture. 145
A historical review of the timeline that created legal reform will
be of aid in comparing the legal regulation of the family through cov-
erture before 1858, with the ostensibly liberal changes that the courts
mandated. Between the mid-1840s and the creation of the new court
in 1858, a steady dialogue existed in political pamphlets and journals,
Parliamentary debates, and even novels focused on four principal ar-
eas of law: divorce, custody of children, property rights of married
women, and access to divorce for lower-middle-class and working-class
couples. While the first three areas directly affected issues central to
the legal doctrine of coverture, even the fourth area of class was
linked to control over property and the need for married women to
work outside the home. Even though coverture may not have been
mentioned frequently by name in the literature, criticism focused on
married women's legal disabilities more than on accepted social disa-
bilities that resulted from women's relegation to the domestic sphere.
The majority of people believed women were inherently inferior
to men, fundamentally different, and properly belonged in the do-
mestic sphere.1 46 At the same time, the majority of critics believed
women could acquire some limited legal rights to divorce and child
custody without jeopardizing the social order of a coercive patri-
archy.147 In analyzing the panoply of critiques around these four prin-
cipal areas of law, we inevitably find ourselves embedded in a complex
discourse about gender differences and the appropriate role of law in
monitoring intimate behavior.
A. Divorce
Complaints about divorce reform focused on the inequities of
coverture and the sexual double standard. Reform critics and legisla-
tors went back and forth on whether women should have the same
rights to a divorce as men, primarily wondering whether adultery
meant the same thing for husbands as for wives. 148 The Church advo-
cated a blanket denial of divorce to all people because it believed mar-
144. See HoRSTMAN, supra note 1, at 70-75; POOVEY, supra note 5, at 54; SHANLEY,
supra note 19, at 29-35.
145. See HORSTMAN, supra note 1, at 70-75; PoovEy, supra note 5, at 54; SHANLEY,
supra note 19, at 29-35.
146. PoovEY, supra note 5, at 69. Harriet Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill's En-
franchisement of Women & The Subjection of Women, was a late entrant into the debate
and took a stand of absolute equality that was quite novel for the time. TAYLOR MILL
& STUART MILL, supra note 76.
147. See infra Parts VI(A) and VI(B) and accompanying notes.
148. See, e.g., 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 502; 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 236. One commentator claimed that
the notorious fact of the general incontinence of men before marriage, di-
minishes the horror with which subsequent infidelities are regarded, and
therefore the amount of injury inflicted upon the wife. The desecration in
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riage was a sacrament. 149 If divorce were to exist, there were two
positions reformers would take: equal rights to divorce or unequal
rights to divorce. The minority view was that husbands and wives
should have the same rights to divorce on the same grounds, includ-
ing simple adultery by either spouse, as was the law in Scotland and
France.150 This was strongly advocated by Lord Brougham who found
"repugnant" the "practice of refusing ... a remedy to one party and
granting it to the other.. . ."151 But the majority believed that hus-
bands should have an easier time getting a divorce for adultery be-
cause adultery by wives was deemed a more egregious crime than
adultery by husbands. 152 Those who advocated equal treatment of
adultery, however, generally agreed that adultery by wives was a worse
sin than adultery by husbands.'53 But given wives' disempowerment,
many thought the legal rules should be equalized on grounds of eq-
uity and fairness as well as on the practical consideration that men's
"unaggravated" adultery 154 could be so frequent as to become intoler-
able for middle-class wives. 155
A minority of reformers, including some evangelicals and dissent-
ers, argued that adultery by husbands was just as egregious a marital
one case seems less than in the other. The offence of the wife changes pu-
rity into impurity; the offence of the husband makes impurity more impure.
Anon., supra note 118, at 541. George Miller considered differential treatment for
adultery perfectly reasonable if the only concern of the law was the transmission of
property. George Miller, Considerations on the Law of Divorce, 26 BLAcKWOODs EDIN-
BURGH MAC. 756 (1829). Since the law was concerned with more than the transmis-
sion of property, he advocated adoption of the Scottish rule on equal rights to
divorce. Id.
149. See, e.g., 146 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 204, 210; 143 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 237.
150. 142 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 418.
151. 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 419.
152. 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 813-14.
153. 145 PAL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 490; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 42.
154. 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 419-22. It seems odd to think of adultery as
being aggravated. But infidelity accompanied by another offense, which could be
discreet and relatively unoffending, like a one-time incestuous affair with a sister-in-
law, would be deemed aggravated. In contrast, chronic adultery or scandalous infidel-
ity over a long period would not constitute aggravated adultery and not give rise to
the right to a divorce.
155. Numerous members of the Parliament believed the law should be equal-
ized, though it was most strongly expressed by Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords
and Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Drummond in the House of Commons. See 147 PARL.
DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1268, 1272; 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 501; 142 PARL. DEB.
(3d ser.) (1856) 411-12, 419. But see 147 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1647, 1647-48,
in which the Attorney General claimed that making the law equal would require a
wife to seek out and serve process on their husband's mistress, which would be too
costly and difficult to do-especially, for instance, if the mistress was also married, in
which case service would presumably have to be on her husband. There was an inter-
esting toleration of adultery, especially among the upper classes, where a different
legal rule might create an incentive to disclose the secrets that kept the upper-class
home away from state oversight.
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fault as adultery by wives because it brought the possibility of venereal
disease and moral pollution into the sanctity of the home.1 56 Progres-
sive feminists agreed, and found themselves in a curious coalition with
conservative fundamentalists who strongly advocated the preservation
of coverture while encouraging sexual purity and intolerance of any
infidelity. 157 However, in the mid-1850s, this coalition had not yet
evolved into the powerful temperance societies that would dominate
feminist reform in the 1880s.158 Hence, most reformers of the period,
both male and female, and even those advocating equal grounds for
divorce, accepted the sexual double standard in some form or an-
other.159 They believed that adultery was inherently different for men
than for women, even if they believed that legal rights arising from
that act should be equal.
Besides disputing the morality of divorce, virtually every lawmaker
was concerned with fears of collusion, or illegitimate use by litigants of
what lawmakers viewed to be a socially destructive course of action. 160
It was vital to discourage divorce and the seduction and predations on
the sanctity of the family that underlay the embarrassing criminal con-
versation actions-actions which were viewed by many to be a blot on
Victorian manhood. 61 The ideal and imagery conjured a fractured
and flawed logic. Husbands were seen as valiantly struggling to keep
home and hearth together and also as spendthrift, lustful, intemper-
ate beasts who preyed on other men's wives.162 Similarly, wives were
viewed as wanton harlots whose base lusts were only contained by
strict divorce laws and simultaneously as long-suffering innocents to
marital infidelity and abuse. 163
At the end of the day, Parliament was unwilling to equalize the
grounds for divorce for men and women, ultimately reaffirming the
156. The amount of venereal disease was quite high and it came to be consid-
ered a separate ground of cruelty. See, e.g., 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 502; 142
PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 415; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 40.
157. See, e.g., EDWARD BRISTOW, VICE AND VIGILANCE: PURITY MovEMENrS IN Birr.
MN SINCE 1700 (Rowman & Littlefield 1977); PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 495-507;
JUDITH WALKOWlTZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY. WOMEN, CLASS, AND THE
STATE (1980).
158. See, e.g., BRIsTow, supra note 157; PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 495-507.
159. Caroline Norton talked about the notion of equality as ridiculous. See NOR-
TON, A LETrER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61, at 98 ("I never pretended to the wild and
ridiculous doctrine of equality"). See PoovEy, supra note 5, at 69.
160. 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 248; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1980.
161. 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 912-30; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856)
1970.
162. E.g., compare 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1981-82 (the Bishop of Oxford
depicting greater ease of divorce as "the opening of the floodgates of licence upon
the hitherto blessed purity of English life"), with 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 425
(the Earl of Aberdeen arguing that women were "infinitely more virtuous than men"
and far more likely to be taken advantage of by unscrupulous men than they were to
be the perpetrators of vice).
163. 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 502; 144 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1715;
144 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1704-05.
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substantive rules of the pre-existing Parliamentary divorce.1 64 Men
could obtain a divorce on the grounds of simple adultery; a wife had
to prove adultery aggravated by incest, bigamy, desertion, or cru-
elty.165 Indeed, the latter two grounds were the only substantive
change the new law provided for women. 166 And it was 1923 before
the differential grounds were finally removed and wives received an
equal right to a divorce on the grounds of simple adultery.167
The commitment to social stability and order was the cornerstone
of the divorce debates. Divorce was deemed destructive of social or-
der and the law was considered a legitimate tool in protecting family
stability by making divorce difficult to obtain. The relatively radical
views of John Milton in the seventeenth century and John Stuart Mill
in the nineteenth-that divorce should be as easy to obtain as mar-
riage-were clearly rejected by the vast majority of even the most pro-
gressive reformers. 168 While marriage was viewed as a natural state of
man, divorce was deemed unnatural. Consequently, even though
marriage was a legal act to be encouraged, divorce was a legal act to be
discouraged. Divorce was not viewed as a private matter between a
man and a woman, but rather a state of affairs that had implications
for parents and children (immediate and extended families) and for
the state. Thus, even as lawmakers viewed divorce as a legal event,
they located it within a complex and holistic ordering of social rela-
tions that extended far beyond the immediate parties involved.
Divorce occupied a fascinating place in the public/private para-
digm of social ordering. Lawmakers readily admitted that the family
was a place of privacy, marital vows were intensely personal, and that
the family home was sacred. 169 Yet, they also understood marriage
and family ordering as a public good that could be legitimately regu-
lated by the state. While lawmakers claimed not to be interested in
the sex lives of private citizens, the consequences of sexual activity in
terms of disrupted families, illegitimate children, and venereal disease
164. This has led numerous commentators to claim that the law, substantively,
did little, while at the same time they view the new court as an important liberalizing
force in the struggle for women's rights. See, e.g., GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33,
at 11; HoRSTMAN, supra note 1, at 169; STONE, ROAD TO DIvoRcE, supra note 6, at 388-
90.
165. -Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, xxvii (1857)
(Eng.).
166. Id.
167. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 19 (Eng.).
168. John Milton and John Stuart Mill are notable exceptions. Each advocated
for relatively easy civil divorce, though each was motivated by different concerns. See
generally JOHN MILTON, THE DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE OF DIVORCE (London, T.P. &
M.S. 1643); TAYLOR MILL & STUART MILL, supra note 76, at 33.
169. For example, see Lord Lyndhurst's remarks early in the debates deploring
the state of the law and the appropriateness of legal reform. 142 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 408-18.
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were profoundly public in their minds and therefore properly the sub-
ject of legislation.17
It is curious that of all the social relationships, the sexual one of
men and women should form the core of family law and not, for ex-
ample, domicile, parental status, or household makeup. This focus on
the sexual relationship means that family law traditionally ignores
such issues as elder care, homelessness, and employment that are cru-
cial to the formation and survival of family units.' 71 Michel Foucault
would attribute the rise of a family law centered on the sexual rela-
tionship of husband and wife as further evidence of the nineteenth
century's obsession with the control and construction of sexuality. 172
Adhering to the widespread acceptance of natural, biological differ-
ences and separate spheres, the new family law was premised on sex-
ual differences and gender subordination rather than on stable
voluntary units of production in which the key relationship is the eco-
nomic partnership rather than the sexual one.
Initially, the majority of women reformers focused on divorce re-
form in terms of individual relief for the handful of women who were
in intolerable domestic circumstances. 173 These reformers viewed di-
vorce as an intensely personal decision that women should be able to
make without disrupting their other personal relations and responsi-
bilities. 174 And they did not accept the dire warnings that the social
order would disintegrate if women were granted a right to divorce
their husbands. Many desperate women would avoid the stigma of a
divorce because the social and familial pressures to avoid the publicity
were deeply ingrained in the cultural fabric. These reformers argued
that no additional legal barriers were needed to keep most couples
together. 175
Male reformers, and notably members of Parliament, viewed di-
vorce in a holistic way. Because women, and especially lower-class wo-
men, were seen as intemperate, and divorce was socially destructive,
the safety, happiness, and well-being of a few women were to be sacri-
ficed to the good of social order and naturalized patriarchy.176 In its
public manifestation, marriage was the symbol of the natural order of
things. Protecting society was deemed more important than women's
legal rights or autonomy. Of course, to the extent separate spheres
170. Id.
171. See THE STATE, THE LAW, AND THE FAMILY. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
35, at 1-5.
172. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books ed., 1990).
173. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61; WESTMEATH, supra note
67.
174. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61; WESTMEATH, supra note
67.
175. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61; WESTMEATH, supra note
67.
176. 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 234.
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continued to operate to protect the privacy of the family for the sake
of male autonomy, discouraging a woman's ability to divorce pro-
tected both the social fabric and the private domain of a man's home.
Therefore, the sexual double standard and the holistic view of divorce
subordinated female autonomy and privacy in the name of social or-
der and male power.
Not surprisingly, the sexual double standard for divorce has re-
ceived significant criticism from modern historians who, at the same
time, applaud the court for making civil divorce available to far more
women than the Parliamentary divorce. 177 The traditional history tells
us that women got halfway there in 1857 and all the way there in
1923.178 What is surprising is the relatively uncritical acceptance by
legal and historical scholars of the creation of any family-law court.179
Even as other historians have criticized the limited nature of the new
court's substantive rules, they have generally viewed the improvements
from Parliamentary divorce to the domestic relations court as so obvi-
ous as to require little scrutiny. The limited nature of the new court's
rights to divorce have been treated as social limitations inherent in
nineteenth-century perspectives and not contained in the very exis-
tence of a family-law court. However, as I believe the data reveals, 180
we cannot uncritically applaud the new court, or perhaps even its later
manifestations, without examining the patriarchal underpinnings that
influenced the belief that family law was a natural improvement over
coverture.
B. Custody'8 1
The overwhelming majority of the complaints by critics about the
law of custody was that it protected mothers of illegitimate children
177. HoRsrMAN, supra note 1, at 169; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at
388.
178. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 19 (Eng.).
179. I make no claim to have read all the literature on the formation of family
law, but with the exception of Michael Freeman I have seen little scholarship ques-
tioning the project of family law, though there is a great deal of scholarship criticizing
family law for being patriarchal and unfair. See generally THE STATE, THE LAW, AND THE
FAMILY. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35. Much of that criticism focuses on the
constraints family-law rules place on women's autonomy, but there is a growing body
of literature focusing on the unfairness of family law to men as well. See generally
NANCY DowD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000); Judith Bond Jenison, The Search for
Equality in a Woman's World: Father's Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1141
(1991); Miranda Kaye &Julia Tolmie, Critique and Comment: Discoursing Dads: The Rhe-
torical Devices of Fathers' Rights Groups, 22 MELB. U. L. REv. 162 (1998). Because my aim
is to explore the project of family law, as a set of rules centered on the sexual relation-
ship, I am trying to avoid the conflicts between advocates of different manifestations
of family-law rules.
180. See infra Part VI (analyzing the data from the first nine years of court
records).
181. It seems self-evident to modem family-law scholars that one cannot fully
understand the law of divorce and its effects without understanding the interplay of
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and not mothers of legitimate children.18 2 Such an imbalance ena-
bled husbands to use access to children to blackmail their wives into
complying with unreasonable demands (either to gain access to sepa-
rately held property or to acquiesce in husbands' sexual peccadillos or
violence).183 Critics also used a rhetoric of motherhood, domesticity,
and tender years to emphasize women's special childrearing abili-
ties.184 How, asked these reformers, could the law not protect women
in their one, principal duty-bearing and rearing children? Although
custody and property rules within divorce. Yet historians of the 1858 court notably
have said very little about the court's treatment of custody and property, nor has any
thorough study been undertaken of the law of child custody in the nineteenth
century. As I began researching nineteenth-century custody laws, however, I began to
uncover some strange disparities between what appeared to be very patriarchal rules
on custody alongside historical claims about the liberalization and equalization of the
law on divorce and marital termination. There existed a weird disconnect between
the data I was uncovering on custody and the claims of twentieth-century historians
about the positive effect of the divorce reform on women. And despite the existence
of a few book-length studies of nineteenth-century divorce, none look closely at the
interplay between divorce and custody. See, e.g., GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33;
HoRSTMAN, supra note 1; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6. Moreover, only one
book talks in any detail at all about custody law, and even that devotes only two short
chapters to its nineteenth-century origins. See MAIDMENT, supra note 43, at 89-148.
That historical disconnect prompted this study into the divorce court's records,
though the results have prompted far more questions than they answer. Tammy
Moore has similarly noted the difficulty in studying child custody records before the
courts regularly made custody orders and when a majority of couples separated by
private agreement precisely to avoid the publicity of formal legal proceedings. See
Moore, supra note 69.
182. See, e.g., CAROLINE NORTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURAL CLAIM OF THE
MOTHER TO THE CUSTODY OF HER INFANT CHILDREN, AS AFFECTED BY THE COMMON LAw
RIGHT OF THE FATHER 59 (London, Ridgway 1837) [hereinafter NORTON, OBSERVA-
TIONS]; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 131-38.
183. This was called by Lawrence Stone the "kissed or kicked" phenomenon, in
which husbands would either wheedle access to property out of their wives, or beat it
out of them. As he explained,
In these struggles to force a wife to surrender to her husband control over
property vested in trustees on her behalf, the three weapons that a husband
had at his disposal were consistent wheedling or bullying-being 'kissed or
kicked' as it was later described; the removal of the children from the house
and a refusal to allow their mother any access to them; and kidnapping fol-
lowed by indefinite incarceration at home or in a madhouse, sometimes,...
accompanied by physical torture. Only the last was subject to legal interven-
tion, and then only if the wife's friends could find out where she was con-
fined, and also obtain a writ of habeas corpus for her release.
STONE, BROKEN LrVES, supra note 52, at 81. Judge Cresswell Cresswell did recognize
that condonation should not lie against a wife who returned home after learning of
her husband's infidelities and cruelty when she did so in response to the husband's
threats to deny her access to her children again. Curtis v. Curtis, 184 Eng. Rep. 688
(D. 1858), affd, 164 Eng. Rep. 1505 (D. 1859).
184. These doctrines have been identified by countless historians as fundamental
to the social construction of women's identities in the nineteenth century, the natu-
ralization of women's childrearing function, and the isolation of women in a separate,
domestic sphere. See, e.g., A WIDENING SPHERE: CHANGING ROLES OF VICTOIAN WO-
MEN (Martha Vicinus ed., 1977); DALLY, supra note 92; LASC.H, supra note 92;
[Vol. 19:211
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 250 2004
"WELL-BEHAVED WOMEN DONT MAKE HISTORY"
the imbalance in the law of custody had been remarked upon by an
anonymous female commentator in 1735,185 Mary Wollstonecraft in
the 1790s,18 6 Caroline Norton in the 1830s, 18 7 and numerous critics in
the 1850s,188 the law of custody until 1857 was notoriously one-sided.
If the mother challenged the father, he still received custody in all
situations except when he posed a danger to the child's life and
limb. l8 9 If third parties challenged a father's fitness, however, he
would routinely lose custody if the child was simply better off remain-
ing with others. 190 This latter situation often occurred when children
went to live with wealthy relatives and the father sought to regain
them in the hopes of gaining access to property that had been settled
on the children.' 91
The arguments made by reformers concerned with custody fo-
cused heavily on a rhetoric of domesticity and the naturalness of the
mother/child bond. For instance, Caroline Norton insisted that only
a mother's love for her child was pure, absolute, and uncompromis-
ing, unlike the sexualized love of a woman for a man. 92 She argued
that
[t]he daily tenderness, the watchful care, the thousand offices of
love, which infancy requires, cannot be supplied by any father, how-
ever vigilant or affectionate .... And it is in this very point that
Nature speaks for the mother. It pronounces the protection of the
father insufficient,-it pronounces the estrangement from the
O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw, supra note 43; PoovEY, supra note 5; Kerber,
supra note 92.
185. ANON., supra note 101.
186. WOLLSTONEcRATv, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN, supra note 115;
WOLLSTONECRAFr, MARIA, OR THE WRONGS OF WOMAN, supra note 115.
187. Caroline Norton wrote five influential political pamphlets advocating
changes in the law of custody and divorce. See NORTON, A LETrER TO THE QUEEN,
supra note 61; CAROLINE NORTON, A PLAIN LETTER TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE
INFANT CUSTODY BILL (London, J. Ridgway 1839); NORTON, ENGLISH LAws, supra note
61; NORTON, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 182; CAROLINE NORTON, THE SEPARATION OF
MOTHER AND CHILD BY THE LAW OF "CUSTODY OF INFANTS," CONSIDERED (London,
Roake & Varty 1838).
188. NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61; NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS,
supra note 61; SMITH BODICHON, supra note 91; WESTMEATH, supra note 67.
189. See, e.g., In reFynn, 64 Eng. Rep. 205 (V.C. 1848); Westmeath v. Westmeath,
162 Eng. Rep. 987 (Ch. 1829); Ex parte Skinner, 9 Moore 278, 27 Rev. Rep. 710
(1824); STONE, BROKEN Lives, supra note 52, at 284-346 (discussing the Westmeath
case); Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19.
190. Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. App. 1827), affd sub
nom., Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1127 (H.L. 1828); Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37
Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817). SeeWright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19, at 175.
191. See, e.g., Lyons v. Blenkin, 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1821) (citing Colston v.
Morris, 37 Eng. Rep. 849 (Ch. 1820)).
192. See NORTON, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 182, at 52; Caroline Norton, Helen's
Tower: Erected by Lord Dufferin, in Honour of his Mother, at Clandeboye, Ireland, 8 MACMIL-
LAN's MAG. 150 (1863) (analogizing maternal love to "[a] watchtower in the weary
strife,/ [w]here Fate's rough billows run/ . . . Emblem of what a steadfast guide/A
mother's love may be!") [hereinafter Norton, Helen's Tower].
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mother dangerous and unnatura4 and such as must be immediately
supplied by female guidance of some sort or other.1 93
Fathers who denied their wives access to their children were viewed as
harming both the children and the mothers. 194
Opponents to reform, however, believed that giving fathers abso-
lute custody of the children would ensure that mothers would not for-
sake their homes and duties lightly. Sir Edward Sugden, a member of
the House of Commons that debated the 1839 Custody of Infants
Act, 19 5 was convinced that mothers would immediately leave their hus-
bands' roofs for the most trivial reasons if they could have continued
access to their children. 196 Sugden claimed that
[w]hen the wife knew that she could not have access to her chil-
dren, after leaving her husband's house, she was unwilling to sepa-
rate herself from him for light causes: supposing this Bill [the
Custody of Infants Act of 1839] to pass into law she would argue
193. NORTON, OBSERVATONS, supra note 182, at 51-52. This typical expression of
maternal fitness came to be known as the tender years doctrine in England and the
United States-a doctrine that preferred maternal custody in disputes involving chil-
dren under seven years of age. England officially repudiated the doctrine in 1925
when it adopted the best interests standard, though the tender years doctrine contin-
ued to operate informally in decisions by judges who continued to believe it was in
children's best interests to be cared for by their mothers. See MAIDMENT, supra note
43, at 145-46.
194. Caroline Norton noted this, as did certain judges. See Ex parte M'Clellan, 1
Dowling's P.C. 81 (K.B. 1831); NORTON, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 182, at 51-52.
195. It is perhaps not unusual for women to have protested the state of child
custody laws two decades before they vigorously sought divorce reform. In the mid-
1830s, a series of highly publicized cases forced Parliament into considering a bill that
would give married mothers at least some legal right to petition for custody even
though they were still married and therefore legally unable to sue their husbands
under coverture. The King v. Greenhill, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836); Greenhill v.
Greenhill, 63 Eng. Rep. 162 (1836); Ex pane M'Clellan, 1 Dowling's P.C. 81 (K-B.
1831). When the bill was considered in 1838, some legislators felt that giving married
women rights to custody would lead to the breakdown of marriage and a destructive
increase in litigation. 44 PARtL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 780-781; 40 PARa. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1838) 1118. And to many, the 1839 Custody of Infants Act was the opening wedge in
the gradual breakdown of coverture. See 40 PAL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1114-18; Han-
dley, supra note 74. Much of the anxiety that had accompanied the 1839 reform
dissolved over the next eighteen years, however, as the courts essentially validated the
paternal claims of control over the family and rejected the maternal claims of protec-
tion for childrearing duties. The courts refused to recognize any independent rights
to custody in mothers while they retained the pre-1839 "life and limb" standard for
paternal forfeiture. They used the Act to expand the jurisdiction of chancery to hear
custody cases in a wider array of situations: younger and non-propertied children.
This shift reflected a change in the attitudes of parents and courts toward the status of
all children, and occurred in the power struggle between fathers and the state, not
fathers and mothers. Mothers were given no new legal protections. For a detailed
discussion of the role of child custody disputes in family law reform, see Wright, De
Manneville, supra note 36; Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19.
196. 40 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1116.
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thus:-'I can now have access to my children when I please and I
will separate immediately from my husband.
' 197
This behavior would tend to the destruction of the family because, as
Sugden viewed it, only by manipulating children to force women to
remain in their homes could Parliament keep a lid on women's irre-
sponsible propensity to terminate their marriages.' 9 8 As another com-
mentator argued:
You cannot take away the least of the safeguards of domestic virtue
without an injury to public morality. What madness then and atro-
cious wickedness it would be to take away, not merely the least, not
merely one out of a number, but the greatest, the last, the only re-
maining bar against the outbreak of ever-tempting lusts, and then
hope that they will afterwards restrain themselves on account of
your impotent good wishes, and unheeded sermons, and vain
regrets!19 9
Access and custody of children were viewed as the final safeguard of
women's fidelity to the home.
While the arguments in the 1830s were centered around a logic
of domesticity, there was an obvious tension between the claims of
mothers and the claims of fathers. Mothers felt that their all-impor-
tant domestic duties could not be performed adequately if they did
not have legal protections for their child-rearing duties when their
marriages fell apart due to no fault of their own.2 00 Fathers felt that
their control over the domestic sphere could not be maintained if
wives had an independent right to leave the family home and retain
access to their children.2 0 ' While mothers focused on child-rearing as
a single, primary aspect of their domestic identities, fathers argued for
an expansive understanding of the domestic sphere that aligned child-
rearing, marital faithfulness, commingling of property, and a sancti-
fied, protected space within the family home.20 2 Mothers viewed their
need for legal protection of custody in terms of their activities and
duties in the single issue of child-rearing; fathers viewed their need for
legal protection of custody in terms of their holistic and physical con-
trol over the family and the homestead. 20 3
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Handley, supra note 74, at 280-81.
200. NORTON, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 182, at 52.
201. Handley, supra note 74, at 276-77.
202. See Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19, at 261-70.
203. This holistic view of fathers was reinforced by the law, which viewed custody
of children as directly tied to the descent of property, protecting the family patri-
mony, and controlling the family honor. Prior to 1839, the Chancery's jurisdiction to
even hear a custody dispute depended on the child having been made a ward of the
court, which required the settlement of property on the child. In most instances, the
court only addressed disputes over the eldest child or heir. After 1839, numerous
mothers would settle property on all their children in order to bring them within the
court's jurisdiction, but the court would actually resolve the case by giving the eldest
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Even though the 1839 Act had given mothers a right to petition
for access to their children, reformers in the 1850s realized that the
Act had made virtually no improvement in the legal protection of ma-
ternal child-rearing. 20 4 Hence, in the 1850s, women demanded a le-
gal right to custody as part of divorce reform. 205 As they argued, a
wife should not have to suffer the dual injustice of being forced out of
her home by her husband's infidelities or cruelties, and also loose ac-
cess to her children. 20 6 However, even though women's critiques of
custody law in the 1850s continued to be centered on a rhetoric of
maternal nurturance and care, a naturalization of mother's love, and
an inability to understand why mothers of illegitimate children had
rights while mothers of legitimate children still did not, women delin-
eated a difference between maternal responsibilities and marital
responsibilities.2 0 7
The reformers set their arguments within a broader acceptance
of marital disruption, however. While the debates of the 1830s in-
sisted that the cases were rare of separated parents, by the 1850s cus-
tody disputes were seen as a logical consequence to the growing
numbers of marital separations. Not surprisingly, the 1850s Parlia-
mentary debates subordinated custody to the issue of divorce and
marital breakup. The holistic view of family control dominated the
discussions as lawmakers focused on the breakdown of the family and
its effects on social stability, rather than on the isolated issue of the
special aptitude of maternal child-rearing abilities or providing for the
children to the father and the youngest to the mother. These earlier custody cases
(pre-1800) showed a clear concern for control over the heir, while the handful of
cases brought by mothers in the first half of the nineteenth century forced the courts
to consider custody as distinct from control over the patrimony, and instead as a ques-
tion of the companionate aspects of custody and access. Id. at 192-205.
204. See id. at 238-248; S-AirNLE, supra note 19, at 136-38.
205. SH-ANLEY, supra note 19, at 136-38.
206. For instance, Caroline Norton, who had finally received access to her chil-
dren three years after the passage of the 1839 Act, was still embittered by the law's
unwillingness to protect mothers. In 1854, she asked:
[I]s there any reason why (to plead the cause of the inferior sex as humbly as
possible) the laws and enactments for their protection should not undergo
as much revision, with as fair a chance of beneficial alteration, as the regula-
tions affecting the management of pauper children,-insane patients,-and
the tried and untried prisoners who occupy our gaols?
CAROLINE NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE: ENGLISH LAWS FOR WOMEN IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 15 (Joan Huddleston ed., 1982) (1854). Norton realized much
to her dismay when she finally was allowed access to her children in 1842 that she still
was legally nonexistent. She wrote two pamphlets in the 1850s linking custody with
other aspects of property, divorce, and contract law. See NORTON, A LETrER TO THE
QUEEN, supra note 61; NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS, supra note 61.
207. All of Caroline Norton's pamphlets note this distinction, but the best ex-
pression is in Norton's poem, "Helen's Tower," contrasting maternal love, "[a] watch-
tower in the weary strife," to marital love, enamored and transient. Norton, Helen's
Tower, supra note 192.
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best interests of children. 208 The lawmakers in the 1850s continued to
be worried that patterns of traditional family control would be under-
mined by the ability of wives to easily leave their husbands, and the
effects on children were deemed only ancillary to the detriment wo-
men's freedom would have on society in general.20 9 Society and chil-
dren would suffer from irresponsible women.
When the new court was given the power to make custody deter-
minations under the 1857 Act, however, there already existed a large
body of precedent from the 1830s and 1840s denying custody to
mothers except in very unusual circumstances and no additional
rights or protections were legislated by the Act.210 The court was
given simply the right to make interim or final custody orders as it saw
fit.2 11 With such little guidance and no new mandate to protect ma-
ternal custody, it is hardly surprising that the court's exercise of cus-
tody jurisdiction was tentative and sporadic and would require
additional legislative reform into the 1880s.2 12 In one case, the court
refused to make a final custody order for a mother whose husband
had moved to the U.S. and committed bigamy.21 3 Without the power
to modify a final order, the court felt it would be unable to grant the
father custody or access later were he to ever repent and return.214
Without the creation of explicit maternal rights, which most women
desired, divorce reform did little to protect women's access to their
children, and did nothing to separate custody from other aspects of
marital and familial autonomy.
208. The Marquess of Landsdowne argued that regularized divorce was far better
for children than informal separation, 144 PARK. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1716, and Mr.
Spencer Walpole exclaimed that families in which adultery, cruelty, or desertion oc-
curred were already "blighted, deserted, barbarous, and unchaste home[s]" and for-
malized mechanisms of divorce would therefore be a blessing, 147 PARL. DEB. (3d
ser.) (1857) 881.
209. In the debates on the Custody of Infants Act in 1837 and 1838, Lord
Lyndhurst and Sergeant Talfourd discussed at great length how giving mothers access
to or custody of their children would ease their situations tremendously without caus-
ing social strife, while Edward Sugden declared that such access would destroy the
social fabric. See 40 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1114-22; 39 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1837) 1087-89. But there was very little mention of children in the divorce act de-
bates, except the Marquess of Landsdowne's comment that children would be better
off if their acrimonious parents could separate. 144 PARK DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1716.
Of course, many of the comments about the destruction of the social fabric caused by
easing the laws of divorce were aimed at women who, it was believed, would exercise
these fights with regard only for themselves, and not for their families. See, e.g., 143
PARK. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 230-38.
210. See Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19.
211. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § xv (1857) (Eng.).
212. See Re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317 (1883); In re Besant, 11 Ch. D. 508 (1878); Re
Agar-Ellis, 10 Ch. D. 49 (1878); Cooke v. Cooke, 164 Eng. Rep. 1269 (1863); Curtis v.
Curtis, 28 L.J.R. (n.s.) 458 (ch. 1859); Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19.
213. Robotham v. Robotham, 164 Eng. Rep. 190 (1858). The court was later
given power to amend final custody orders in 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, § iv (1859) (Eng.).
214. Robotham, 164 Eng. Rep. at 190.
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C. Property
Like custody, property settlements are intricately intertwined with
divorce in modem family law. Yet in 1857 Parliament apparently saw
little need to give divorcing women any property other than a return
to feme sole status for future earnings and no property rights for mar-
ried women in functioning relationships. In an analysis of the argu-
ments offered by reformers for modifying the property rights of
married women, we see similar complaints about the legal disabilities
of coverture as were argued in the custody context.21 5 Caroline Nor-
ton and others spoke of coming to consciousness regarding their lack
of property rights when they discovered they did not even own the
clothes on their backs.21 6 But they expanded their arguments to use
their domestic duties and the support of children tojustify their need
to earn money and have control over their own inheritances. 217
Wives' lack of property rights were also equated with their own
status as property. As Eliza Linton argued,
[If married women] were independent of man's support, and could
feed and clothe themselves unhelped, and maintain their own social
status unassisted, they could make better terms for themselves and
compel a more just and liberal treatment .... As it is, men have the
right to demand from their wives absolute attention to their wishes,
because they are their property .... 218
Frances Power Cobbe criticized the situation of married women when
she asked, "[w] hy is the property of the woman who commits Murder,
and the property of the woman who commits Matrimony, dealt with
alike by your law?"2 1 9 Many reformers could not understand why the
law of coverture destroyed all legal rights for married women when
criminals, adulterers, apprentices, servants, and military men retained
numerous legal protections.
Although coverture did not make such a distinction, there ex-
isted a social distinction between allowing women to own their labor,
their wages, and their personal property and allowing them to own
and control real property that was settled on them by their parents or
family or was acquired during the marriage. 220 While control over
wages and labor distinguished the slave from the free laborer and was
215. See generaly HOLCOMBE, supra note 54; SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 103-30.
216. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61, at 82-85.
217. NORTON, ENGISH LAwS, supra note 61, at 161; SMITH BODIcHON, supra note
91. Without access to property, it was believed women would be loath to leave their
husbands' roofs. Additionally, limited property rights would be seen as necessary to
allowing women to perform their domestic duties of running a household.
218. Eliza Lynn Linton, Womanly Dependence, in OURSELVES: A SERIES OF EssAys ON
WOMEN 226-27 (2d ed., London, Routledge 1870).
219. Frances Power Cobbe, Criminals, Idiots, Women and Minors: Is the Classification
Sound?, FRASER'S MAG., 1869, at 5.
220. While wealthy women had the separate estate, recognized in equity, utiliz-
ing such protections required male control in the form of trustees. See STAVES, supra
note 61.
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tied to individual autonomy and identity, control over real property
inheritances and marital property was part of one's family identity and
not seen as crucial to individual emancipation. Wages were about im-
mediate individual support, while inheritances were imbued with
complex notions of family identity. For women who did not actively
function in the economic sphere, their ownership of real property was
generally deemed a detriment, because family inheritances could pass
outside a woman's family upon marriage. 221 Even for those women
who did own real property associated with economic production, like
a rooming house or tavern, title generally was held by the husband or
by trustees and a wife's income was often construed as a result of her
husband's industry. Thus, separated women would be given a right to
their wages before obtaining any rights to marital property, marriage
settlements, or inheritances. An acceptance of this distinction per-
vaded the debates around divorce. In the end, the 1857 Act gave mar-
ried women no rights to wages, marital property, or inheritances, and
only gave divorced and separated women the right to wages after the
date of the separation. 222
Once again, Parliament ignored the demands for women's indi-
vidual legal rights within the domestic sphere, and opted instead for a
holistic family law that would discourage women from choosing di-
vorce and would not upset the patriarchal order that existed in the
public sphere of male dominion over property. By not allowing mar-
ried women a right to their own wages, Parliament guaranteed that
male employers would deal principally with the husband in negotiat-
ing wages. By not protecting a wife's inheritance, Parliament guaran-
teed that middle-class wives would not be able to afford to divorce
their husbands and live on their own property. By using alimony as
the principal form of property adjustment, Parliament ensured that
wives would be dependent on their husband's wages for support in
the future, rather than on a division of marital property that might
put wives in control of substantial amounts of real or investment prop-
221. Eileen Spring has made an intriguing argument that all major property doc-
trines were in fact created to avoid the situation of the heiress inheriting real prop-
erty. EILEEN SPRING, LAw, LAND & FAMILY. ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND,
1300 TO 1800 (1993). The use, the will, the strict settlement, jointures, and even
equitable estates were all motivated by the desire to avoid the heiress. The argument
she makes in the book is in response to other interpretations. See Lloyd Bonfield,
Affective Families, Open Elites and Strict Family Settlements in Early Modern England, 39
EcON. His-r. REv., 341 (1986); Lloyd Bonfield, Marriage, Property & the "Affective Fam-
ily," 1 L. & HIsT. REv. 297 (1983).
222. Women would be returned to feme sole status so wages or inheritances post-
divorce would be owned solely by them, but property brought to the marriage or
earned during the marriage would remain owned by the husband entirely. 20 & 21
Vict. c. 85, §§ xxv, xlv (1857) (Eng.).
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erty.223 Such post-divorce dependence was bound to discourage wo-
men who wished to terminate their marriages.
When laws giving married women control over their wages and
earnings were finally passed in 1870, little consideration was given to
inheritances or other real property which was either owned and man-
aged by the husband, or settled on grandchildren by fathers who did
not want their estates to fall into the hands of their sons-in-law. 224 Re-
form of inheritances and real property did not occur until 1882.225
Even though the 1857 Act allowed the court to make property settle-
ments on divorced wives out of the marital estate,22 6 property was
clearly subsumed in order to protect the integrity of the marital unit.
The property provisions of the 1857 Act were so inadequate that a
subsequent amendment was required in 1860 to give the court power
to adjust marriage settlements. 227 Moreover, in the first nine years of
the court's existence, fewer than 1% of wives received a property set-
tlement or adjustment at the time of divorce.2 28
D. Class
Today one cannot talk about marital property without some at-
tention to the plight of working-class wives who were likely to leave a
marriage with no property except the newly restored right to their
own wages. But in the 1850s, working-class women, as distinct from
working-class men, were not regularly discussed. The complaints
about class by reformers and opponents to the bill were relatively uni-
form. All sides agreed that the law should not treat people of differ-
ent classes differently, with some exceptions for the unruly working
classes. 229 During the course of the debates on the 1857 Act, Lord
Campbell recounted a legal anecdote that had become a kind of ur-
ban legend. He related:
[in a] case tried before Mr. Justice Maule, the prisoner, being con-
victed of bigamy, was called upon to say why sentence should not be
passed upon him. He then said, 'My wife was unfaithful; she robbed
me and ran away with another man, and I thought I might take
another wife.' The reply of the learned Judge was-You are quite
223. Married women could not buy property once married. So, unless they
owned it before marriage, they would likely only acquire some limited interests in real
property during life through inheritance. For a thorough discussion of married wo-
men's separate property rights, see STAVES, supra note 61.
224. Married Women's Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.).
225. Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.).
226. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, §§ xxv, xlv (1857) (Eng.).
227. 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61, § 5 (1859) (Eng.).
228. Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 1008 tbl.20.
229. It was not that legislators wanted separate class-based laws, but they often
felt that it was acceptable to make legal remedies available to the respectable middle-
and working-classes, but that all attempts should be made to discourage use of or
access to the remedy by the unruly classes. See STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6,
at 384-85.
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wrong in supposing that. You ought to have brought an action for
criminal conversation; that action would have been tried before one
of Her Majesty's Judges at the assizes; you would probably have re-
covered damages, and then you should have instituted a suit in the
Ecclesiastical Court for a divorce a mensa et thoro. Having got that
divorce, you should have petitioned the House of Lords for a di-
vorce a vinculo, and should have appeared by counsel at the bar of
their Lordships' House. Then, if the Bill passed it would have gone
down to the House of Commons; the same evidence would possibly
be repeated there; and if the Royal assent had been given after that,
you might have married again. The whole proceeding would not
have cost you more than £1,000.' 'Ah, my Lord,' replied the man, 'I
never was worth a 1,000 pence in all my life.' The Judge's answer
was, 'That is the law, and you must submit to it.' Who could wonder
that the man should return, 'That is hard measure to us who are
poor people, and cannot resort to the remedy which the law has
afforded to the rich.' 230
This anecdote was frequently recounted during the 1850s as evidence
that the law of divorce was terribly unjust. While the lawmakers were
not comfortable with equalizing the grounds of divorce between hus-
bands and wives, they were most willing to make divorce available to
some segment of the poorer classes if it was going to be available to
the upper classes.2 31 Although there was some concern that the lower
classes needed more stringent regulation of their sexuality, most
lawmakers balanced that view with an understanding that the more
improper the behavior of any spouse, the more imperative it was to
free the innocent partner.2 32 Although working-class wives would
seem to be particularly sympathetic due to middle-class views of lower-
class sexual license, working-class wives also were caught up in stere-
otypical views of sexual degradation and sexual profiteering by both
sexes.
2 3 3
To the extent discussions of class arose in the Parliamentary de-
bates, they focused on two narrow issues: broadening the remedy be-
yond the aristocracy and making the remedy available outside London
through the use of magistrate and county courts. 234 Although
lawmakers recognized that some poorer classes would not be able to
seek a remedy if it were only available in London, there was much
230. 142 PAr. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1986.
231. 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 232.
232. 142 PAr.L. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 413-15.
233. Lord Brougham discussed the undesirable fate of the young heir lured
across the border to Scotland who makes a hasty marriage with a prostitute and needs,
upon sober reflection, to undo his mistake. See 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 423.
In rejoinder, however, the Earl of Aberdeen asked how many young Dukes had done
the trapping rather than been the prey, and he thought that for every one such
thoughtless young man trapped into marriage, hundreds of innocent women had
been trapped by "artful and designing men." 142 PARJ. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 425.
234. See, e.g., 142 PARI. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1973-74; 143 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1856) 232.
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concern that divorce would be too easy and unregulated if made avail-
able through local courts. 235 By keeping the jurisdiction in London
and requiring the intervention of a relatively high-level court, Parlia-
ment attempted to balance the need to provide a remedy for the egre-
gious cases and yet keep a lid on what they thought would be
uncontrolled and wanton dissolution by the masses. The hypocrisy in
the proposed law was highlighted when one Member of the House of
Commons, Mr. Bowyer, noted that it took only one judge to order
death to a prisoner but three judges to order a divorce. 236 In the end,
the remedy was to be available to the middling classes and to some in
the upper working class, but the fees would remain beyond the range
of most working-class people until the twentieth century.23 7
Again, we see in the reform arguments about class a tension be-
tween those who viewed divorce and marital fidelity as primarily a so-
cial issue, and those who viewed it as a private one. In a sense, class-
based arguments posed the greatest difficulty for Parliament because
they pitted male privilege within the private sphere against upper-class
male social control-men against men. It was harder tojustify a class-
based double standard than a gender-based double standard because
working-class men still expected the privileges of patriarchy that their
higher-class brethren enjoyed. Statistics showed, however, that the
vast majority of litigants were from London, were engaged in middle-
class occupations, and could afford the roughly £100 fees necessary
for a full divorce. 238
E. Reform and the Status Quo
The arguments for reform ran the gamut from complete gender
equality to very limited and contained rights for those few special
cases of women who were shackled to profligate and abusive hus-
bands. 239 While lawmakers were concerned with the high numbers of
divorce petitions when they reached four per year, it was generally
235. The Bishop of Oxford was convinced that access to local courts would make
divorces too easy and tempting. 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 1980.
236. 147 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 758-59.
237. Though there was some limited legal aid, some petitioners did apply for a
waiver of court costs as in forna pauperis, but the numbers were few and did not
affect attorney fees. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 909.
238. The creation of the new court did result in a reduction of costs from
roughly £1000 for a Parliamentary divorce to less than £100 for a civil divorce. Id. at
1009 tbl.22, 1010 tbl.23 and accompanying text.
239. There were lengthy debates in 1837 and 1838 on the Custody of Infants Act
and whether or not the law should be changed to address just the few instances of
injustice that a few women faced, or whether it should be changed for all because the
presence of a few cases does not mean that all women are not living under tyrannical
circumstances. See 42 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1050-54; 39 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1837) 1083 (Sergeant Talfourd exclaimed that "[t]he instances in which it is brought
before the public cognizance may be few, but it is ever in the background of domestic
tyranny, and is felt by those who suffer in silence"). Similar feelings were expressed
about the wisdom of changing the law for a few dysfunctional couples. 144 PARE. DEB.
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believed by most that the new civil court would see only a slight in-
crease in divorces. 240 After all, the substantive law would remain very
much the same and the costs would put divorce out of reach of all but
the most well-off working-class couples. And the middle class would, it
was believed, continue to eschew the highly public process of legal
divorce in favor of private separations. 241 Given the slight modifica-
tions in substantive law, the prediction that the court would have very
little to do was arguably rational. However, if Parliament thought four
divorces per year was an epidemic, it was stunned when the court
granted over 250 divorces in the first year.242 Moreover, that number
would slowly rise over the next decade, forcing numerous bi-annual
amendments to deal with procedural difficulties as well as jurisdiction
over additional marital property.243
The ultimate irony of the mid-nineteenth-century legal reform
was that as progressives sought to eliminate the legal incapacities of
coverture, they accepted socialized gender inequality and separate
spheres. Similarly, reformers accepted the need for divorce reform
while simultaneously accepting the sexual double standard. 244 Due to
naturalized gender differences and the propriety of separate spheres,
most reformers felt that equal legal rights in both realms would not be
exercised equally because women would not choose to venture into
the public sphere to challenge the natural superiority of men.2 45 It
was safe to give women some limited power because many felt they
were incapable or uninterested in exercising it.246 Built into the re-
form, and consequently the new family law, was an understanding that
because of women's different natures, their exercise of power within
the domestic sphere would be significantly different from the way
men exercised power. For instance, expectations surrounding univer-
(3d ser.) (1857) 1705. Margaret Oliphant also registered her opinion on this issue in
The Laws Concerning Women, supra note 10.
240. There were numerous references to a belief that the court would not be
very busy. 146 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 207; 142 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 404,
415.
241. See STONE, RoAD TO DVORCE, supra note 6, at 181-82.
242. 151 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1859) 567; HoRsTMAN, supra note 1, at 85.
243. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 19 (1878) (Eng.); 36 & 37 Vict.,
c. 31 (1873) (Eng.); 29 & 30 Vict., c. 32 (1866) (Eng.); 25 & 26 Vict., c. 81 (1862)
(Eng.); 23 & 24 Vict., c. 144 (1860) (Eng.); 22 & 23 Vict., c. 61 (1859) (Eng.); 21 & 22
Vict., c. 108 (1858) (Eng.). See also Act for the Further Amendment of the Law of
Evidence, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 68 (Eng.).
244. Their sense of equality insisted that women should be able to leave adulter-
ous relationships even as they felt that adultery by women was a more egregious
breach than adultery by men and the law could therefore treat them differently. See,
e.g., 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 813-14; 147 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 393; 147
PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1643.
245. See, e.g., 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 502.
246. It would be hard to reconcile all the liberal, democratic rhetoric of the
nineteenth century with laws that clearly disadvantaged one group solely on the basis
of their status as wives or women.
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sal male suffrage were that working-class men would grab and abuse
the power that was granted to them, but expectations surrounding the
reform of coverture were that few women would even notice the
change.247 The entrenchment of the ideology of separate spheres and
naturalized gender differences limited the expected effects of the re-
form and also justified the institutionalization of separate spheres and
gender subordination in the new family law.
The reform debates were centered in private-sphere domestic val-
ues, and accepted the naturalized passivity of women. These debates
illustrate that most people thought there would be little real change.
The new law would help a few people at the margins of marital dis-
cord, but domestic life would be little altered because the constraints
within the private sphere would keep in check whatever destructive
tendencies women had.248 Even the most progressive reformers of
the nineteenth century wanted to abolish coverture and replace it
with legal rights protecting women's domestic activities-with a law
that recognized and reified separate spheres even as it purported to
give women power. There was such a strong acceptance of the sexual
double standard and women's relegation to the domestic sphere that
few critics thought giving women legal rights would make them claim
an equality with men.249 Women were seen as too silly and emotional
247. This was not because some people did not foresee the implications of the
breakdown of coverture. In fact, some conservative members of parliament thought
giving women a single thread of legal rights would cause them to destroy the entire
social fabric. See, e.g., 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 279. But the majority of re-
formers and members of parliament viewed the changes as ones of form and not
substance, that a few egregious situations would be avoided but that significant
change would not occur. Lord Brougham's view represented the vast majority in the
body that voted for the Act. 146 PA.. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 205-07. And in many
cases they were correct. The law creating the new court offered very little substantive
change, but it did begin the breakdown of coverture. Yet even as coverture was even-
tually destroyed, the ubiquity of separate spheres has kept the lid on the effects of the
change, as has the nature of the reform. The creation of a family-law court has insti-
tutionalized separate spheres, thus limiting the effects of the reform.
248. See Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19, at 217-20 (discussing
Thomas de Quincey's The Household Wreck, in which the idealized Victorian woman is
exactly the kind of timid, child-like figure who is destroyed by contact with the boister-
ous world of courts and law). In debating the 1839 Custody of Infants Act, Mr. Shaw
asserted that "no woman of a delicate mind would submit to call upon a court to
interfere and to exercise these powers." 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1053. Some
critics claimed that the influence of litigation is "deplorable and demoralizing" to
women. Handley, supra note 74, at 301.
249. Not surprisingly, the legal debates were quite complex. On one extreme,
many believed men and women were fundamentally different, that women were natu-
rally inferior, and that therefore the laws of coverture wisely placed control in the
hands of male decisionmakers. For these people, coverture made sense because men
and women were naturally unequal, and allowing equity courts to handle the extreme
cases made the law rational andjust. Margaret Oliphant, for instance, argued against
equality within the home as contrary to natural law. Oliphant, supra note 10, at 379-
87. A less extreme position accepted the fundamental differences between men and
women and women's inferiority, especially in the public/business world, but advo-
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to seriously consider themselves the equal of men. To the extent crit-
ics worried about the effects of legal rights for women, they feared
wholesale destruction of the family from women's irresponsible exer-
cise of rights rather than the social parity that we today view as the
goal.250 Some critics also hoped that granting women domestic rights
would satisfy them so they would not ask for additional rights like suf-
frage or equal participation in the public arena. 25 1
What is most notable about the arguments for reform and the law
that was eventually passed were the gender differences that emerged
in the former and the latter's conservative nature. While men tended
to argue for an holistic family law that would integrate divorce, separa-
tion, custody, and property issues in order to keep the family intact,
women reformers tended to argue for a more rights-based individual-
istic approach whereby the rights to divorce, custody, or property
would be independently determined based on each woman's situa-
tion. Progressive reformers believed that women should not be sub-
jected to the status-based disabilities of coverture. Married women,
they argued, could continue to be individual actors with individual
rights without upsetting the domestic sphere, the social order, or even
patriarchal power relations. Ironically, while the new court more
closely reproduced the integrated family law advocated by men than
the individual rights-based approach advocated by women, it has been
interpreted by scholars and historians to have been a liberal institu-
tion that paved the way for women's rights. However, before turning
cated a change in coverture to protect women's rights within their recognized domes-
tic sphere. This position was expounded most forcefully by Caroline Norton, who
thought that the purpose of coverture was to protect the inferior, the wife, just as
other laws protected the servant, the apprentice, the sailor, and the infant. Law was to
be protective, not empowering. See NORTON, ENGLISH LAWS, supra note 61, at 2.
These critics all believed coverture could be broken down and women would exercise
their legal rights responsibly only in the limited domestic realm they already domi-
nated. Giving married women rights to property, custody, and perhaps even divorce
was seen as necessary to protect the family and the domestic sphere, but it was not
expected to radically change male/female relations within that sphere.
250. These critics vociferously opposed any relaxation in the laws of coverture
because they viewed women as reckless beasts who required the coercive force of cov-
erture to retain their base and lustful natures. See Handley, supra note 74. Any de-
cline in the laws would lead to social unrest and disaster. The Bishop of Oxford, for
example, "believed that if facilities for divorce were once afforded the gravest dissatis-
faction would be produced, unless those facilities were extended to the very lowest
classes of society; and he contended that such facilities could not be given to the
lowest classes without endangering the moral purity of married life." 142 PARE. DEB.
(3d ser.) (1856) 1980. Ironically, it seems that these critics saw a link between the law
of coverture and gender subordination and they believed that removing the legal
barriers against women would unravel the contemporary social fabric. They did not
think gender equality would be the outcome; rather, they believed social order would
disintegrate if women's true natures were given free rein.
251. See 145 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 278; 145 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 800;
SHANLEY, supra note 19, at 46-47.
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to the historical interpretations of the law, we must turn now to a
closer examination of the actual records of the new court.
VI. SOCIAL DIFFERENCES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL REFORM: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF FAMILY LAW
In Jane Austen's 1813 novel Pride and Prejudice,252 the odious Mr.
Collins asks Elizabeth Bennet for her hand in marriage, but is
promptly rejected because Elizabeth would rather live as a pauper
spinster than be trapped with a man whose eye is more on the family
plate than his potential wife's qualities. Mr. Collins, however, does
not at first accept her rejection, explaining: 'You must give me leave
to flatter myself, my dear cousin, that your refusal of my addresses is
merely words of course.... I shall choose to attribute it to your wish
of increasing my love by suspense, according to the usual practice of
elegant females."2 5 3 After remonstrating at length with Mr. Collins
that she was not the usual kind of elegant female, Elizabeth withdrew,
"determined, that if he persisted in considering her repeated refusals
as flattering encouragement, to apply to her father, whose negative
might be uttered in such a manner as must be decisive, and whose
behaviour at least could not be mistaken for the affectation and co-
quetry of an elegant female." 254
Ironically, such was the precarious position of the Victorian
maiden seeking matrimony as well as of the Victorian matron seeking
divorce. In the new world of civil divorce, couples who wanted to be
rid of one another must protest, but not too loudly. For if they suc-
cessfully defended their spouse's divorce petition, they would find
themselves in the undesirable position of remaining bound to an abu-
sive or adulterous spouse. Just as it was the social custom to say no to
an offer of marriage when one planned to say yes shortly thereafter, it
was the legal custom to say no to a divorce when the parties had no
desire of taking up cohabitation again.
Early civil divorce required constructing a narrative of fault and
innocence out of a marital conflict that most likely found both at fault
or both in favor of the suit. One could not be seen to agree to the
divorce for risk of having it denied on the grounds of collusion, and
one could not fight the petition too stringently for fear of having the
case dismissed. Even if both parties wanted out of the marriage, the
respondent still had to argue against the petition for the sake of pro-
priety as well as bargaining power, and the petitioner had to appear
innocent and distraught by the respondent's actions. Not surpris-
ingly, the law did not situate the parties equally and so success or fail-
ure, as well as who brought suit, could have significant consequences.
The husband who brought suit and was successful got to retain his
252. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (Signet Classics 1961).
253. Id. at 95.
254. Id. at 96.
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wife's property, retain custody of the children, and would be relieved
of supporting his errant wife in the future. The wife who was success-
ful was relieved of her husband's company and might get defacto cus-
tody of the children, though the odds were against her receiving a
final custody order that would protect her if he returned a "changed
man." Moreover, only one in ten successful wives might get a small
alimony order that the court would be reluctant to enforce if her hus-
band refused to pay.25 5 Even worse, if the case were dismissed or
abandoned, the parties would be on their own to negotiate a private
separation that they and their family could live with, though few provi-
sions would be enforceable if the husband changed his mind.256
Very often, however, the cultural and legal rules do not ade-
quately convey the complex variety of factors that influence different
couples' decisions to divorce. To further understand how these rules
played out in people's lives, I undertook an empirical study of the
court's records for the first nine years (January 1858 to July 1866).257
Because of the legal double standard and the different socio-eco-
nomic situations of men and women, I was particularly interested in
whether differently situated petitioners fared differently before the
new court and to what extent their own demographics affected the
cause of action, the grounds alleged, or the relief obtained. 258 I have
255. See discussion of alimony infra notes 352-376 and accompanying text.
256. In re Besant, 11 Ch. D. 508 (1878); Hamilton v. Hector, 13 L.R.-Eq. 511
(M.R. 1871); Vansittart v. Vansittart, 70 Eng. Rep. 26 (Ch. App. 1858); Westmeath v.
Westmeath, 37 Eng. Rep. 797 (1821).
257. Of the 2540 petitions filed during that time, I reviewed nearly one quarter
of them, noting such details as: length of marriage, number of children, occupation,
residence, and grounds for the action. I also analyzed the court's docket for every
one of those petitions, which identified the final outcome of the case. Further, I
studied a block of cases filed in the first forty months (January 1858 to April 1861) for
interim motions for custody or alimony pendente lite, final custody or permanent ali-
mony orders, as well as procedural issues dealing with jury trials and adequacy of
service. I examined every petition by a petitioner whose last name started with the
letter A, and then every fifth petition thereafter. This represented approximately
24% of the total number (2540) of petitions filed during those nine years. Not all
petitions were for marital termination, however; they were for divorce, judicial separa-
tion, annulment, restitution of conjugal rights, protective orders for property, ali-
mony, and legitimacy. The docket contains the court's records of the pleadings filed
and the court's actions on each case. I examined every single case docketed for the
period January 1858 to April 1861, when the court shifted to a different record-keep-
ing system, which totaled 1154 cases. Where possible, I overlaid the information from
the docket on the petitions. For a detailed breakdown of the petitions see Wright,
Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 992-97 tbls.1-6 and accompanying text.
258. From my research into the law that preceded the new court, I concluded
that it enforced traditional gender roles and gender inequality within the family by
giving only begrudging protection to certain wives and not to others, wives who con-
formed to the Victorian ideal of separate spheres and traditional domestic femininity.
Child custody was an area of legal control of the family that allowed judges to impose
certain social norms into the family through their defining of the welfare standard,
and marital fault and custody were used to define motherhood and police the bound-
aries of acceptable maternal behavior. Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note
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published preliminary findings in another article and will not repeat
the general findings here.259 In this article I focus on how divorce,
custody, and property rulings were intertwined with social differences
and legal disabilities so as to disadvantage wives, even though the
newly granted right to a divorce may have appeared neutral, or even
favorable toward women.
The number of women who filed petitions in the court compared
to men are staggering (1461 petitions filed by women compared to
1065 filed by men in the first nine years260), especially in light of wo-
men's exclusion from most legal remedies before 1858. From a "pure
numbers" perspective, the court would appear attractive to women liti-
gants.261 However, the relief requested and granted differed dramati-
cally for women and men. 262 Fifty-seven percent of women's petitions
were for some form of relief less than a full divorce with the right to
remarry, while only 6% of men's were for something less than full
divorce. 263 Although women's divorces were slightly more successful
(70% to 63%), women abandoned their suits at a significantly higher
rate than men (29% to 18%).2 64 Since there are roughly equal num-
bers of wives as husbands in England at any given time, 265 deviations
in percentages of those seeking relief before the new court and those
19. But to determine whether my interpretation of the law, which came from exami-
nation of case reports, diaries, and political writings, was consistent with the court's
day to day functions, I spent time over two summers analyzing the first nine years of
the court's primary trial records. I obtained this information at the Public Record
Office in Kew, Richmond, which has retained only the petitions, answers, and affida-
vits for the roughly 10,000 petitions filed between 1858 and 1886. The petitions were
filed by year in two separate sets of boxes, the first set covering 1858-1866 and the
second covering 1867-1886. There were approximately 2500 petitions in the first set
and 7500 in the second set. I have not even begun to research the second set. Unfor-
tunately, many of the records Rowntree and Carrier were able to examine in 1958
have been destroyed, including marriage certificates, accountings, and pleadings
other than the initial petition and answer. See Griselda Rowntree & Norman H. Car-
rier, The Resort to Divorce in England and Wales, 1858-1957, 11 POPULATION STUDIES 188
(1958).
259. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42.
260. I reviewed one petition for every 4.26 in the first nine years. Thus, I re-
viewed 343 brought by wives and 250 brought by husbands. Multiplied out they equal
1461 brought by wives and 1065 brought by husbands, plus a few miscellaneous causes
of action, for a total of 2540 petitions in the first nine years. Id. at 992 tbl.1, 995 tbl.4.
261. Husbands brought roughly 997 divorces while wives brought only 630 be-
tween 1858 and 1866. Wives brought an additional 532 separation actions, thus bring-
ing 54% of all marital termination actions. Id at 994 tbl.3, 995 tbl.4.
262. Women actually had a higher success rate than men in their divorce actions,
though a lower success rate in separation actions. See id. at 996 tbl.5.
263. See id. at 995 tbl.4, 1004 tbl.15.
264. Women'sjudicial separations, moreover, were abandoned at a rate of 44%,
compared to husband's judicial separations at 18%. Divorces were abandoned at a
rate of 18% for husbands and 17% for wives. The numbers identified here are the
average of both divorces and separations. Id. at 996 tbl.5.
265. Although there were a few claims of women committing bigamy, the num-
bers of bigamists are so few as to be insignificant.
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obtaining it are likely to be based on legal barriers to one group, so-
cial differences that make legal solutions more attractive to one group
over the other, or a combination of the two. Since women today con-
tinue to file more divorce petitions than men, at least some of these
socio-legal differences may still remain.2 66
Unlike a civil or criminal suit, where the defendant usually does
not want to be sued, the respondent in a divorce case may have will-
ingly committed a marital breach in order to manipulate the case.
Indeed, the respondent may be funding the litigation, and may be
quite content that the parties can work out a more fitting resolution,
regardless of the court's orders. Even respondents who do not wish
for a divorce generally will not reunite with spouses who want out of
the relationship. Therefore, understanding the motives and actions
of the men and women who sought the assistance of the divorce court
requires reading the petitions carefully, recognizing that the allega-
tions of either or both parties are likely to be exaggerated or false. A
review of the divorce records requires an understanding that, in some
cases, the stakes were very high and the discord was very real. In other
cases, the court was merely rubber-stamping a voluntary and bar-
gained-for separation.
In the following sections I discuss some of the actual cases I en-
countered to put a human face on the numbers and help us under-
stand the motives and complexities of these legal controversies. I
then analyze the cases for marital termination, child custody, and ali-
mony along the axis of age of marriage in an attempt to tease out the
interplay of custody and property with termination. Certain conclu-
sions seem rather obvious-that denying a divorcing wife who was not
at fault any further property adjustments will make it difficult for her
to prove that custody of her children is in their best interests if she
cannot support them. However, other conclusions are less obvious
and are more central to my argument: by adopting a marital fault
rule, tying custody and property to fault, and failing to accommodate
the sexual double standard, women would not prove to be the favor-
ites of the new family law.
A. Divorce
Marital termination actions in a fault-based 267 system fall into one
of three broad categories: those desired by the wife and not the hus-
266. Prior to 1923, when the grounds for divorce were equalized between men
and women, women had a lower divorce rate, though when divorce and judicial sepa-
ration were added together, their total termination rate was higher than men. See Act
to Amend the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 19 (Eng.). After 1923,
women's rate of divorce compared to men's was over 50%, and rose above 70% in the
1980s. In 1986 the percentage of successful divorce petitions filed by wives was 73%.
See STONE, RoAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at tbls.13.1 & 13.2.
267. There was much discussion in England and the United States when both
moved from a fault-based to a non-fault-based system for divorce. In a fault-based
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band, those desired by the husband and not the wife, and those de-
sired by both parties. An imprecise overlay of these categories would
be those cases in which the husband has committed a marital breach;
the wife has committed a marital breach; where both have committed
breaches; and where neither has done so. Even if one spouse did not
seek the separation at the onset, by the time the suit reached the
court, both spouses were likely to be either eager for or reconciled to
the final decree. Yet under fault-based rules, at least one party, and
sometimes both, had to appear unwilling to separate and unhappy at
using formal legal mechanisms to make permanent that separation.
Couples had to construct their cases around a model of fault and in-
nocence, even when neither was at fault or both were at fault. Failure
to construct the appropriate narrative of fault and innocence would
result in the case being dismissed and the parties being forced to re-
main informally separated or to undertake a private separation agree-
ment, both of which left them legally married and subject to the
whims and anger of the other.
The importance of the petitioner maintaining an appearance of
innocence and unhappiness at separating, even as he or she was filing
suit, put the parties to a dissolution action in the crazy situation of
having to say no when they really meant yes. At some level, all divorces
are of couples in which both parties ultimately want relief; yet the
court treated the divorce as a benefit to be meted out only to those
petitioners who, unlike Elizabeth Bennet,2 68 fit the expected norm of
elegant society and could say no enough times and in the right man-
ner as to make everyone understand that she really meant yes. Moreo-
ver, a woman's language and manner had to conform to a complex
code of social expectations and gender subordination in which her
desires were never explicitly to be made manifest, because in a very
real sense she was trading one bad situation for another, neither of
system, a spouse seeking a divorce would have to prove a marital breach on the part of
his/her spouse. If that person had not committed adultery, deserted the family, or
engaged in cruelty, the innocent spouse could prevent the divorce. In a no-fault re-
gime, either party can unilaterally obtain a divorce, against the consent of the other
spouse, regardless of innocence or fault. I find the shift to no-fault particularly inter-
esting as a statement about the legal system's concern for innocent spouses. In a
fault-based regime, an innocent spouse whose partner seeks a divorce can prevent it
or demand property or custody concessions because he or she has not violated the
marital contract. Under no-fault, the innocent spouse has no protection, and the
party seeking to leave may do so without much cost. For interesting discussions of the
move to no-fault in the United States, see RICHARD CHUSED, PRIVATE ACrs IN PUBLIC
PLACES: A SOCIAL HIsTORY OF DIvoRCE IN THE FoRMATIvE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAw
(1994); MARY SOMERVILLE JoNEs, AN HIsrORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHANGING Di-
VORCE LAw IN THE UNrrED STATES (1987); LENORE WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLU-
TION (1985); B.H. LEE, DIVORCE LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND (1974); Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1 (1987).
268. See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
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which was likely to represent her true desires. 269 A woman seeking a
dissolution generally wanted rid of her abusive and adulterous hus-
band and she was willing to sacrifice property, perhaps her children,
and certainly her future security to that desire. A man seeking a disso-
lution discarded an unfaithful wife. He also most likely retained the
children and a significant economic advantage that allowed him the
security to start a new family if he so desired.
For women, the court functioned much like the three-headed
dog Cerberus who guarded the gates of Hell. A woman had to adhere
to the strictest of social expectations which demanded she appear to
be an innocent, abused wife who decried the step she was forced to
take. She knew that any misstep might jeopardize her social and eco-
nomic standing. A woman also had to satisfy legal rules which de-
manded that she be utterly without fault, but willing to take the drastic
step of separating herself from her lord and master. She had to as-
sume the contradictory role of passive victim of private wrong as she
stepped into the public light to vindicate herself, a step that immedi-
ately marked her as undeserving because she was not content to re-
main in her proper sphere. Then she had to appease the economic
reality which premised her reward on either her own labor or her own
innocence, never on her own desire. A woman who successfully trod
the minefield might receive her reward: separation from a violent or
adulterous husband and freedom. But she received little else. A wo-
man who failed lost all social, legal, and economic standing unless she
could construct a narrative of greater fault on her husband's part to
preserve some informal social standing.
The following excerpt from a letter by Mrs. Allen, a fallen wife, to
the husband she left is a poignant reminder of the fate of unsuccessful
women.
It is now eight years since I saw my still beloved children, and the
yearning desire I have once more to behold them, induces me to
write to you.... Surely when in your prayers you ask to have your
'trespasses forgiven, as you forgive others,' you will not withhold
yours now, from the Mother of your Children, however much you
may consider it undeserved. I did not leave you for a life of gaiety,
or pleasure, on the contrary toil and sorrow have been my portion
ever since.270
269. Elizabeth Packard, for instance, spoke of wanting to be married, not di-
vorced, but she wanted assistance from the law to make her marriage function prop-
erly where her husband had behaved in violation of the norms. See Hendrik Hartog,
Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 79 (1988).
270. Allen v. Allen, J77-1-6. Hereafter, all cites beginning with J77 refer to the
court files located in the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew. J77 refers to the entire
set of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court records from 1858 to 2002. These files
were originally closed for ninety years. Now they are only closed for thirty years. The
next number refers to the box in which anywhere from five to fifty petitions are con-
tained. And the last number refers to the actual petition. All records surviving in the
Allen case would be folded together under the box and case number (here 1-6).
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She then explained that the man for whom she left her husband had
died, that she had been unable to find employment, and she asked for
the money necessary to return to England to obtain a situation as a
housekeeper. Mrs. Allen only asked to occasionally see and communi-
cate with her children. Mr. and Mrs. Allen had been married about
twelve years when Mrs. Allen left with her lover. The adulterous
couple lived in various English and Scottish locations prior to moving
to the United States. She taught art to make ends meet. Mrs. Allen
ended the letter with this plea: "Truly I thought my heart would burst.
Is my crime so great that I am out of the pale offorgiveness by my nearest
relations, and those calling themselves Christians?"27 1 Her husband's re-
sponse to this letter was not to send her money to return home, but to
file a petition for dissolution. He had her address for service of pro-
cess and proof of her adultery. The court granted the dissolution, and
the adulterous wife was allowed no financial support and no prospect
of seeing her children again.
Yet if neither party was likely to seek reconciliation or would file
for restitution of conjugal rights, what purpose did it serve Mr. Allen
to obtain a dissolution at this time? It was most likely spurred by his
desire to foreclose any possible financial claim she might make for
support and to prevent her from seeing the children if she were able
to scrape together the money to return to England. It is unclear
whether the lawsuit was motivated by the wife's threats to return, or
the opportunity that the new court allowed the husband to formally
end their relationships so that he could remarry.272 Whatever his mo-
tive, however, the grant of the dissolution left the wife with no legal
claim for financial assistance, or access to her children. As a final in-
justice, she would not be entitled to property from the estate of her
deceased seducer since they were not married.
In addition to being able to maintain the necessary appearance of
innocence to negotiate the delicate social and legal hurdles, the suc-
cessful petitioner to a dissolution action reaped benefits that made
the decision of who would file suit a serious strategic move. The
double standard prevailed even more harshly when economic factors
came into play, for husbands who proved the adultery of their wives
and were granted a dissolution were better positioned-legally, eco-
Within each set of records there might be as few as four pages of a petition or as many
as fifty pages containing petitions, answers, affidavits, and the court docket. The PRO
does not number the individual pages within each case's records, so there are no
further page references to be made. Furthermore, in my own research I simply took
notes on each case, so I do not have the complete files available, though I do have
substantial notes in my files.
Mr. Allen was a school teacher at the famous Walpole House, attended a few
decades earlier by William Makepeace Thackeray and detested so strongly that he
used it as the model for Miss Pinkerton's Academy in his novel Vanity Fair. Mr. Allen's
wife was a drawing teacher, presumably at the same school.
271. Allen v. Allen, J77-1-6.
272. The case was filed in February 1858.
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nomically, and socially-than wives who divorced their husbands. Be-
cause a husband retained the property his wife brought to the
marriage, even when he was at fault, the economic and legal reality
conformed to social expectations that he remarry and support a new
family. His former wife, however, was expected to fade into obscu-
rity-the apparent fate of Mrs. Allen. 273
These differences are the result of legal rules and social assump-
tions about the acceptability of adultery, as well as each person's role
within a marriage. We are familiar with the stories of fallen women
cast out of their homes and social circles while men commit adultery
with impunity. We also are familiar with the antics of couples schem-
ing to construct their divorce cases by plotting for the husband to hire
a prostitute, taking her to a country inn, and, lo, being discovered in
bed together the next morning by a shocked chambermaid. The
chambermaid then finds herself a star when she is served a subpoena,
travels to London, and renders theatrical testimony on the stand.
These images pervaded nineteenth- and twentieth-century English life
and literature to such an extent that they influenced the lives of
countless people. The record of Wallis Simpson's second divorce,
which forced a nation to face the realities and myths of marital break-
down when she then remarried King Edward VIII, followed a script so
well acted that it competed with the best on West End stages.274
Fault-based divorce represents one of those anomalies in the law.
The existence of the rule makes a statement that society dislikes the
disruption of divorce, but the ease with which one spouse can commit
a marital breach sends a clear signal that the law cannot stand in the
way of those who truly seek to separate. Fault-based divorce laws did
not deter marital termination; they merely adjusted the bargaining
power of the parties. 275 Very few angry couples, after a lengthy di-
vorce proceeding, went home and made up when the court denied
the decree on the grounds of collusion or failure to prove their case.
Rather, the parties most likely committed more adultery, went on with
their separate lives, or relied on the court's dismissal to demand
273. Parliament considered at length prohibiting adulterous couples from mar-
rying after a successful dissolution action, but declined in order to encourage seduc-
ers to marry the women they had ruined. While the discussion appeared to focus on
incentives to make amends for the wrongs these men had done to seduced women,
the law clearly encouraged remarriage for women so they would not be a burden to
their ex-husbands. See 144 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1857) 1702.
274. J162-1. Mrs. Simpson claimed the respondent committed adultery at the
Hotel de Paris, Bray, in the County of Berks, with a Mrs. E.H. Kennedy. There is a
transcript in which a waiter at the hotel states that he was working one of the rooms
and that a man and lady occupied it and he took them their breakfast and they were
in bed together. Although the Queen's Counsel tried to intervene, the court rejected
the evidence of collusion and granted the decree nisi in April, 1837. Simpson and King
Edward were married less than two months later.
275. Though no one has directly proved the correlation, I believe that with the
rise in no-fault divorce, and a relaxing of the courts' concerns with collusion, the
private separation deed has, not surprisingly, fallen into desuetude.
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greater or fewer concessions in a private separation. When women's
already meager bargaining power was combined with the socio-legal
double standard, the new fault-based holistic family law did little to
help individual women petitioners, and even less to improve women's
position in a sex-segregated world.
It certainly did nothing for a wife, like Mrs. Allen, who was the
only partner at fault. Consider the case of Spratt v. Spratt &DAuterz
2 76
in which the husband filed the initial petition for dissolution alleging
adultery and desertion on the part of his wife. Mrs. Spratt had aban-
doned her husband to take up lodgings with Frederick D'Auteri, her
husband's former pharmaceutical assistant. In Mrs. Spratt's answer
we discover that the husband frequently abandoned his wife for days
on end without money, that she was forced to ask Mr. D'Auteri for
small loans, and that Mr. Spratt often sent his wife into their lodger's
bedroom before he had arisen to request money. Mr. Spratt fre-
quently asserted that Mr. D'Auteri "would do anything for" Mrs.
Spratt.277 We also learn in Mrs. Spratt's answer that Mr. Spratt had
also been guilty of adultery, had fathered a child by a married woman,
and had used instruments on his wife to procure an abortion. The
couple had been married for nine years, though the allegations of
adultery by both parties suggested they were both straying as early as
five years into the marriage. An interim order of custody granted the
seven-year-old daughter to the father, while the four-year-old son was
allowed to remain with Mrs. Spratt's friends on condition that she not
remove him. 278 The dissolution was granted after a jury trial, how-
ever, and the father received a final custody order for both children,
thus rewarding the adulterous husband and not the adulterous wife.
Assuming that the Spratt's marriage had deteriorated, both par-
ties had committed adultery, and they were living separate and apart
for nearly four years, why did the husband bring suit and not the wife,
and why then? It is likely that Mrs. Spratt could have met the higher
burden of aggravated adultery by characterizing the abortion as cru-
elty, or casting the failure to support his wife as desertion. The timing
is suspect; there must have been a reason she did not file first. The
answer most likely is that her own adultery would have prevented the
suit from being successful, even though her husband's adultery clearly
did not prevent his suit from being successful. Even in a case of ap-
parent equal fault, there were forces at work that prevented the effects
of the law from being equal.
In a small sampling of twenty-four cases brought by husbands,
twelve included responses by wives claiming that their husbands had
driven them to commit the adultery through their own cruelty and
adultery or denying the adultery altogether, and five of those twelve
276. J77-49-20.
277. Id,
278. Spratt v. Spratt, 164 Eng. Rep. 699 (D. 1858).
[Vol. 19:211
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 272 2004
"WELL-BEHAVED WOMEN DONT MAKE HISTORY"
involved wives who filed a counter petition.2 79 Of those twelve, six
were dismissed, four granted dissolution to the husband, one granted
dissolution to the wife, and one was not continued. 280 Moreover, the
one case granting dissolution to the wife, Fisher v. Fisher & Fenner,281
involved a wife who filed her suit first; her husband's suit was an offen-
sive response to her petition. It did not seem to matter to the court if
the wife's adultery was the original marital breach as in Allen, or oc-
curred in response to the husband's fault as in Spratt. Regardless of
the cause, a wife's adultery would prevent her from obtaining a disso-
lution. And a wife's counter-allegation of adultery might be successful
only if she disproved the charge against her. More likely, she would
only succeed in having the case dismissed.
Dismissal, however, was no great victory to the wife. In the six
cases where the court dismissed the husband's suit, presumably be-
cause the fault of both indicated collusion or condonation, the likely
outcome would have been an informal separation or a private separa-
tion agreement that would place the wife in a dicey legal limbo.282
The parties would remain legally married in name with the husband
owing his wife support, but at the same time retaining a proprietary
interest in his wife's chastity. This control enabled him to fully di-
vorce her later if she formed a liaison with another man. It was under-
stood that separated wives had to remain chaste because their
279. This was a small sampling of cases obtained for other reasons, but a close
analysis of the petitions showed that a large percentage of these wives not only had
reason to leave, but fought the petition. Because they involved claims of custody,
usually by mothers, the number of cases by husbands was low.
Petitions by Husbands
Wife W filed
Outcomes Opposed suit
Divorce Granted 12 3 1
Divorce Abandoned 5 0 1
Divorce Dismissed 6 3 3*
Other - RCR 1 1 0
Total 24 7 5
*husband's suit dismissed and wife's counter-suit granted in one case
280. The twelve cases are Allen v. Allen & D'Arcy,J77-1-11 (dismissed); Carter v.
Carter & Saunders, J77-9-60 (n/c); Cubley v. Cubley & Smith, J77-9-50 (granted for
husband); Fisher v. Fisher & Fenner, J77-18-16 (granted for wife); Gibson v. Gibson,
J77-20-32 (dismissed); Redfern v. Redfern & Balse & Browne, J77-45-42 (dismissed);
Ryder v. Ryder & Watson,J77-44-35 (dismissed); Seddon v. Seddon & Doyle, J77-50-87
(dismissed); Spratt v. Spratt & D'Auteri, J77-49-20 (granted for husband); Stacey v.
Stacey & Baldwyn, J77-53-216 (granted for husband); Thompson v. Thompson,J77-54-
38 (granted for husband); Watson v. Watson & Wilkinson, J77-59-84 (dismissed). As a
relatively random selection of petitions filed by husbands which were opposed suffi-
ciently to have claims of custody, roughly half included counterclaims by wives of their
husbands' adultery and cruelty.
281. J77-18-16.
282. See discussion of the difficulties of private separation, supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text. See also NORTON, A LETrER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61, at 38-40.
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husbands could obtain a full divorce and be relieved of the obligation
to support them if they later succumbed to the temptations of another
man. This was true even if the wife had separated with the consent of
a husband who had committed adultery himself. The social hypocrisy
that permitted a separated man to live with another woman, but did
not allow a wife to live with another man, stemmed in part from the
legal double standard that allowed men to divorce their wives for sim-
ple adultery, but not vice versa.
The difficulty for women was compounded by the greater barriers
they faced to earning an income. A woman who owned no property
often required a man for support. If she did not have a father,
brother, or son, and turned to another man, she risked divorce and
the loss of what little she had from her first marriage. And if her new
man would not marry her and take over her support she would be left
in the position of Mrs. Isabel Carlyle, heroine of the wildly popular
East Lynne, who was divorced by her husband for running off with an-
other man. 28 3 When the divorce was final, her seducer, who had just
come into his own fortune, refused to marry her because now that he
had secured his title it would be unbecoming for a man of his position
to marry a divorced woman.284
This double standard was exacerbated by the husband's legal ob-
ligation to support his wife so long as she remained chaste. The obli-
gation would cease upon her remarriage or commission of adultery.
A separated wife, however, had no proprietary interest in her hus-
band's post-separation chastity; even if she proved his adultery, that
alone would not be grounds for a divorce. Because the one-sided obli-
gation of support was premised only on the woman's behavior, her
adultery had far greater implications for her future life as well as her
treatment before the new court than did her husband's. A woman's
adultery was an irretrievable fault upon which her entire future and
her success before the court might depend, while a husband's adul-
tery was merely an aggravating factor. Regardless of who initiated the
divorce, society's aversion to female adultery meant that even where
both had been guilty, the wife's trespass was more likely to influence
the outcome than the husband's adultery. Whether the court dis-
missed the action or granted the husband's petition, mutual adultery
meant that the wife would be condemned to a future of unimpeacha-
ble behavior or be cut off from all support. This applied even though
her husband's cruel and adulterous behavior may have driven her out
of her home. The only remedy to her was a successful divorce that she
initiated.
However, even success did not always grant security. The double
standard also disadvantaged wives when they initiated suit. In a some-
what random sampling of eighty-nine cases brought by wives, only one
283. MRs. HENRY WOOD, EAST LYNNE (Richmond, West & Johnson 1864).
284. Id. at 100.
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included an answer alleging the wife's adultery;285 three were followed
by a separate suit by the husband alleging the wife's adultery;28 6 two
were in response to suits by the husband for dissolution which alleged
adultery;287 and ten alleged misbehavior, violence, intoxication, or
other incompatibilities that drove the husband to his suit. The re-
maining seventy-three cases were either unopposed or included gen-
eral denials of marital fault by the husband. 288 If we omit the five
cases in which both spouses filed petitions, and compare the success
rate of cases with counter-allegations, women suffered from the allega-
tions of fault more than husbands. This was true even when the fault
was not adultery, but rather abusive language or intoxication. Of the
eighty-four suits by wives that did not involve counter suits by hus-
bands, a simple allegation of misbehavior by the husband in his an-
swer dropped a wife's success rate from 77% to 55%.289 If we include
the double-suits, a wife's success rate dropped to 44%. Husbands
whose wives made counter-allegations of their husbands' marital faults
saw a relatively small drop in success rate from 50% to 43%.290 Al-
though wives were more likely to have husbands who did not allege
some aggravating factor on the part of their wives, when husbands
made such allegations, the effect on the outcome was substantial.
285. Singleton v. Singleton, J77-53-206.
286. Carter v. Carter, J77-9-60; Fisher v. Fisher, J1 1-18-16; Thompson v. Thomp-
son, J77-54-38.
287. Redfern v. Redfern & Balse & Browne, J77-45-42; Ryder v. Ryder & Watson,
J77-44-35. These two "double-suits," plus the three identified in note 286 above, were
also included in the sampling of twenty-four petitions filed by husbands listed above.
288. A summary of the outcomes of these petitions is as follows:
Petitions by Wives
Husband H filed
Outcomes Opposed suit
Dissolution Granted 42 4 1
Separation Granted 21 2 0
Divorce Abandoned 8 1 0
Separation Abandoned 14 4 1
Divorce Dismissed 3 0 2
Separation Dismissed 0 0 0
Other - RCR 1 0 1*
Total 89 11 5**
*wife's suit dismissed and husband's granted
**3 suits wife filed first, 2 suits husband filed first.
289. Of the seventy-three that did not include counter-allegations by the hus-
band, a wife's success rate was 79% (fifty-six granted and fifteen abandoned or dis-
missed). Of the eleven cases with counter-allegations of the wife's fault, a wife's
success rate was 55% (six terminations granted and five abandoned or dismissed). If
we include the double-suits the number is even smaller, 47% (seven terminations
granted and eight abandoned or dismissed).
290. Or from 50% to 33% if we include the double-suits.
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Of course, even at their lowest success rate, wives were successful
more often than husbands,291 so one is tempted to claim that the
court was in fact much more responsive to women than men. But this
overlooks the fact that men and women were differently situated. A
quick perusal of Mrs. Allen's case reveals that, in a fault-based regime,
unfaithful wives were relegated to the margins of society, cast off pen-
niless and friendless. Unfaithful husbands could take the marital
property and begin a new life, and only a few would be subject to a
relatively small alimony obligation.292 The harshness of the legal and
social response to female adultery would certainly operate as a deter-
rent to wives who were in unhappy marriages.
The large number of husbands who were successfully divorced by
their innocent wives because of the husbands' aggravated adultery
shows the extent to which women were forced to adopt traditional
female roles of passivity, chastity, and innocence. When the wives' en-
tire futures depended on allegiance to their marital vows, they were
likely to restrain their own desires. It would be harder to prove they
were at fault, and the small percentage of successful cases brought by
husbands for their wives' adultery reflects this deterrent effect of the
law. Because few consequences attached to adultery by husbands,
there was little deterrence to the activity and thus more successful
cases were brought by wives. Women's high success rate overall can
be explained by the lack of deterrent effect of the law on male breach
and men's lower success rate can be explained by the deterrent effect
of the discriminatory divorce law on women's behavior. Together, wo-
men suffered the dual injustice of facing harsher penalties for infidel-
ity than men, combined with far greater pressure to conform to a
narrow range of domestic behavior.
Moreover, those differences are further exacerbated by counter-
allegations of misbehavior when the parties began from different start-
ing points due to the differential effects of the law. Female petition-
ers' success rate dropped twenty-two percentage points when
husbands alleged that their wives were culpable because of misbehav-
ior like abusive language and intoxication. 293 This behavior did not
rise to the level of marital fault sufficient tojustify a divorce or separa-
tion. In contrast, male petitioners' success rate dropped only seven
percentage points when their wives alleged that they were guilty of
cruelty or adultery, allegations that would constitute marital fault suffi-
cient for a separation or divorce. 294 Thus, wives' counter-allegations
of marital breach had less effect on husbands' petitions than hus-
bands' counter-allegations of character flaws had on wives' petitions.
291. Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 996 tbl.5.
292. My data show that only about 10% of wives who obtained their divorces or
separations were actually awarded alimony, so 90% of guilty husbands got off without
any financial obligations. See discussion infra notes 352-376 and accompanying text.
293. Supra note 289 and accompanying text.
294. Supra note 290 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:211
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 276 2004
"WELL-BEHAVED WOMEN DONT' MAKE HISTORY"
We can only conclude that the court was marching to the tune of the
rest of Victorian society; it viewed an ill-tempered wife to be worse
than an adulterous and violent husband.
This somewhat random sampling was compiled because I was an-
alyzing cases dealing with requests for custody of children and not
looking specifically to cases involving vigorous defenses. Nevertheless,
the data show that a significant percentage of the cases brought by
husbands against their wives for adultery (twelve out of twenty-four)
may have occurred because the husband drove the wife out, or be-
cause they had mutually moved on to other relationships (i.e. both
were at fault). Only a relatively small percentage of cases brought by
wives included counter-allegations that the wives had contributed to
the separation (fourteen out of eighty-seven).
This kind of careful attention to the petitions provides a deeper
understanding of the raw numbers which merely revealed the number
of cases filed by husbands and those filed by wives. Though wives filed
more termination petitions, and may have had a higher success rate
than husbands, the nature of their allegations were quite different.
The effects of social expectations were clearly felt in the court's treat-
ment of those petitions, and the different financial and custodial con-
sequences meant that the effects of divorce were quite different. We
cannot simply say that the court was good for women because more
women found some relief there.29 5
In a case such as the Spratts', numerous forces were operating to
influence which party sought the divorce, how much bargaining
power each had, and whether the resolution would be ultimately satis-
factory for either or both parties. The overwhelming numbers pre-
vent me from individually analyzing each case, but certain patterns do
emerge when we view the data as a whole. One axis that is particularly
fruitful is length of marriage, not so much because older couples have
different expectations than younger couples, but because age tends to
affect attitudes toward reconciliation, economic resources, age of chil-
dren, and preferred remedies. 296 If we impose modern sensibilities
295. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 992-96 tbls.1-5. Wives filed 630
divorce petitions, 532 judicial separation petitions, twenty-one annulment petitions,
and sixty-four restitution of conjugal rights petitions for a total of 1247 petitions in
the first nine years (these numbers are approximations from the numbers of petitions
actually viewed multiplied by 4.26 to reach the total number filed). Id. Their success
rates for divorces were 70.42% and for separations 40.19%. Id.
296. I went through the petitions, answers, and affidavits to glean information
about the people who were using the court, how long they had been married, how
many children they had, their occupations, the grounds they gave for the marital
breakup, and the relief they requested. I looked at petitions covering approximately
nine years. Then I went through the court's docket, examining the process the court
used to resolve the cases, how long it took, how often it granted alimony or custody,
how often a jury trial was used, who the lawyers were, and the final outcomes. The
docket consisted of seven folio books, of 350 pages each, which recorded all pleadings
filed, all hearings, and the substance of all orders for the period January 1858
through April 1861. To date, I have been able to analyze the court docket only for
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and common stereotypes about divorce, adultery, and desertion onto
nineteenth-century family breakdown, we might construct likely scena-
rios for different marriages. We might imagine that a wife in her first
five or so years of marriage would have an infant child or two. When
her marriage began to break down she would petition for a divorce
rather than a judicial separation in order to remarry and, if possible,
she would return to her parents' house for their financial assistance in
the marital termination action. Her youthful idealism would make
her unwilling to compromise on her legal rights and she would have
every intention of starting anew in the marriage market. By contrast, a
wife married between ten and twenty years would be likely to have
some older children, might possibly receive the income from the
older children's wages, and would be financially unstable if she were
forced to support the entire family on her own. If her husband com-
mitted adultery, she would use a termination action for strategic rea-
sons, primarily to get custody, alimony, or property settlements. She
might be more willing to try to reconcile or seek other resolution
mechanisms to spare the children, avoid the costs, or sidestep public-
ity. But property would be a primary issue if she were to maintain the
family intact. And a wife at the later end of her marriage, greater than
twenty years, would seem the most indifferent to whether she received
a divorce or ajudicial separation as she would have little likelihood of,
or interest in, remarriage. She would be most successful because she
would have the most economic resources at her disposal and her chil-
dren would be grown so the family's expenses would be diminished.
She would also be less interested in a property settlement if she had
her own business or had some family or friends to support her be-
cause her expenses would be low.
Only a few of these assumptions are borne out by the early court's
records. This may be because they are tinged with modem sensibili-
ties or because additional social forces in the nineteenth century
make many of these assumptions too simplistic. The data suggest that
many of the assumptions just hypothesized are not justified, and that
other social forces may have influenced the differences we see among
different groups of wives.
the first three and a third years of the court's existence, but the docket fills out infor-
mation not available in the petitions. Much of this data is further examined in
Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42.
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According to the petitions, young wives were just as likely to re-
quest ajudicial separation as a divorce (twenty-five & twenty-five), they
would not continue more than half of their termination actions
(twenty-seven),298 and cruelty was by far the most common complaint
(thirty-seven), either alone or mixed with adultery. As the marriage
progressed, ranging from five to ten years, the number of divorces
requested outpaced the number of judicial separations (thirty-four to
twenty-eight), but the number of cases not continued or dismissed was
still higher than those granted (thirty-three to twenty-nine). Although
there were more couples in this range than any other, the pattern for
success rate and grounds most closely followed that of the youngest
marriages. Slightly more than half (thirty-four out of sixty-seven) re-
quested a divorce, and nearly half of all termination actions (thirty-
three) were abandoned or dismissed. A notable distinction between
the younger marriages and these cases is the increase in desertion as a
ground for the divorce (nineteen out of sixty-seven compared to six
out of fifty-six). In both groups, these couples were likely to have
small children and to have fewer financial resources than older
couples, and a separation (either formal or informal) was likely to
have caused significant disruption to their lives.
Marriages between ten and fifteen years showed a noticeable shift
in the relief requested. These wives were more than twice as likely to
request a divorce than a judicial separation (forty-three to nineteen)
and the overall success rate was significantly higher than the rate of
non-continuance and dismissal (thirty-seven to twenty-five).299 These
wives seemed particularly serious about wanting to obtain a full di-
vorce, and they were least likely to abandon their case before comple-
tion. They alleged the most common marital faults-adultery mixed
with cruelty-at a rate more than twice any other ground. These wo-
men are a particular anomaly. If the children's wages were critical to
their livelihood, or their husbands had deserted them, we would imag-
ine that these women would have less property with which to pursue
the divorce. While most successful wives were entitled to have their
costs paid by their husbands, the number of desertion cases (sixteen
out of sixty-five) indicates that nearly 25% of these wives could not rely
on this relief.
As we move into the later stages of marriage, fifteen to twenty-five
years, the numbers of divorces and judicial separations shifted back
toward equal numbers (thirty-five and thirty-three), and the success
rate continued to be high (forty-two granted to twenty-six abandoned
and dismissed). The most notable shift is in the increase in desertion
claims and the relative decline in claims of adultery (twenty-three de-
298. This number reflects both abandoned and dismissed suits because neither
resulted in a termination that might yield recognizable legal rights.
299. This may be indicative of a prevailing norm that in society's eyes, long suf-
fering earned a wife a right to a divorce, while simple outrage was all that was neces-
sary for a man to deserve a divorce.
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sertion to thirty-three adultery). While the rate of success in the ter-
mination was roughly the same as for wives married ten to fifteen
years, the number of suits dismissed by the court was at its lowest
(five). Hence, these women may have been least likely to collude with
their husbands, or they may have had the strongest claims. Did these
women plan to remarry? Did they ask for the divorce simply because
they could? Did they use divorce to seek alimony or property settle-
ments? These women had the highest success rate of any set of claim-
ants, yet they accepted a judicial separation at almost the same rate as
divorce.
For women in the lengthiest marriages, over twenty-five years, the
numbers shifted dramatically toward a greater percentage of judicial
separations over divorces (twenty to eight). This confirms the stereo-
type that older women were not likely to be interested in remarriage.
Adultery was the single most common ground given, with desertion
close behind (fourteen to ten). Ironically, however, these women had
one of the lowest success rates (37%), even though they were request-
ing primarily judicial separations. 300 This may be because the court
felt that the only practical result of a separation was to protect a wife's
property, and that this could better be achieved through a protective
order. Curiously, one would imagine these women to have had the
highest success rate. They would not be likely to seek a divorce or
judicial separation unless their relationships had been eroding for
many years. They would have had a long time to amass sufficient evi-
dence of marital fault.30 1 Since desertion was an important ground,
one would think the court would have been liberal in granting these
judicial separations. However, the low success rate and the high num-
ber of property orders to this group of petitioners indicate that the
court preferred granting protective orders rather than separations to
these women. 30 2
In viewing the data in its entirety, we see that, among the young-
est wives, the high rate of judicial separation compared to divorces is
quite odd (twenty-five and twenty-five), given the logical conclusion
that younger women likely would be more interested in possible re-
marriage than their older counterparts. But to the extent these wo-
men were imbued with some sort of Victorian romanticism that
300. Although a judicial separation would prevent the errant husband from re-
turning and demanding conjugal rights, it essentially foreclosed any sexual activity by
these women. They could be charged with adultery if they took up with another man
after their separation and might lose any alimony they had won in the separation suit.
The preference for property orders over judicial separations further exacerbates the
problem, most likely condemning many older women to celibacy.
301. This cuts both ways because there could be many instances in which adul-
tery or cruelty that was not ongoing would be considered condoned by the innocent
spouse and would not constitute grounds for termination.
302. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 1006 tbl.17 (showing that wo-
men married five to ten years and twenty-five to thirty years had significantly more
property orders than other wives).
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rejected the idea of remarriage, 303 the high rate of non-continuance
may indicate that some other resolution took place. That resolution
might have been a private separation or a reconciliation. To the ex-
tent dismissals by the court might indicate likely collusion, the rate
was high enough among young couples to perhaps scare many collu-
sive couples into dropping their petitions before they reached a final
determination. The number of dismissals dropped dramatically for
older marriages, which is difficult to understand. Because dismissal
would occur if the petitioner failed to prove her case, if both were
guilty, or condonation or collusion occurred, a low dismissal rate
would indicate that these petitioners had stronger cases. Were older
couples less likely to collude than younger couples or were older
couples more likely to have adequate proof of marital fault?
Thinking back to the Spratt and Allen cases, 30 4 we must consider
the individual positions of these women. Under the prevailing legal
rules requiring proof of aggravated adultery, wives had four choices,
in ascending order of permanence, when seeking termination of their
marriages. First, if their husbands had deserted them for at least two
years and they had wages or other income they wished to protect, they
could easily obtain a protective order for property that allowed them
to continue to support themselves without fear of losing their liveli-
hoods to returning husbands. A protective order was inexpensive,
quick, and protected their income, but it gave them no other legal
protections, such as custody of their children, the right to remarry,
return of property they brought to the marriage, or any access to
property earned during the marriage. Wives continued to live in a
legal limbo, married in name only, with no financial support from
their deserting husbands, and protected only in future earnings. For
women whose husbands had moved to America or Australia, and who
perhaps had entered into bigamous second marriages, or who had
voluntarily agreed not to molest them, the property order gave them a
certain modicum of independence, but little ability to form new inti-
mate relationships.30 5
303. Anne Bronte's novel, The Tenant of Wildfell Hall, tells of a young woman who
had left her cruel and adulterous husband and taken their child with her, but while in
hiding she never imagined herself married to another and divorce did not appear an
option. ANNE BRONTE, THE TENANT OF WLFELL HALL (Harcourt 1962) (1848). In
fact, when her dissolute husband was lying on his deathbed, she returned to nurse
him until death, not because she wanted a reconciliation, but because her duties as a
wife insisted that she remain committed to him until death. See also Wright, The Crsis
of Child Custody, supra note 19, at 243-45.
304. See supra notes 270 & 276 and accompanying text.
305. The reality was, however, that these women could easily appear single or
widowed and many may have remarried and hoped they would not be caught. See
Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 967 n.323. And this was at least part of the
social ethos of the time, as we see it reflected in novels like Thomas Hardy's Mayor of
Casterbridge and the fact that of 543 petitions examined that were filed by both hus-
bands and wives, allegations of bigamy appear in ten, or nearly 2%. While that num-
ber is quite small, it only includes those cases in which bigamy was proved through
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Second, for women in the upper and middle classes, and espe-
cially those with some property, a private separation agreement exe-
cuted by the husband and trustees for the wife would have some
binding legal authority. Many of the property provisions of these
deeds were enforceable in Chancery, 30 6 but provisions dealing with
custody or upbringing of children were not. v0 7 Most important, the
deed was only enforceable so long as the wife remained chaste. She
continued to be married to her husband in name, so she could not
remarry. If she chose to take up relations with another man her hus-
band then would have the power to divorce her entirely. These deeds
really only worked to the extent the husband agreed to comply with
their terms; if he chose to violate them, however, in issues regarding
children or cohabitation, the courts were reluctant to enforce the
wife's rights.
Third, a judicial separation would give women a right to support
as well as a return to feme sole status for future earnings, and would be
used mainly by women who presumably were not in a position to re-
marry. Their reasons could be that they were uninterested in remar-
riage or were unable to meet the burden of proving aggravated
adultery. These women formed future intimate relationships at great
risk of losing financial support and being divorced in a later action, at
least in those cases where their husbands were providing such sup-
port. But while the separation granted them physical relief from abu-
sive and adulterous husbands, and protection for earnings (though
not property), the separation gave them little else.
Fourth, a full divorce with the right to remarry obviously provided
wives with the most legal protections, but they were costly to obtain,
did not guarantee financial support or custody of children despite the
articulated rules to that effect, and placed the wives in a tenuous social
position. They would not get return of any property they brought to
the marriage, so remarriage might be difficult.30 8 The odds of receiv-
ing alimony were less than one in eleven.30 9 However, the records
indicate that most of the women who successfully brought dissolution
actions had been suffering violence at the hands of their husbands for
many years, with bouts of adultery scattered throughout, and most
had been forced to leave their husbands' house at least once prior to
filing their petitions. They had been threatened with knives, canes
evidence of subsequent remarriage. I suspect that many of the desertion cases in-
cluded bigamy, especially if one spouse had left the country. There were 121 of the
543 petitions that alleged desertion, or nearly one in four.
306. They were enforceable only in Chancery because they were the product of
the court's equity arm. Staves, supra note 69.
307. See Hamilton v. Hector, 13 L.R.-Eq. 511 (M.R. 1871); Vansittart v. Vansittart,
70 Eng. Rep. 26 (Ch. App. 1858); Walrond v. Walrond, 70 Eng. Rep. 322 (Ch. App.
1858); Westmeath v. Westmeath, 37 Eng. Rep. 797 (1821). See also Moore, supra note
69.
308. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 976-78.
309. See discussion on alimony infra tbl.3.
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and pistols, pokers and fire irons; they were dragged downstairs and
beaten with fists; they were routinely given venereal disease, doused
with the contents of chamber pots, forced to undergo abortions, in-
sulted and demeaned, locked out of the house at night, and had their
jewelry pawned or stock in trade stolen. Thus, their commitment to
obtaining the dissolution was quite high, and most appeared willing to
obtain freedom at any cost.
It is this cost that is most troublesome, however. To say that a
wife could not ever leave her husband is unquestionably harsh and
unfair. But to say that she could leave her husband, but it was going
to be difficult, costly, and dangerous, is perhaps even worse. If a hus-
band drove his wife into the arms of another man, she lost everything.
If she colluded in the action, she would be left with the vagaries of a
private separation. If her children were over age seven, she lost them,
even if she was innocent.310 After she walked the minefield of social
and legal barriers, even the innocent wife was likely to lose custody of
her children, receive no property settlement from the property she
brought to the marriage, and most likely would not get any alimony.
If she was lucky enough to get alimony, she had best be on her guard;
remarriage or cohabitation with another man would terminate her
husband's future obligations. If she had a bad temper, her case
against her guilty husband would suffer. Wives were ultimately strong-
armed into complying with complex social and legal expectations of
innocence and forbearance while husbands were given the benefit of
the doubt in nearly all legal determinations.
This is not to say that all wives were innocent victims and all hus-
bands abusive adulterers. Approximately half of the divorce petitions
brought by husbands were not contested and over 60% were
granted.311 Many women found sufficient incentives in the arms of
other men to risk being divorced and left destitute by their husbands.
Husbands were entitled to a divorce only on the grounds of adultery
and many women, like Mrs. Allen, fell in love with other men and
chose to leave the safety of social and legal propriety for life with
someone more compatible. But as Mrs. Allen's case revealed, adultery
by a wife had very different consequences than adultery by a husband.
An adulterous wife would be divorced, lose all rights to property and
children, and would be able to secure a living only through her own
labor or the generosity of her seducer. Mrs. Spratt's lover, Mr.
D'Auteri, like Francis Levison in Mrs. Henry Wood's novel East Lynne,
may have felt some reluctance in marrying a divorced woman, even if
the divorce resulted from their own seduction. We see in Spratt, as in
the novel, that after some time these seduced women are abandoned
by their seducers and turn to a life of prostitution or menial labor to
survive. In fact in Spratt, it appeared not to be Mrs. Spratt's affair with
310. Wallis v. Wallis, J77-58-15. See discussion on child custody infra VI (B).
311. Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 996 tbl.5.
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D'Auteri, or even her moving into lodgings with him that precipitated
the divorce; rather, it was after she broke with D'Auteri and started
seeing numerous men that Mr. Spratt felt it necessary to divorce her.
A husband who left his wife for another woman, on the other hand,
took his income and his social respectability with him. If his wife di-
vorced him, he did not rely on an offer of remarriage or on the gener-
osity of his mistress for support.
B. Custody of Children
Interpreting the data surrounding child custody orders is particu-
larly difficult. Although the court had adopted a rule that the inno-
cent spouse was entitled to retain custody, 12 other considerations like
the tender years doctrine, pre-existing rules on forfeiture of custody
developed in the Chancery, and the realities of desertion and support
make custody difficult to analyze. For instance, the substantive rule
that prevailed in the Chancery before the new court was formed held
that fathers would retain custody unless they were a danger to the
child's life and limb, even when the mothers were innocent.313 That
presumption was difficult to break, especially by a court that had lim-
ited ability to amend final orders. Thus, in one case, a final custody
order was denied to a mother because the court wanted the freedom
to modify the order if the father were to ever return from the United
States and take an interest in his children, even though he had aban-
doned them and entered into a bigamous marriage in his new
country.314
Rhetoric around the tender years doctrine slowly emerged during
this time to recognize the bonds between mothers and infant chil-
dren.315 We would therefore expect to see a greater percentage of
custody orders for mothers of infant children than for mothers of
older children, but such was not the case. 316 Moreover, it is difficult
to determine how many families were split up, with the youngest chil-
dren remaining with the mother, and the older children being placed
with the father or at school. The Spratts' children, for instance, en-
ded up separated during the litigation, with the father obtaining cus-
tody of the seven year old and the four year old remaining with
friends of the mother who allowed both parents access. 317 Mrs. Spratt
was eventually denied all access to both children even though she had
had custody of both for the four years of the separation.318 In another
312. Martin v. Martin, 29 L.J.K.B. 106 (D. 1860).
313. SeeHope v. Hope, 44 Eng. Rep. 572 (Ch. 1857); InreFynn, 64 Eng. Rep. 205
(1848).
314. Robotham v. Robotham, 164 Eng. Rep. 587 (D. 1858).
315. See discussion of tender years doctrine supra note 193 and accompanying
text.
316. See infra tbl.2.
317. Spratt v. Spratt, 164 Eng. Rep. 699 (D. 1858).
318. Id.
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case, Wallis v. Wallis,3 19 the wife successfully obtained ajudicial separa-
tion for her husband's cruelty and was awarded alimony, but was given
custody only of an infant daughter and not of her three elder sons.
The father was given access to his daughter once every six weeks, and
the mother was granted access to her three sons at the same interval,
though she was entirely innocent.3 2 0
In addition, most of the men who deserted their wives also de-
serted their children, while few women who left their husbands left
their children behind. According to the petitions that eventually re-
sulted in a custody order, even the women who were at fault generally
left their husband's domicile, taking the children. In the cases that
produced the most conflict over custody of the children, the majority
were in the possession of the mother at the time of suit. But one must
remember that actual physical care of a child does not translate into
legal rights if the father chose to challenge the mother's custody or
child-rearing decisions. Moreover, a legal regime that failed to pro-
tect maternal custody except in very rare circumstances created an
imbalance in the marital relation that gave fathers autonomy and
power which they could wield against mothers if they were otherwise
unhappy with the way their marriage was going.
One poignant case shows the difficulty mothers had in protecting
their children. In Ryder v. Ryder & Watson,3 2 1 the Honorable Freder-
ick Dudley Ryder, the younger brother of the second Earl of Har-
rowby, sued his wife of twenty years for dissolution. Ryder alleged that
she had committed adultery with the rector of the local parish, and
had subsequently given birth to the rector's illegitimate child. The
parties were married in 1839 and had ten surviving children. Mrs.
Ryder's answer to the petition denies the adultery and makes her own
very serious allegations. She revealed that while she was pregnant with
her ninth child in 1853, Mr. Ryder committed incest with their eldest
daughter. Upon discovering the incest, Mrs. Ryder refused to sleep
with her husband and revealed his incest to her nurse as insurance
should she die in childbirth. After she confronted her husband with
the information she had, he criticized her for, as he put it, "awakening
the perceptions of [their daughter] to the revolting and fearful char-
acter of her father's said offence and for reproaching him with the
injury to her position and prospects in life, which it would occa-
sion."32 2 When Mrs. Ryder refused further intercourse with her hus-
band, he frequently forced himself on her.
319. J77-58-15.
320. Id. While I would be loath to suggest that all spouses who are responsible
for the breakdown of a marriage would be unfit parents to have custody of their chil-
dren, there are serious fairness issues in a legal scheme that grants an innocent
mother access to her three sons for the same remarkably brief periods as the violent
and abusive father has to the infant daughter.
321. J7744-35.
322. Id.
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Between 1853 and 1857, the Ryders continued to live in the same
house and the husband forced himself on his wife numerous times,
resulting in a tenth child, who was born in 1855. Throughout this
period, Mrs. Ryder begged her husband to leave the family. Finally,
through the intervention of relatives, Mr. Ryder consented to reside
permanently abroad, leaving his wife in charge of their family and
property. A deed of separation was then prepared, but Mr. Ryder ulti-
mately refused to execute it. He returned in the fall of 1858 and
again took into his own hands all the rents and profits of the family
estates. He even withdrew money his wife held in trust for the Parish
Clothing Club, which she eventually had to replace by selling a por-
tion of her clothing. In the spring of 1859 Mr. Ryder proposed to
renew cohabitation, and threatened to take the children from her if
she refused. In June of that year, Mr. Ryder returned to their house
with his brother and brother-in-law and again made the offer that they
resume cohabitation. Upon her refusal, he took three sons and three
daughters, leaving only the eldest daughter with her (the three eldest
sons were at school). A month later, Mr. Ryder returned in the same
company, and with two hired men, and demanded the eldest daugh-
ter, but agreed to return the two youngest daughters if she complied.
Mrs. Ryder refused. The eldest daughter was forcefully removed and
the mother was left alone, losing physical custody of both her female
toddlers to a husband who had admitted to his sexual abuse of his
thirteen-year-old daughter. In response to Mr. Ryder's petition for
dissolution, Mrs. Ryder filed her own petition for dissolution, alleging
the above incidents and praying for custody of all ten children, even
though the eldest was at the time twenty years old and two others were
over fourteen.
At the end of the day, both cases were consolidated and ulti-
mately dismissed. An interim order on custody left all children at
school or at their uncle's house (the husband's brother), with access
to be granted to both mother and father. In this case, the father had
committed incest when his eldest daughter was no more than thirteen
years old, yet the mother cohabited with her husband for another four
years trying to persuade him to leave. It was another two years after
they separated before the husband filed suit and formal legal chan-
nels were followed. Although the wife clearly had grounds to obtain a
Parliamentary divorce, as well as the financial means, 323 she chose not
to seek legal intervention, relying instead on family pressure to effec-
tuate a private separation.
The similarities between this case and the case of Abigail Bailey,
written about at length by Hendrik Hartog in his most recent book,
Man and Wife in America,324 make it tempting to imagine that the same
323. The wife revealed in her answer that she was entitled to rents and profits
from her father's estate of £3000 per year, and this would not include any property
owned by the husband in his own right.
324. HARTOG, supra note 37.
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lengthy processes were at work in Mrs. Ryder's mind as in Abigail Bai-
ley's mind. Abigail Bailey married her husband, Asa Bailey, in 1767,
and they had fourteen children together.32 5 After sexually assaulting
two servant girls early in their marriage, Asa turned his interests to
their oldest daughter, Phoebe, when she was about sixteen years
old.32 6 Hartog recounts, from Abigail's memoirs, the agonizing delib-
erations she went through in trying to reason with her husband to get
him to leave peacefully and privately, and how long it took before she
resolved to seek legal assistance or reconcile herself to a divorce. 327 In
the case of Mrs. Ryder, the husband initiated the legal action, 328 per-
haps because she had indeed had an affair with the rector, but more
likely because he hoped to preempt a suit by his wife. However, it is
quite clear that Mrs. Ryder, like Abigail Bailey, wanted her husband to
depart quietly, leave the family in peace, and not force her to have to
turn to the public world of law and courts to protect her eldest
daughter. 32 9
In comparing the cases of Ryder and Bailey, we can clearly discern
the differences between English and American law on child custody.
Hartog was correct in noting that an American court, faced with Asa
Bailey's incest, would have readily granted custody of the children to
the mother.330 An English court actually faced with Frederick Ryder's
incest, however, refused to grant custody to the mother and instead
left the children with the husband's brothers, the Earl of Harrowby
and the Honorable Granville Dudley Ryder, both of whom had partici-
pated in the forcible removal of the children from their mother's
home. 331 In deciding Mrs. Ryder's motion for interim custody, the
court left the sons at school, the remaining children at the homes of
their uncles, and refused to make any order as to the three children
over age fourteen.3 32 More importantly, the court held that the seri-
ous charges leveled by the parties against each other were not factors
325. Id. at 44-52.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Ryder v. Ryder & Watson, J77-44-35.
329. While few people would choose immediately to go to court against a spouse,
we must agree with Lord Lyndhurst that most women would choose litigation only
after all other channels failed. 142 PARi. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 415. That tendency,
which may or may not be true for husbands, certainly makes one wonder how many
women would have had the grounds for a divorce but chose not to seek formal termi-
nation of their marriages at all.
330. Hendrik Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married Woman's Con-
sciousness, in LAw IN EvERYDAY LiFE 63-108 & cases cited n.52 (Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns eds., 1993).
331. Ryder v. Ryder, 164 Eng. Rep. 981 (D. 1861). The 1804 case of De Man-
neville v. De Manneville, 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch. 1804), the first inter-spousal custody suit
brought in an English court, also involved a father who had forcibly removed a child
from its mother, and he too was granted permanent custody. See also Wright, De Man-
neville, supra note 36.
332. Ryder, 164 Eng. Rep. at 981.
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to be considered in making the interim custody order.333 The court
felt that doing so might improperly influence the later proceedings. 33 4
Allegations of incest were thus deemed irrelevant in determining in-
terim custody. In rejecting the Chancery rule that would remove a
father who posed a danger to the life and limb of his child, this court
apparently viewed the husband's brothers' homes to be safe havens
from the possible abuse of the father.33 5
In cases in which the custody of the children became a decided
source of conflict, the court often separated the children as in Spratt,
ordered them into the homes of relatives away from both parents as in
Ryder, or ordered them to remain in the interim where they had been
taken by the father, even though he had used threats of taking the
children away to force his wife to comply with demands for property
or to overlook his adultery. 33 6 In one case, Cartlidge v. Cartlidge, the
court denied the mother's interim custody petition, instead allowing
the child to remain with the father who had ordered the wife out of
the house and refused to allow her to take the seven-month-old infant
with her.337 The court refused to interfere with the "natural right of
the father," and held that
the petitioner must establish a case beyond the mere natural desire
of a mother to have the custody of her infant child ... it is quite
clear to my mind, that the child is healthy, and at least as thriving as
when the mother was with it. There is no proof that the mother's
health is injured, or that she is capable of suckling the child. It
being unnecessary then, on account of either the mother or the
child, I think I ought not to remove it.338
I examined the petitions for custody orders filed in the first nine
years,339 and compared them to cases involving couples with children.
Petitioners were required to indicate the number of children living in
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. In all likelihood, the father would have been living in the home of one of
his brothers after being ousted from the family home by his wife. How the court
could think it appropriate to leave the children in any home that might be visited by
the father is hard to imagine if the best interests of the child is supposed to be the
court's guiding principle.
336. In the case of Morris v. Moris, J77-35-65, the husband placed the children
with his sister and forbade the wife from seeing them while he lived in adultery with
another woman. The court ordered the children to remain with their aunt and al-
lowed the mother access for two hours every two weeks until the case was resolved, at
which time they were put into the custody of the mother. In the end, the mother
received a judicial separation and custody, but no alimony, and the husband contin-
ued to live in adultery with his mistress.
337. Cartlidge v. Cartlidge, 164 Eng. Rep. 1117, 1117-18 (D. 1862).
338. Id. Eventually, the wife's dissolution was granted and she was given final
custody, but in the interim of over two years the mother had very limited access to her
newborn infant. Cartlidge v. Cartlidge, J77-10-100.
339. The dataset of cases involving custody came from every petition that in-
cluded a request for custody somewhere in the body of the petition regardless of
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any petition seeking marital termination, and of the 298 petitions
filed by wives for separation, divorce, annulment, or restitution of con-
jugal rights, 168 had children. This amounts to slightly more than
56% of all female petitioners indicating that they had living children.
Out of those 168 petitions, a total of forty-nine involved either a re-
quest for custody of the children in the prayer of the petition, or a
later petition for custody that was either granted or denied. Of those
forty-nine, only twenty-four were granted custody either in the final
dissolution decree or in a separate interim or final custody order.3 40
The remaining twenty-five were either abandoned (along with the ter-
mination petition) or were not granted a final custody order despite
the termination petitions having been granted.3 4 1 Thus, only approxi-
mately 14% of wives who had children received an order of custody
(twenty-four out of 168).
TABLE 2: WIvEs: LENGTH OF MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND
CUSTODY ORDERS (1858-1866)342
Children
# custody
petitions % of total
Length of # w/ # receiving aband. or with
Marriage total # children Custody no order children
<5 56 23 4 2 17
5-10 67 39 2 9 5
10-15 65 39 9 6 23
15-20 40 26 5 5 19
20-25 32 18 1 3 6
25-30 18 10 0 0 0
>30 14 10 0 0 0
unknown 6 3 3 0 100
Total 298 168 24 25 14
whether it was granted, and every reference to custody in the docket for the first three
and one-third years.
340. Three of the twenty-four custody orders were for interim custody and were
not followed by any final custody order. We can assume that they resulted in custody
for the mother, however, because if she obtained interim custody she would be likely
to come back to court if the father removed the children and denied her custody after
the termination.
341.
Wives' Custody Petitions Compared to Success in Termination Action
Cause of Not Custody No Order on
Action Granted Continued Dismissed Granted Custody
Divorce 20 6 1 14 13
Separation 10 10 2 10 12
Total 30 16 3 24 25
342. In this table, the first column lists the total number of petitions in the nine-
year period that I examined, and the second and third columns identify the total
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What is notable is that the percentages of women with children
who received custody differed dramatically between women married
less than five years and those married five to ten years-the years one
would expect to see the most number of custody orders. In fact, the
highest percentage of orders to petitioners with children came in the
ten-to-twenty year group. The tender years doctrine appears to have
influenced the court to rule favorably for those very youngest mar-
riages (and presumably youngest children), but the group of wives
with the largest number of petitions (five-to-ten year range) had the
lowest success rate in their custody requests.3 43 And yet the majority
of their children were likely to be under seven years of age.
Custody was also denied to numerous women who requested it
and should have had it granted them because they proved the
grounds for their termination. For instance, in Brown v. Brown,344
Harriot Brown obtained a judicial separation from her husband on
the grounds of cruelty, but she was not granted custody of the chil-
dren, even though her husband was currently imprisoned with hard
labor for his violence toward his wife. Notably, in Brown, we can as-
sume that the mother received no legal protection for her children.
She filed in forma pauperis, and presumably could not afford to follow
up her suit with multiple petitions for custody. And she probably had
actual custody and merely wanted the legal protection of a final order
in case her husband returned. In Ryder, however, where there was
substantial wealth, the court's dismissal of the action likely precipi-
number of those petitions that indicated the presence of children and for which a
custody order was granted. The fourth lists the number of custody petitions that were
abandoned, denied, or no order was given and the fifth gives the percentage for each
age group of custody orders granted per total number of couples in that age group
with children.
343. This is also odd because children over age fourteen were generally allowed
to choose which parent he or she wanted to live with and custody orders were likely to
be informally modified as the child was able to express a preference for custody. See
Rex v. DeLavel, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (1763). At the same time, however, there was a legal
preference that children between seven and fourteen years of age would reside with
the father (who could best coordinate education or professional training), while chil-
dren under seven would be awarded to the mother (who could best provide for the
nurturing care of infants). Though we cannot assume that women married fifteen
years, for example, would have children in their teens, the high percentage rates for
the young marriages corresponds to the tender years doctrine, but the high percent-
age rates for wives married ten to twenty years does not correspond to the custom that
fathers would receive custody of children over seven. Nor does the low percentage
rate for women married five to ten years make sense if younger children were likely to
be given to the mother. In any event, it is important to remember the distinction
between the formal rules giving fathers custody in most instances of dispute, the
tender years doctrine as a rule of thumb adopted by the court to protect infant chil-
dren, and the cultural reality that mothers probably ended up with actual physical
custody in a majority of the cases in which they were not at fault, but no legal protec-
tion if the father later showed up and demanded access or custody.
344. J77-2-44.
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tated a private separation agreement.345 This agreement may have
provided the wife with some rights to custody or access to her chil-
dren. Nevertheless, the refusal of the court to affirm custody of any of
the children in either wife meant that Mrs. Ryder probably had to
surrender property to her husband in the private separation to obtain
better custody terms, and Mrs. Brown would have had to constantly
watch over her shoulder for the return of her angry husband.
A careful review of the twenty-four petitions in which the wife re-
ceived an order of custody reveals that many of the couples already
had separated. Two husbands were in jail for violence to their wives;
twelve involved either wives leaving because of violence and abuse, or
husbands deserting their homes with a mistress; one husband was a
gambler and another a sodomite; and an additional eight involved
cruelty and adultery in the home that involved periodic separations,
though it is unclear if the parties were separated at the time the peti-
tion was filed. And while custody was challenged only in a small hand-
ful of these cases, the vast majority did not appear to be contested by
the father.
There were some cases in which no custody orders were made
because the termination suit itself was not continued. But there was a
sufficiently large number of cases where prayers for custody were
made in the petitions, the termination petitions were granted, and
inexplicably nothing was done about custody by the court. One rea-
son could have been, as articulated in Robotham, that the court did not
want to issue final orders that could not be modified if the parties'
circumstances changed. 46 Other reasons might have been that the
husband had not challenged custody, or the parties had agreed infor-
mally to custodial arrangements and neither side felt like risking a
negative final decision by the court that would be unalterable. How-
ever, the data reveal that approximately 86% of married women with
children did not request custody, or did not receive it if they re-
quested it. This does not mean that all of these women lost access to
or custody of their children in fact. But even if most retained defacto
custody, or settled for custody in private separation agreements, these
mothers were likely to have no legal rights if the father should return
later and demand the children.3 47 Certainly, not all children would
be the subject of great legal disputes, like the Ryder sons who were
potential heirs to the title and estates of the Earl of Harrowby.3 48 Hus-
bands like Mr. Spratt, who had tried to force their wives to have an
abortion, were unlikely to present an image of the devoted father. Yet
even Mr. Spratt ultimately received custody of both children because
345. See discussion supra note 321 and accompanying text.
346. Robotham v. Robotham, 164 Eng. Rep. 587 (D. 1858).
347. This occurred in In re Besant, 11 Ch. D. 508 (1878), Ryder v. Ryder, 164 Eng.
Rep. 981 (D. 1861), and to some extent in the case of Abigail Bailey. See Hartog, supra
note 330.
348. See discussion supra note 321 and accompanying text.
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his wife had to commit adultery to survive. The bar against awarding
custody of children to an adulterous wife was not removed until
1873 . 49
The lower numbers do not ignore the fact that some women, in
fact more women than ever before, received a final custody order for
their children, and the recognition that they had the legal rights to
make medical, educational, and religious decisions on their children's
behalf.350 But the uneven application of the law, including the ban
against adulterous wives receiving custody, again forced women into
traditional domestic roles, precluded their forming new attachments,
and dramatically hampered their ability to seek support from male
friends during the termination process. When the dictates of title and
property prevailed over the safety of a daughter who was being sexu-
ally assaulted by her father, and when the paternal right to control the
education of his children so dominated the law that the court would
split the family to protect husbands who had violently threatened and
abused their wives, women were no doubt discouraged from bringing
suit, they were denied anything like legal rights in their children, and
the cycle of familial abuse was unlikely to be broken.351 And to add
insult to injury, most of these wives would receive no alimony or finan-
cial support to enable them to survive. They would subsist solely on
the generosity and intervention of family or friends.
C. Property
One of the harsher aspects of coverture is that all property a wo-
man brought to her marriage immediately became owned by her hus-
band. Upon marital termination, that property remained his. The
law treated her property-be it real or personal, rents or profits, an-
nuities or bonds-as his legal right upon marriage and therefore not
to be interfered with upon divorce. Moreover, the 1857 Act did not
grant the court jurisdiction to modify any pre-existing property settle-
ments. Consequently, when a husband was entitled to keep the prop-
erty a wife brought to the marriage, and he was found guilty of a
breach which entitled his wife to a divorce, alimony was the only
349. Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.).
350. Of course, when the total number of mothers receiving custody in the fifty
years before 1858 was in the single digits, twenty-four orders in nine years may seem
like a sea change. See Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody, supra note 19, for a thorough
discussion of the pre-1858 custody cases. Mrs. Ryder and Mrs. Spratt, however, were
unlikely to view the law reform favorably as they watched their vulnerable children
removed by violent and abusive fathers, all with the blessing, or at least the
forebearance, of the court.
351. In three cases in which the court split custody, granting the eldest to the
fathers and the youngest to the wives, the fathers had violently abused and beaten
their wives so badly that the wives had been forced to leave their husbands' roofs. See
Martin v. Martin, J77-35-40 (two sons split between parents); Mead v. Mead, J77-35-60
(three sons to father, youngest daughter to mother); Wallis v. Wallis, J77-58-15 (three
sons to father, youngest daughter to mother).
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mechanism for an innocent wife to receive any financial return from
the property she once owned.352 But as we know all too well today,
alimony poses significant problems for couples who want no more
communication with each other after the divorce is granted. When
emotions run high, and both parties blame the other, alimony is often
viewed by the husband as a galling reminder of his ex-wife's failures.
Out of spite, he often refuses to pay it. In the nineteenth century, as
today, collecting on alimony, as on child support, could be very diffi-
cult, especially if the husband had left the country or simply chose not
to pay.
The wife who was found guilty of adultery would not be entitled
to alimony, though the court did have the power to settle damages
awards on the wife if they were collected from the co-respondent.353
Although this was actually done more often in Parliamentary divorces,
there is some evidence that the court applied small damages settle-
ments on wives who might have had no other means of support.3 54
Yet alimony was by far the most common tool for restructuring
marital property, and permanent alimony awards were allowed only
for wives who ultimately prevailed in their suits. 35 5 I examined the
court's records detailing alimony orders for the first three and a third
years.35 6 And once again, the court's record is disappointing.
352. The court's ability to modify property settlements was amended by statute in
1860. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 144 (1860) (Eng.).
353. Only successful wives were entitled to alimony, and her own adultery would
preclude a wife's grant of a dissolution. But the court could settle property damages
auards on the wife according to 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § xxxiii (1857) (Eng.).
354. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 1007 tbl.19.
355. Of course, it is an oxymoron to call the property "marital property," for the
law treated all property owned by the couple as exclusively the husband's. The wife
was entitled only to support and she could often obtain credit in her husband's name
to enable her to purchase necessary goods. But if a husband advertised that he was no
longer supporting her, merchants sold wives goods on credit at their own risk. See
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 160-62.
356. The numbers for alimony are obtainable only from the docket and thus
represent a significantly smaller sample. While there were fifty-six wives married less
than five years in the petitions covering nine years, only twenty-one of those same
cases were identified in the docket, and for those twenty-one only two received
alimony.
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Only twenty-two out of 127 female petitioners obtained an ali-
mony order, and eleven of those twenty-two received only temporary
alimony during the pendency of the suit. The law entitled every single
wife, whether she was the petitioner or respondent, to alimony during
the pendency of her suit (pendente lite), but very few women asked for
it, and even fewer received it. And the temporary alimony would ter-
minate upon completion of the litigation.35 8 The average amount of
alimony pendente lite was significantly smaller (£28 per year) than the
permanent alimony awards made by the court (£81 per year) .39 This
may indicate that women of slightly more means had the ability and
incentive to pursue their case to full termination and an order of ali-
mony, rather than settle for a temporary award that might only tide
them over for a year or eighteen months.360 Yet of the twenty-two
alimony orders granted, only four equalled or exceeded £100. In con-
trast, Mrs. Ryder brought real property whose rents and profits were
roughly £3000 per year to her marriage.3 6 1 Clearly, the very wealthy
couples did not seek the court's oversight in property matters, and the
court's inability to resettle pre-marital property arrangements may be
one reason these couples ultimately sought resolution elsewhere.3 62
Mrs. Ryder's case was dismissed,3 63 most likely followed by a private
separation agreement that would return to her the profits of some of
her property and would settle the remainder of her property on her
children at her death. Wealthy fathers would strive to ensure that
358. These temporary alimony orders most often occurred in cases that were
ultimately dismissed or not continued. It is unclear if the failure of the underlying
termination action resulted in discontinuance of alimony payments, or if, as Lawrence
Stone suggested, women used filing these actions to get alimony awards. STONE,
ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 183. Eleven alimony awards out of 127 petitions,
however, is not such a great success rate that we can assume that most women were
using the court to obtain alimony. All we can be sure of is that only eleven of the
sixty-nine petitioners who were granted their divorce or separation (out of the 127
petitions in the docket), received an award of permanent alimony, though all sixty-
nine were entitled to it.
359. Twenty-eight pounds in 1860 is roughly equivalent to £1320 in 2004, or
$2500. Eighty-one pounds in 1860 is roughly equivalent to £3820 in 2004, or $7,258.
The British pound was worth more in 1860, however, being worth roughly $4.85 while
today it is worth about $1.90. In any event, it would be hard to imagine anyone, much
less a mother with small children, supporting herself comfortably on anything under
£100 per year.
360. The average time from filing to final termination was 356 days for dissolu-
tion and 268 days for separation, with many cases taking over a year if there were
custody or alimony petitions.
361. Ryder v. Ryder & Watson, J7744-35.
362. After the court could rearrange property settlements by virtue of the
amendments of 1860, it did make settlement orders in thirteen cases, out of a little
more than one thousand termination actions. The percentage is so small as to be
insignificant as an indicator of the court's willingness to rearrange marital property or
as an indicator of a couple's willingness to ask the court to do so. See Wright, Untying
the Knot, supra note 42, at 993 tbl.2, 1008 tbl.20.
363. Ryder v. Ryder & Watson, J77-44-35.
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property settled on their daughters would not remain in the hands of
estranged sons-in-law. But women like Mrs. Spratt or Mrs. Allen, who
did not have powerful fathers who could protect their daughters'
property, could not count on receiving assistance from the court.
Unfortunately, few petitions reveal much information regarding
either the social class or property owned by the parties. Although the
marriage certificate cited the vocations, if any, of the husband and the
fathers, it is difficult to glean the financial position of the couple after
perhaps many years of marriage. Periodically, a petition reveals some
of the more common human behaviors that occured under the stress
of a disintegrating marriage. In the case of Cartlidge v. Cartlidge,364 the
wife accused her husband of using abusive and insulting language,
trying to strike her with his umbrella, telling her "to go and lodge with
the Irish people up the yard," threatening her with commitment in an
asylum, and ordering her to leave the house. Mr. Cartlidge would not
let his wife's mother speak to her in the home, but rather made her
speak through the window (he felt his mother-in-law was stirring up
trouble between them). But what seemed most galling to Mrs. Car-
didge was that she was displaced in the home as mistress by her hus-
band's sister. The sister presided at table and was her brother's
partner in a drapery business. Mrs. Cartlidge filed her petition for
dissolution on March 10, 1862. Shortly thereafter, a notice appeared
in the local paper which read:
Great and Important Sale. In consequence of unforeseen circum-
stances, and over which the proprietor has no control, the whole of
the large and valuable stock of Linen and woolen drapery belong-
ing to J. Cartlidge, High Street, will be offered immediately for a
clearance sale . . . the Stock will be remarked in plain figures, at
prices which will ensure a speedy clearance, as the proprietor is de-
termined to clear out as speedy as possible.365
In a subsequent series of affidavits, only a few of which remain, the
wife denied the husband's charge that she had an income of £700 per
year, but admitted that she had £75 per year, plus an interest in some
property worth £5 per year that she had to sell off to pay the expenses
of the suit. She referred to the proceeds of the sale as that "which her
husband should have to pay, but he made himself bankrupt and sold
his business to his sister."3 66 Apparently, the proprietor did not "clear
out as speedy as possible;" rather, he got his business out of his name
so the court would have nothing to attach if he failed to pay any ali-
mony award.
Of course, it is a common problem today in divorce situations
that one party, usually the husband, will attempt to hide assets from
364. J77-10-100.
365. Id. The shop was to be closed between April 2nd and April 5th at which
time it would be reopened with new prices for inspecting the stock. Id.
366. Id.
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the other's discovery. Mr. Carflidge was not the only respondent who
avoided an alimony order by transferring his property into another's
name, though it was not common. The most common way to avoid
alimony during the nineteenth century was simply to desert one's wife
and children, which occurred in nearly one-quarter of these cases.3 67
In the end, Mrs. Cartlidge received her divorce on the grounds of
cruelty combined with adultery; she also received custody of their in-
fant child, but she did not receive any maintenance or alimony order.
And when she attempted to visit the sister at her drapery business, she
was refused entry.368
Not surprisingly, a wife who was granted an order of permanent
alimony retained it only so long as she remained chaste and unmar-
ried. In Fisher v. Fisher the court discussed at length the history of
alimony and maintenance. It explained that in the ecclesiastical
courts, when a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted at the suit of the
husband, no alimony was awarded. When the ecclesiastical courts
granted a divorce at the suit of the wife, alimony was often ordered
because she remained his wife and her husband was legally obligated
to support her. The practice in Parliamentary divorces was that main-
tenance might be provided for the adulterous wife, though often it
was out of the damages awarded in the criminal conversation action
through the interposition of the "Lady's Friend."3 69 The Fisher court
felt that these situations were inapposite to a wife's petition in the new
court because, as Sir Cresswell Cresswell stated, " It] he husband elected
to have the marriage dissolved, and to be again free from all marital
obligations. He therefore was at liberty to take what he asked upon
the terms offered."370 Sir Cresswell Cresswell could find no instance
of a wife obtaining alimony who sought a Parliamentary divorce, so
there was no precedent to follow when she sought the termination.3 71
Thus, in deciding whether an innocent wife who elected a dissolution
over a judicial separation should be entitled to alimony, he stated:
"the Legislature no doubt intended that she should not seek a remedy
at the expense of being left destitute ... on the other hand, I think it
would not be politic to give to wives any great pecuniary interest in
obtaining a dissolution of the marriage tie."3 72 For Sir Cresswell Cress-
well, the issue appeared to be the wife's election of a formal dissolu-
tion rather than a judicial separation. Because the wife could have
chosen merely the separation, and thus remained married and enti-
367. Desertion was a stated ground in seventy-five out of 298 actions. See supra
tbl.1.
368. Cartlidge v. Cartlidge, J77-10-100.
369. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 161 n.22. The Lady's Friend was a functionary
appointed by the House of Commons to represent the wife's pecuniary interests dur-
ing a Parliamentary divorce.
370. Fisher v. Fisher, 164 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1056 (D. 1861) (emphasis added).
371. Id.
372. Id.
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fled to support, the logic was that she did not need alimony. In con-
trast, if she chose a full divorce, the court concluded that she was
willing to forego the benefits of that support in exchange for full free-
dom, including the freedom to remarry. Ironically, therefore, we see
the court more willing to grant alimony in cases of separation where
the marital fault was less severe than in divorces where the husband's
marital fault was quite egregious.
Mrs. Fisher received £100 alimony, to be reduced to £80 upon the
death or marriage of their daughter, "so long as [she] leads a chaste
life and remains sole and unmarried and maintains the daughter."3 73
Thus, to avoid creating incentives to terminate their marriages, the
court would grant an innocent wife only the barest amount necessary
for survival and only so long as she behaved in compliance with the
social and legal expectations of a wronged wife. The separated wife
had to remain chaste to avoid being divorced and left destitute, and
the divorced wife had to remain chaste to maintain her alimony. Even
post divorce, men retained an interest in their wives' chastity, while
women were never allowed a correlative interest in their husbands'
chastity. Perhaps to avoid the surveillance or inconvenience, or be-
cause the cause was worthless, most wives simply did not ask for ali-
mony, especially if they had adequate support from family or a future
husband.
Those wives who were deserted or whose husbands had such un-
certain income as to make an alimony order useless were on their own
after they elected a divorce. 374 In addition, many wives whose husbands
were violent, and especially those whose violence centered around
poverty or difficult financial circumstances, would be unlikely to de-
mand alimony because they wished to avoid further violence and con-
frontations with their angry husbands. Wives like Elizabeth Aitken
faced a difficult decision when opting to terminate their marriages.
Elizabeth owned her own shop through the 1850s, and after 1853 she
often separated from her husband because of his violence and adul-
tery. However, James, her husband, routinely entered her shop, beat
her, and took what money or stock she had available. He was twice
bound over at the police court to keep the peace, yet he still felt no
compunction demanding that she turn over money she had saved.
Once, when he demanded thirty shillings and she refused, he beat her
in front of her shop girls. He then stole seven pounds of inventory
and left, returning twenty minutes later again demanding the thirty
shillings. This time she gave it to him to avoid more violence. 375 Eliz-
abeth received her dissolution, and custody of her four children, but
373. Id.
374. The court had the ability to grant a protective order for property that would
return a wife to feme sole status for past and future earnings, set back to the date of
desertion by her husband. But it was applicable only in cases of desertion. See Wright,
Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 1004 tbl.15.
375. Aitken v. Aitken, J77-1-34.
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no alimony. And a wife like Elizabeth Laxton, who received her di-
vorce on the grounds of adultery and cruelty, obtained no alimony
order even though her husband was a barrister with chambers in the
Middle Temple. s76
In the end, alimony and property settlements were clearly inade-
quate to enable a wronged wife to pursue her legal rights to divorce in
the absence of family and friends. It is outrageous that a judge would
parse out the alimony award to the least penny necessary so as not to
create an incentive for wives to divorce their violent and adulterous
husbands. The levels of violence reflected in the petitions, even al-
lowing for some exaggeration, was depressing in frequency and inten-
sity. Yet few studies of the court, and no parliamentary returns, have
focused on the violence and abuse in these families. Naturally any
violence would be a great disincentive to a wife who contemplated
pursuing her legal rights and remedies against a guilty husband be-
cause violence often increases when a wife tries to escape through sep-
aration or divorce. Alimony awards were rare because a large
percentage of the population lived at or near the poverty level. But
these awards were made even more rare by the niggling opposition of
the court, the rules of coverture that ceded all power over marital
property to the husband, fault-based rules that denied unfaithful wo-
men any financial support, and the reality of violence that forced wo-
men into the arms of other men. When Mr. Spratt's violence and
adultery forced his wife into the arms of Mr. D'Auteri, she had no-
where else to turn. 37 7 But once she did, she lost her support, her chil-
dren, and her home by a fault-based law that allowed men to retain a
property right in their wives' chastity even as they flagrantly violated
their own marriage vows.
D. Analysis
What this data reveal is important for understanding the diverse
scope and effect of legal reform. While lawmakers thought the court
would have a lot of free time because very few English wives or hus-
bands would need its services, the tremendous increase in cases is not
surprising to modem historians who are comfortable with the exis-
tence of divorce as a remedy for broken marriages. Over a nine-year
period, close to 400 women asked for and received divorces, while an
376. Laxton v. Laxton,J77-32-35. The Middle Temple, the Inner Temple, Gray's
Inn, and Lincoln's Inn are the four inns of court, surviving since the medieval period,
that originally served as law schools and professional associations for barristers, and
today survive as associations in which membership is required before being called to
the Bar. They also serve as the body that disciplines barristers and they provide differ-
ent chambers that, like American law firms, choose the young apprentices they will
hire.
377. Spratt v. Spratt & D'Auteri, J77-49-20.
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additional 170 received separations. 378 The former met the stringent
grounds of proving aggravated adultery; only about 14% of those with
children received legal custody and less than 9% received any perma-
nent alimony. Despite the law that all women were entitled to tempo-
rary alimony during the proceedings, and all women who were
granted their separation or divorce were entitled to their children and
permanent alimony, orders to this effect rarely issued from the court.
More importantly, wives' success rate differed dramatically by the
length of their marriage, as did the remedy they requested and the
grounds for relief. Differences in length of marriage across groups of
women appear to have been important in the relief they requested.
Such differences compel us to examine more closely the ways in which
different marriages age and the effectiveness of the law for different
groups of women.
Women in the middle range of marriage (ten to twenty years)
were the most successful in their divorces. 379 This indicates that the
law somehow resonated better with these wives than with wives at the
early or the late stages of marriage. The court was particularly hostile
to women at the latest stages of marriage (twenty-five years and over),
granting their petitions in only 36% of cases, while they granted them
in 61% of cases for women married between ten and twenty years. 380
Perhaps the older women were more likely to use termination peti-
tions for strategic reasons, such as to obtain property settlements or
alimony. Older wives did have a higher rate of alimony orders, receiv-
ing it in 29% of cases while women married ten to twenty years re-
ceived alimony in only 11% of cases. 38' But the older wives also had
more allegations of desertion than their younger sisters, which was the
ground for obtaining a protective property order.38 2 Thus, the con-
nection between property and marital termination is unclear. Those
women who seem most in need of property were least likely to get it,
and those most likely to deserve termination were least likely to get it.
Did the court not grant either set of claims because they were weaker
claims, or because it felt the claims violated certain social norms?3 8 3
Wives at the earliest stage of their marriages are also an anomaly,
for they brought equal numbers of separation as divorce petitions, 384
378. I extrapolated out from the success rate indicated here to the additional
76% of petitions that I did not examine.
379. See supra tbl.1.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. It would seem possible that older women would get property and not di-
vorces because the court felt that men should not be allowed to set aside long-term
companions who had contributed to the marital estate, though these requests were
made by women, women who apparently decided a future alone was better than one
married. What they got was continued legal ties but some recognition of their claim
to marital property.
384. See supra tbl.1.
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though the separation was a particularly problematic remedy, because
they would be a group most likely to remarry and most harmed by the
legal limbo of a separation. They had one of the lowest rates of ali-
mony orders and yet one of the higher rates of custody orders,38 5 so if
they did get their children they did not seem likely to get any property
to help support them. They had a very low success rate for judicial
separations (eight out of twenty-five for those married less than five
years, and eight out of twenty-eight for those married five to ten
years), matched only by the rate of the oldest wives married longer
than thirty years (two out of nine).386 Nearly half, however, of wives
married fifteen to twenty years were successful in their separations
(seven out of eighteen). 387
The data illustrate that we cannot explain the high rate of divorce
petitions and high success rate for certain marriages, and the low rate
of divorce petitions and low success rate for other marriages, simply by
reference to the creation of the court in 1858. While the court gave
women a chance for divorce that they never before had, the court
functioned differently for married women in different demographic
categories. Women without children had a slightly higher success rate
in their divorces and separations than women with children (52% to
49%), though the difference may not be statistically significant.388 Of
those married women who received alimony in the docket, slightly
over half (fourteen out of twenty-two) had children and half did not,
though most with children were clustered in the early stages of mar-
riage while those without children were in the later stages.389 The
presence or absence of children had little to do with whether or not
alimony or a divorce would be awarded. At the same time, women in
different age groups clearly sought different forms of relief in the new
court based on quite different grounds. While cruelty predominated
in the early years of marriage, desertion predominated in the later
years of marriage as aggravating grounds.3 90 And one important dif-
ference is the number of cases that were abandoned: twenty-two out of
fifty in the first five years of marriage compared with fifteen out of
sixty-two in the middle years of marriage. 391
Most important, this data show that custody of children and ali-
mony were not awarded regularly enough to have had much impact
on a woman's decision to terminate her marriage. Even looking at
women married twenty years or less with children, only twenty out of
385. See supra tbls.2 & 3.
386. See supra tbl.1.
387. Id.
388. For the 280 divorces and separations granted in which the number of chil-
dren was known, there were eighteen (6%) for which the presence or absence of
children was unknown, yielding a margin of error greater than three, which is the
difference between the two categories of wives.
389. See supra tbls.2 & 3.
390. See supra tbl.1.
391. Id.
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127 mothers received a custody order (16%),392 thirteen out of ninety-
five received alimony (14%), 393 while 113 out of 212 (53%) were
granted their divorces or separations.3 94 And while one might think
these numbers are tremendously high compared with the complete
lack of custody and alimony orders prior to 1858, we must compare
them to the law that granted all successful wives both custody and ali-
mony. If only 16% received custody and only 14% received alimony,
how did the rest of the separated wives survive and did they not re-
ceive custody and alimony because they did not ask for them? If so,
why did they not ask?395 Or did they have defacto custody because the
father had not threatened to interfere and the only property that mat-
tered was their future earnings, which would be protected by the dis-
solution or separation?
Moreover, these numbers on custody and alimony pertain only to
those women who were granted their marital terminations; a full 130
out of 275 women, nearly one-half, either abandoned their termina-
tion suits or had them dismissed.3 96 That number is troubling be-
cause of the socio-economic impediments that existed to a wife's
ability to complete her suit; she may have lacked the economic re-
sources, been pressured by family or friends to reconcile, felt societal
pressure to conform to expectations of feminine passivity, or received
the benefit she sought and thus dropped her case.3 97 For those wo-
men who were unsuccessful in the court, the law provided no formal
protection and most likely exacerbated their difficult relations with
their husbands. Wives who had strong families or fathers who would
act as a trustee in a private separation agreement may have felt that
the legal protections offered by the court were not worth the public-
ity, cost, and delay. If their husbands ultimately complied with the
terms of the agreement, their futures might have been relatively
peaceful. Such wives still were foreclosed from entering new relation-
ships, and contractual terms about custody and upbringing of the chil-
dren would not be enforceable, but these women might have achieved
a certain amount of peace. Caroline Norton, for instance, found her
392. See supra tbl.2.
393. See supra tbl.3.
394. See supra tbl.1.
395. Although the court docket indicates alimony and custody petitions when
separately made, they did not identify them if they were incorporated in the initial
petition or another motion. Sometimes an order for custody or alimony would be
noted in the docket when no request appeared to have been made and other times
when it had. Presumably, many requests were made orally or were embedded in
other motions that were not summarized fully in the docket.
396. See supra tbl.1. Of course, when we extrapolate that out for the nine years,
roughly 542 out of 1146 female petitioners would have their suits dismissed or would
abandon them.
397. Until the divorce or separation, coverture remained a very real impediment
to a wife's ability to pay an attorney, pursue her own calling, or make decisions about
childcare.
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later years to be more serene once the children were grown and her
husband had devoted his attentions to a new family.398 But this preca-
rious peace highlights a serious failure in the law. If as many as half of
the petitioners did not follow through on their petitions, and instead
turned to informal mechanisms, the law failed them precisely because
they could not get what they wanted through formal legal channels. 399
In discussing this data with a number of historians, a few have
suggested that I am making mountains out of molehills. In fact, they
assert, most wives used a divorce pleading to get better terms in pri-
vate separations and so the grounds and success rates should not be of
concern because women were ultimately better served in their infor-
mal arrangements by the ability to file even if they did not follow
through on their petitions. Such responses merely mask the point I
am trying to make, however, which is that the enforceability or nonen-
forceability of certain legal rights may have undermined women's abil-
ity to negotiate marital breakdown in ways that were satisfactory to
them. Women who were using the formal law strategically to achieve
other ends usually did so because the formal ends were either unavail-
able or unattractive. It does not matter if 50% of female petitioners
did not obtain relief either because they got what they wanted in a
private separation or they simply failed in their cause of action before
the court-either way the law failed them. It forced them to accept
informal terms through private separations that had tenuous enforce-
ment rights, or it simply failed to give them the relief they really
wanted. If the court were providing adequate relief for these wives,
i.e. the relief they wanted, then they would have pursued the ends
they desired and obtained them, rather than being forced to use un-
satisfactory legal procedures to get something better, or perhaps
worse, in informal arrangements. 4 0 An inadequate formal rule fails
both those who take advantage of the rule and get less than what they
want or need, as well as those who use it for other ends if those other
ends do not include adequate enforcement mechanisms. But despite
the limitations of the 1858 court, women filed more petitions than
men in every year studied,40' apparently willing to pay the cost of los-
ing custody and alimony in order to be free of their husbands. The
question for the historian then becomes whether or not a different set
of legal rights would have better satisfied the needs of those women
398. JANE GRAY PERKINS, THE LiFE OF THE HONOURABLE MRs. NORTON (1909).
399. Caroline Norton spent a significant amount of time recounting the difficul-
ties of the separated wife who has no legal power to protect herself, and no husband
willing to bother protecting her. See NORTON, A LETTER TO THE QUEEN, supra note 61,
at 39-40, 57. See also Lord Lyndhurst in the Parliamentary Debates. 144 PARL. DEB.
(3d ser.) (1857) 1705; 142 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1856) 410.
400. Formal arrangements must have been less attractive because so many wo-
men failed to follow through with their divorce or separation petition. And though
many family-law scholars advocate the value of informal arrangements and mecha-
nisms, the lack of enforcement with informal arrangements is rather troubling.
401. Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 996 tbl.5.
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who were successful before the new court as well as those who were
not.
VII. LAw's INNOCENCE: THE LIBERALIZATION NARRATIVE AND THE
APOLOGY OF FAMILY LAW
The cases discussed above reveal one thing quite clearly: the wives
who came before the court and asked to have their marriages termi-
nated had little ability to restructure their lives as they desired. The
law protected their bodies from violence and abuse,40 2 but it did not
give them the power or autonomy to determine the parameters of
their day-to-day existence. Progressive reformers believed that legal
rights to divorce would allow women to control their husbands or es-
cape them if they could not, that legal rights to their children would
allow them to choose how they would be mothers, and that legal
rights to property would give them the autonomy to define their daily
lives. Instead, wives were blamed for their husbands' breaches, they
suffered even if they were not at fault, and their husbands' actions
could condemn them to a future of loneliness, dependence, and celi-
bacy. If a mother did get custody of her children, which most did not,
she raised them under the shadow of her husband's ever-present
power to regain them at age seven, to claim them if he decided to
"reform" and return to his family, and to control their education and
upbringing if a private separation was her remedy. She lived in con-
stant fear that he would re-enter her life and get the children back.
She had limited ability to gain and control property. Her employ-
ment opportunities were necessarily limited by her gender, what prop-
erty she may have owned and might even regain would be in trust or
without the power of control and disposition, 40 3 and if she did get
alimony it would be premised on her remaining chaste and unmar-
ried. Even if she did find a new husband who could give her eco-
nomic security, she would certainly risk losing her children if she
remarried. For a woman whose entire life was defined by her worth in
the marriage market, the fault-based interdependent family law that
arose to replace coverture gave her very little power to control her
destiny.
The disjuncture between the meaningful legal rights that reform-
ers sought and the limited reforms that occurred is best understood as
a tension between what I call domestic rights and family law. Domes-
tic rights, like any legal rights in the public sphere, would have
granted women the power and autonomy to define their lives in their
domestic world just as men were able to define their lives in the public
402. Although wives could sue before a magistrate if her husband had struck her,
her right to bodily integrity did not, for instance, include the right to prevent her
husband from imprisoning her so long as he provided sustenance for her, nor did it
include the right to be free of sexual assault through the marital rape exemptions.
403. See Wright, Untying the Knot, supra note 42, at 1008 tbl.20.
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world. Mrs. Spratt, Mrs. Ryder, and Mrs. Fisher did not obtain domes-
tic rights, for domestic rights were individual legal entitlements that
would have enabled each woman to structure her own life within the
scope of her economic and personal means. Family law, on the other
hand, was a newly evolving set of legal rules that privileged the family
over individual members, that protected socially preferred relation-
ships and persons and not others, and that used denial of rights and
power to enforce conformity to a particular vision of social order.
Family law perpetuated coverture, patriarchy, and separate spheres by
denying women domestic rights and granting them to men.40 4 I have
suggested elsewhere in the context of inter-spousal custody disputes,
and I now extend my claim to include the rise of family law, that just
as women were able to use the rhetoric and language of rights to de-
mand power over their domestic lives, the dialogue shifted to one of
duties, obligations, and the best interests of others.40 5 In that vein,
women's demands for rights and autonomy were constructed as antag-
onistic to the interests and needs of husbands and children, as well as
to the social order. The demand for rights was, and continues to be,
vilified as destructive of the collective good, just as women were poised
to claim the same legal rights that men had enjoyed for centuries.
Numerous historians and family-law scholars have noted the lim-
ited autonomy the new court gave to Victorian women.40 6 Mary Shan-
ley wrote that the "Divorce Act also sanctioned and perpetuated a
patriarchal understanding of the marriage bond."40 7 And Gail Savage
404. Although the domestic realm was not identified with men, men's control
over the family property, the children, the domicile of his wife, and a whole host of
legal relationships meant that men remained in control over the domestic realm
under family law just as they had under coverture.
405. This could be a claim of conspiracy. Women demanded certain legal rights
and male legislators gave them something that looked like legal rights, or a literal
version of those legal rights, but without the power and autonomy needed to make
those rights effective. Once that sleight of hand occurs, an academic or historical
justification is required to excuse the inadequacies of the law. When the desired out-
come does not in fact come to fruition, there must exist a scapegoat, a narrative that
places blame for the failure, not in the undermining of the legal rights that was built
into the reform, but on some other excuse-social or ideological constraints that are
outside the power of law to change. Such is the nature of power. It fights the ceding
of power and when it must do so, it musters all available resources to limit the damage
and potential for real change that the relinquishment of power made possible, even
as it restructures the narrative to imply that great change has occurred. See also
Wright, De Manneville, supra note 36, at 302-03.
406. CORNISH & CLARK, supra note 34, at 386-90; SHANLtE, supra note 19, at 167;
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 6, at 388-90.
407. SAr'iLE, supra note 19, at 48. Mary Shanley's study of the elision of the
married women's property movement with divorce reform in the decade preceding
the 1857 Divorce Court Act mirrors the claim I've made in the custody context, that
coverture would be slowly dismantled but at the same time property and custody
would be tied to marital performance in such a way as to reproduce patriarchal au-
thority within the family through an interdependent family law. In the early 1850s,
spurred perhaps by the passage of a married women's property act in New York in
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has stated that the "law did not by itself materially affect either the
behavior of families or the status of women during the Victorian and
Edwardian periods."408 But my critique goes further than asserting
that the newly evolving family law did not do much for women.
Rather, it is that the project of family law was inherently destructive of
women's interests. Nineteenth-century women wanted power to struc-
ture their domestic lives; instead they got family law which denied
them even the moral authority to demand the autonomy and the legal
rights needed to define and protect their family relationships. Con-
sidering the historical consensus that the new court perpetuated the
patriarchy of coverture, it seems odd that there has been little critique
of the overall enterprise of family law. 40 9 Most historians and legal
scholars accept the underlying importance of the emergence of a sep-
arate family-law court as crucial for protecting the separate interests
and concerns of women. A new law of the family that valued and pro-
tected the special place of family in society was viewed then, as it is
today, as a step away from coverture and toward equality, important
for the family and society, and by inference important for women.
The contradiction should be obvious. The dominant narrative
about the rise of family law is that because women are so strongly
identified with the family, and because their interests lie in the family,
a separate law of the family is good for women. 410 The question that is
rarely asked is whether or not women's interests are located in the
family as the result of the coercive aspects of a patriarchal family law
1848, a group of women began advocating for property law reform to change the law
of coverture that gave all of a wife's property, earnings, and debts to her husband
upon marriage. Id. at 29-35. In 1856 the group presented a petition to Parliament, in
which they had gathered 29,000 signatures, asking that Parliament recognize that
.married women, like all other adults, had an inalienable right to their own property
and the fruits of their own labor." Id. at 33. What they asked was that all married
women would be protected in the ownership and management of their own property.
But by the spring of 1856, "the issues of married women's property and divorce law
reform were inseparably linked." Id. at 35. As the 1857 Act eventually provided, only
divorced, separated, or deserted wives would be allowed to own their own separate
property; married women who did not petition the court would remain in a state of
coverture with regard to their property. Only the very small handful of women, the
few hundred who could appear before the new court, would receive any rights to their
own separate property, and those rights would be inextricably linked to marital fault.
It was not until 1870, and then more fully in 1882, that married women would gain
the right to own their own property, and only under extraordinary circumstances. Id.
at 49-78, 103-30. See generally THE LANGHAM PLACE GROUP, supra note 132.
408. Gail Savage, The Operation of the 1857 Divorce Act, 1860-1910, 16J. Soc. HIST.
103, 108 (1983).
409. This is not to say that there haven't been important works criticizing the
patriarchal aspects of family law. See EEKELAAR, supra note 35; O'DoNoVAN, FAMILY
LAw MATTERs, supra note 35; THE STATE, THE LAW, AND THE FAMILYv CRITICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 35. Even in their critiques, only O'Donovan seems to address the
underlying issue of how family law is constructed to perpetuate patriarchal power. See
O'DONOVAN, FAMILY LAw MATrEs, supra note 35, at 10-29.
410. See infra notes 412418 and accompanying text.
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or because of other socio-economic forces that are beyond the law's
control. The existence of family law encouraged women to remain in
the domestic sphere and be content with the protections they had
acquired, rather than demand rights in the public sphere that might
conflict with the small protections they had gained. Moreover, to the
extent family law is constructed as advantageous for women, its role in
the disempowerment of women and in gender inequality is obscured.
Ultimately, the liberalization narrative serves to obscure the way family
law institutionalizes coverture and rewrites law and legal reform as in-
nocent in the coercive embodiment of gender inequality.
The liberalization narrative of the rise of family law posits that in
the shift from coverture to family law, women's interests in the domes-
tic sphere were recognized and protected, they acquired enforceable
legal rights through the 1857 legislation, and as a result of those legal
rights they become more empowered within their domestic sphere.
This liberalization narrative is an historical construct of gradually
evolving gender equality through the legal protection of the domestic
sphere. Ultimately, it is suggested that family law gave women the
power within that sphere to disagree with their husbands, control
their own lives, and ultimately claim parity and power outside the do-
mestic sphere. The liberalization narrative, therefore, claims that the
abolition of coverture and the rise of family law is a two-part process of
empowerment for women, first within the family, and second in the
public sphere through exercise of domestic rights. 41 1
Not surprisingly, there have been few book-length studies solely
on the transition to family law, so identifying this dominant historical
narrative has required piecing together historical claims about the
new court and the law that arose from it.412 For instance, Alan Horst-
man summarized the 1857 Act as "the most successful piece of legisla-
411. In its simplest form, the liberalization narrative goes something like this:
changing the old laws that categorized married women with infants, lunatics, and
criminals certainly improved women's lives. The form those changes took-a domes-
tic relations court that would govern issues of child custody, marriage, and family
property-has been a positive step toward validating women's lives and agency by
acknowledging and protecting those primarily female spaces and interests. It was a
new social experiment, one that would not be fully duplicated in the United States
until well into the twentieth century, revealing England's lead in the march toward
women's equal rights. Under the new English system, some women received what I
call domestic rights, custody of their children, rights to control their own property,
and agency in terminating marriage. According to this liberalization narrative, once
some women got rights, all women would get them.
412. See, e.g., GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33; HoRSTMAN, supra note 1; LEE,
supra note 267; O.R. McGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND: A CENTENARY STUDY (1957);
STONE, RoAD TO DrVORCE, supra note 6. While these books and others have been
written on English divorce, the focus has not been on the actual working of the di-
vorce court, so much as on the general changes wrought over the past century and a
half.
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tion in the nineteenth century."413 R.H. Graveson wrote that this
"taste of independence gave to Victorian women, married and unmar-
ried, an appetite for equality with men in other legal respects."
414
And Roderick Phillips stated that the court's "domestic and global im-
plication .... endowed it with importance quite out of proportion to
its intrinsic significance." 415 Even earlier critics were quite unabashed
in their praise of the shift. De Montmorency asserted that "[t]ime
brings its revenges even to women," and "[o] ne might almost now say,
inverting Rousseau's famous phrase: woman was born in chains, and
behold now on every side she is free."416
The general praise of the family-law court by most historians is
premised on a belief that as women gained power to exit intolerable
relationships, they also gained power within both functional and dys-
functional relationships, and that power within their family would
eventually radiate outward into the public sphere. As Debra Friedman
claims, " [d] omesticity became the ideal of womanhood, and the home
her exclusive domain, leading to a redistribution of authority in the
household, with the wife becoming the equal of her husband."41
7
Once wives were equal with their husbands in the domestic realm,
they would be able to claim power and parity in the public sphere.
But of course, even the most woman-centered family law has not re-
sulted in gender equality in the public sphere.
This is the contradiction at the heart of family law; the law is
viewed as transformative and impotent at the same time. The law was
to transform women's lives by abolishing coverture and giving them
domestic rights and power within the domestic realm. But when the
transformation did not occur, the blame was laid not on the ineffec-
tiveness of the domestic rights, or the idea of a separate law of the
family that would institutionalize separate spheres, but rather on
deeply rooted gender differences and inequality that pervade social
and economic, but not legal, relationships. This is the apology of fam-
ily law. While it held such promise, its failure is attributed to non-legal
factors that the law cannot change. By failing to question how family
law contributes to gender inequality, historians and scholars construct
a narrative of innocence. The liberalization narrative asserts that fam-
ily law is trying to help women achieve gender equality, not perpetu-
ate it, and thus is innocent in the very real inequality that exists.
One example might help. Consider Herma Hill Kay's pathbreak-
ing study of the shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce. 418 Kay con-
413. HoRsTmAN, supra note 1, at 169. Margaret Maison wrote that it caused "a
minor social revolution in England." Margaret Maison, Adulteresses in Agony, 19 THE
LISTENER, Jan. 19, 1961, 133-34.
414. GRAVESON & CRANE, supra note 33, at 16.
415. PHILLIPS, supra note 62, at 412.
416. De Montmorency, supra note 9.
417. FRIEDMAN, supra note 94, at 37-38.
418. Kay, supra note 267.
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cludes that no-fault divorce helps two-career couples without children,
but actually disadvantages women who have been married longer,
have children, and subordinated their careers to their family. 4 19 Kay's
solution: teach women not to choose traditional family roles that sacri-
fice their earning capacity for their husbands and children. 420 At no
point does Kay assert or imply that the problem might very well lie in
the artificial dichotomy of fault-based and no-fault divorce.
It is family law that positions divorce and the heterosexual couple
at the center of a series of legal duties and obligations that are treated
quite differently from, say, the fiduciary obligations of trustees or
board members. If the marital unit were treated more like a corpora-
tion, for instance, in which board members who violate their fiduciary
and contract obligations are held individually liable, the conundrum
created by fault-based and no-fault divorce would disappear. If we did
not use social and legal rules to create a system whereby men but not
women are encouraged to go forth and begin new families when the
old ones fall apart, and if women were not punished for subordinating
their family relationships to their careers, we might be able to con-
struct a set of legal rules governing intimate relations that does not
turn on female subordination, the perpetuation of the separate and
devalued domestic sphere, or the punishing of all family relationships
that violate whatever contemporary norm is laid down by our legisla-
tors, politicians, and judges.
There exists in most family-law scholarship today a profound be-
lief in the legitimacy of family law. The family, like a business or a
piece of real estate, is viewed as a discrete entity that requires its own
set of legal rules. It is an entity that is fluid but ultimately coherent.
But why must it be centered around the sexual relationship of hus-
band and wife and not, for example, around community groupings,
neighborhoods, or church membership? Why is it concerned with
custody of children and not with homelessness for those same chil-
dren? Why is child sexual abuse, hunger, or health insurance not at
the center? Family law continues today to focus on the heterosexual
couple, expectations about gender roles, and the use of property and
power to coerce the perpetuation of a narrow ideology of the Victo-
rian nuclear family that is ultimately concerned with fault, breach,
control over wives and children, and inter-generational transfers of
property. Family law is about protecting the sanctity and privacy of a
man's home and not about survival, flourishing, or autonomy of all
people, including women and children. It continues to be used to
punish those who fail to fit a particular model of monogamous house-
hold formation, and it denies the multi-faceted communal needs that
most people have. It also contributes to the double-bind faced by
most Anglo-American women, which is that in order to fully control
419. Id.
420. Id.
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and exercise domestic rights in choosing a family they most often
forego rights and opportunities in the public sphere.
Besides the formal legal barriers inherent within family-law rules,
there are informal barriers to women who try to fulfill their traditional
domestic duties and also claim equal rights and equal access to gender
equality in the public sphere. Women who have entered the public
sphere are often denied domestic rights while women who claim and
receive domestic rights are essentially barred from participation in the
public sphere. 42' Women who have busy careers will be denied cus-
tody of their children while fathers with busy careers will not,4 22 and
women who take time off from work to have families will be penalized
when they seek to return. Separate spheres lives on in the formal
rules of family law, in informal barriers to women crossing over into
the public sphere, and in the absence of adequate legal protections
for women's participation in male-dominated arenas. 423 I assert that
we cannot have an egalitarian and successful family law that does not
have, at its core, a focus on the right and ability of all adult members
to participate fairly and equally in the public sphere to earn the re-
sources necessary to support their family. How can it be that scholars
recognize the gendered constraints on women of the early family law
and yet applaud its creation as a recognition of women's needs when
it continues to be based on the disempowered domestic sphere as the
natural place for women?424
The liberalization narrative is quintessentially a narrative of legal
innocence. It tells women that since the laws have changed and they
are still disadvantaged by their domestic activities, the law is not at
fault.42 5 But the law is at fault. Katherine O'Donovan has put it quite
well:
421. O'DONOVAN, FAMILY LAw MATTERS, supra note 35, at 75-79; O'DoNOVAN,
SEXUAL DrIVSIONS IN LAw, supra note 43, at 166-76.
422. One need only recall the turmoil surrounding the custody dispute between
Marcia Clark, the prosecutor in the OJ. Simpson case, and her husband. Marcia's
custody was challenged on the grounds that her job was too demanding to allow her
to satisfactorily tend to her children's needs. See Margery Eagan, Maybe Moms Just
Have to Know Their Limits, BoSTON HERALD, Mar. 24, 2002, at 015; Melody Petersen,
The Short End of Long Hours; A Female Lawyer's Job Puts Child Custody at Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1998, at Dl; Julie Gannon Shoop, Working Mothers See Double Standard in Cus-
tody Cases, TRIAL, Oct. 1, 1995, at 12.
423. O'DoNoVAN, SEXUAL DISIONS IN LAw, supra note 43, at 163-66.
424. This is, perhaps, the impossible task of feminism-a desire to legitimate and
empower women's ability to move beyond the domestic sphere and compete equally
with men at the same time that it aims to legitimate women's agency and protect them
in their domestic choices. Feminism wants women to have full equality with men in
the public sphere and also be protected when they choose to devote their time to
children, family, and home.
425. Perhaps a simple way of putting it is this: When women's subordination was
sanctioned by the laws of coverture, it was easy to see how law institutionalized gender
inequality. They were directly linked. The liberalization narrative posits the shift
from coverture to family law as removing the legal impediments to gender equality.
But because family law derives from and creates separate spheres, and because the
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Gender ideologies and identities ensure that the resulting inequal-
ity is accepted as natural and inevitable .... The law's role in this is
active, despite its absence from the personal. For it constructs gen-
der ideologies and identities for the private as well as public struc-
tures which determine the relationship between the sexes.
426
What we learn from the divorce court records is that the nineteenth-
century answer to women's demands was nearly as limiting and con-
straining as coverture. So why would we think that today's answer to
women's demands, relatively unfettered domestic rights through fam-
ily law, is any more successful in empowering women, especially in
light of the very real evidence that women today have not achieved the
level of gender equality they deserve?
Family law contains within itself the elements of women's subor-
dination. There is an inherent incongruity between legal rights,
which are the currency of the public sphere, and a separate legal sys-
tem of the family that purports to use rights to regulate what society
and the law tell us are at heart interconnected relationships. Legal
rights within the domestic sphere have no purchasing power because
the private sphere is constructed in opposition to the public sphere;
because of that socially constructed difference, those inhabitants who
want to use legal rights to define their private lives are legally and
socially disempowered to do so. Many people sense that a law that
recognizes a separate family realm, and treats it differently, somehow
perpetuates inequality to the extent women's legal rights are located
within the family and men's legal rights are located outside the family.
At the same time, many family-law scholars and the majority of the
population also feel that the family is a fundamentally distinct realm
that should be governed by different laws and different procedures,
and an emphasis on mediation processes and not adversarial litiga-
tion. Is the answer to this tension simply the claim that the family is
different, that the law must recognize difference and accommodate it
in order to protect social order? Such would be the position of cul-
tural feminists who would structure legal relations around the reality
of gender difference. 42 7 But in a post-modem world, the reliance on
difference tojustify family law ultimately demands a more critical anal-
ysis of the power and dominance of male interests in constructing that
private sphere is constructed around the denial of rights as the currency of power, the
shift was a change in name only. Law continues to institutionalize gender inequality.
Only now there is needed some institutional narrative to deny law's role in maintain-
ing women's subordination in order to avoid having to make meaningful changes.
The liberalization narrative, therefore, provides a story of law's innocence to deflect
criticism away from legal institutions and toward other social constraints.
426. O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw, supra note 43, at 134.
427. See CAROL GLIcAN, IN A DIFERENr VoIcE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO-
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan is considered the founding mother of the cul-
tural or relational feminists. Cultural feminists argue that women require special
treatment in law in order to overcome the biological and natural differences that
render them unable to function equally as men in a male-defined world.
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difference. 428 To the extent family law derives from and helps create
separate spheres, one cannot help but question the underlying com-
mitment to gender equality.
The literature from the period, as well as the law that emerged
from the 1858 court, reveals significant differences between conserva-
tive and progressive reformers as to the nature of the changes being
sought in abolishing coverture. Yet, the family law that eventually
arose was notably very similar to the substantive law that existed prior
to 1858. The 1857 Act may have tolled the death-knell of coverture,
but separate spheres, the holistic family law, a conservative first
judge,429 and the minimal substantive changes all worked to under-
mine the efficacy of the change for women. To the extent the new
court tied custody and alimony to marital fault, it forced on women
traditional family roles and perpetuated patriarchal relations between
husbands and wives. Separate spheres and other socialized con-
straints limited women's abilities to take advantage of the new court in
its first decade, and the formal legal hurdles also placed women in
vulnerable positions if they tried to end their marriages through infor-
mal means.
The domestic rights women achieved under the 1857 Act not
only were not liberalizing and empowering, but in fact were quite lim-
iting and constraining. The liberalization narrative suggests that al-
though the early manifestation of family law was flawed, the enterprise
was not, and that over time the law would overcome its flaws. As we
have come to understand the legal constraints of the early law, so the
narrative goes, we have removed them.430 And implicit in most of the
428. See CATHERINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987). MacKinnon is the founding mother of radical feminism, a theory that
gender difference is constructed by men in order to dominate women. Only by
deconstructing the way in which gender difference is socially constructed can femi-
nists uncover the power lying at the root of gender inequality.
429. The first judge of the new court, Sir Cresswell Cresswell, was notoriously
conservative even though he did venture beyond the old common-law rules to exer-
cise some modicum of discretion granted by the Act. See Wright, Untying the Knot,
supra note 42, at 910-13.
430. Eventually the constraints and limits of the 1858 court have been amelio-
rated and the promise of family law fulfilled according to the liberalization narrative.
For instance, what began in 1857 with the court's jurisdiction to give custody to
mothers finally ended in 1973 with legislation giving mothers equal legal rights to
determine their child's upbringing. Guardianship Act 1973, c. 29, § 1 (Eng.). What
began with the right to award support or maintenance in 1857 finally ended in 1882
with the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c.75 (Eng.), or in 1925
with the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 23 (Eng.), where the
rules of intestate succession placed husbands and wives on an equal footing. The
historical arguments almost uniformly contend that the law has eventually buried all
the detrimental vestiges of legal coverture; what began in 1857, and has taken a cen-
tury and a half to complete, is the equalization of women's legal rights within the
domestic sphere by the recognition of independent domestic rights for women. Mar-
ried women have the domestic rights that Caroline Norton, Emily Westmeath, and
the covered women of the nineteenth century sought for themselves.
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histories of the last century and a half is a belief that in removing the
patriarchal constraints of the 1857 Act we have fully abolished cover-
ture. Women today do have the domestic rights that Caroline Norton,
Emily Westmeath, and Barbara Smith Bodichon desired. Women to-
day have a preference for custody, are entitled to ownership of marital
property, and can get a divorce as easily as men. Their legal rights are
the same as men's, even if the consequences of those rights are not.
Even still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century we continue
to have a set of legal rules and courts that treat the domestic sphere
differently than the public sphere, maintaining separate spheres and
identifying women's interests as primarily within the home. More im-
portantly, we have been unsuccessful in breaking the double bind, the
fact that women who choose to participate in the public sphere face
enormous challenges if they choose also to have a family. Marriage
and motherhood is still deemed by most employers to be inconsistent
with top-level performance in the workplace and its corresponding
top-level wages. While women are still struggling to get out of the
home, and criticized if they do successfully enter the public sphere,
the law has been slow to reciprocate by empowering women with legal
rights in male-dominated arenas. The problem inherent in the domes-
tic rights granted to women under early and contemporary family law
is that the exercise of those rights still precludes the exercise of rights
and economic success within the public sphere.431 But the liberaliza-
tion narrative tells us that that contradiction is not legally constructed.
When we consider the demands of many of the nineteenth-cen-
tury women reformers-independent rights to custody and property,
regardless of marital status or fault-the creation of the 1858 court
actually appears insidious. It gave women what they demanded-ac-
cess to their children, divorce from abusive husbands, and limited
control over property-but only if they remained locked in their do-
mestic world. The reform gave them part of what they asked for, but
without any power that would translate outside the domestic sphere, it
had limited effect. Likewise, now that critics have seen how the nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century family law did not empower wo-
men as they had desired, the liberalization narrative attempts to
deflect criticism away from the constraints of family law and onto the
empowerment of it. This deflection occludes the role of law in main-
taining gender inequality by telling women that the law empowers
them; it is the broader social climate that law cannot address which
constrains them. It convinces them that the law, especially family law,
is not a party to the disempowerment women face in the public
sphere. And that is precisely the problem. In challenging the accu-
racy of the liberalization narrative and asking why it has become such
431. Women who are successful in their careers often put off having children,
perhaps indefinitely. And women who do have children are either forced to leave the
workforce or are passed over for promotions that would have put them in more de-
manding and time-intensive jobs, which happen to pay the best.
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a pervasive explanation for women's domestic lives, I suggest that we
are still living the myth that family law destroyed coverture.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1982, Michael Freeman questioned what he saw as a nearly
uniform acceptance of the need for a family court that would temper
the "impersonality, insensitivity and remoteness of law, not to say its
excessive rigidity and formality."43 2 Freeman warned that the push for
a sensitive and less adversarial court that would be "responsive to the
perceived needs of the family," would bring with it a highly bureau-
cratic and therapeutic state that would result in "greater surveillance
and more intense supervision."433 With a family court, the family
would come under greater supervision and control from a monolithic,
centralized state that would protect certain family structures and de-
stroy others.434 And while few critics would deny that family courts
today are awash in social workers, professional counselors, and quasi-
medical experts, there is little critique of the underlying institution
being administered to-the family-and the extent to which the law
of the family produces the dysfunctions that are later analyzed, regu-
lated, and controlled.
Family-law scholars have been quick to point out the variety of
ways in which contemporary family law reinforces certain traditional
family forms, privileges certain relationships, and also subjects the
family to the surveillance of a highly bureaucratic state. Legal histori-
ans have also criticized the early family law that evolved out of the
1858 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court for reinforcing tradi-
tional patriarchal relations between men and women. But there is lit-
tle evidence that the two groups have come together to closely
examine how the early family-law court functioned and what legacy
that court has provided in the precedents and the structuring of fam-
ily disputes for today's family law. This study illustrates one way in
which the family law of today has adopted a narrative of innocence
and women's agency in the gender inequality they face. While this
study is partly about understanding the underlying workings of the
nineteenth-century court, any study must be done in light of the his-
torical interpretation that has been placed on the court's actions. In
many respects, the issues and prejudices at stake in 1857 set the stage
for the new family law, which continues today to be rooted in the val-
ues of the Victorian era.
What I have endeavored to do in this article is take a closer look
at the shift from the debilitating constraints of coverture to the so-
432. Michael D. A. Freeman, Questioning the Delegalization Movement in Family Law:
Do We Really Want a Family Court?, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARA-
TrVE LEGAL PERSPEcrIVES 8 (John Eekelaar & Sanford Katz eds., 1984).
433. Id at 8-9.
434. Id.
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called liberality and feminization of family law. And what we discover
from a close analysis of the early court's records is that it indeed rein-
stated and reproduced the patriarchal conditions of coverture. De-
spite women's demands for domestic rights, they received begrudging
protection only from particularly abusive husbands, and a majority of
women who asked for and received that protection most likely lost
custody of their children and a vast majority lost all legal claims to
marital property. Moreover, while some women seemed to be well-
situated to benefit from the court's new rules, there were others who
were not. And the rather inexplicable differences between what dif-
ferent women requested and what they received makes it impossible
to speak of the law having any kind of uniform effect on all women.
Placing the law's effects within the context of the reform debates al-
lows us to see the ways in which the new family law gave women what
they asked for but not what they wanted. It gave them some protec-
tions within their domestic sphere but no legal rights. The ostensible
protection of women's domestic world came at a cost of remaining in
the private sphere without the rights and economic resources that
were the currency of the public sphere. Coverture was reproduced
through the discretionary power of state officials who would reward
certain socially-accepted domestic behaviors and penalize deviations
from others.
Probably more interesting than the reproduction of coverture in
the early family law is the dominant historical narrative about this rise
of family law as empowering for women and that the limits of the early
family law have been overcome for the most part by the recognition
and protection of robust domestic rights in today's family law. This
liberalization narrative is, I argue, a narrative of law's innocence in the
gender inequality women face inside and outside the home. The
dominant historical narrative recognizes the limits and constraints of
the early family law, but it asserts that family law in essence has been
an empowering force in women's lives. But just as the nineteenth-
century court's actual operation undermined the power and protec-
tion the law supposedly granted women, the liberalization narrative
obscures the way in which domestic rights and family law undermine
women's ability to operate equally inside and outside the private do-
main. Insofar as this narrative is a legal/historical myth of evolving
gender equality and the law's concern for women's domestic interests,
the overwhelming ubiquity of the narrative in the face of strong evi-
dence to the contrary suggests that the narrative itself serves to deflect
critical attention away from the legal roots of the early family law and
onto other purported sources of gender inequality. By obscuring fam-
ily law's role in maintaining inequality,43 5 the liberalization narrative
435. Family law puts women in the untenable position of having to choose be-
tween their children and intimate relations or equality in the outside world. They
cannot have both. And the liberalization narrative is used to convince women that
choosing power in the domestic sphere is not directly related to disempowerment,
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deflects criticism and reform activities onto other sociological
grounds.
As we study how family law replaced coverture and how it sub-
sumed women's demands for independent rights into a dependent
domestic sphere, we can see how the liberalization narrative about the
rise of women's rights deflects their demands for equality and power
in the whole of their lives, not just their intimate family lives. Just as
the court acted as gatekeeper in the nineteenth century, so that wo-
men who ventured too far beyond their allowed scope of acceptable
behavior would be denied access to the remedies and protections of
the family law, the liberalization narrative functions as gatekeeper to-
day. By setting up the domestic and public spheres as legally separate,
independent zones of activity, the liberalization narrative obscures the
legal interconnectedness of the two spheres. It encourages women to
exercise their autonomy within the domestic sphere, assuring them
that they are helping the cause of equality, while occluding the way in
which their choice to exercise domestic rights bars them from mean-
ingful public participation.
But how can we see from the tension between the claims of wo-
men reformers and what they got in the limited, interdependent fam-
ily law, that the liberalization narrative allows modem family law to
reproduce the constraints of coverture? In other words, how do we
know that the contradictions in the nineteenth-century family law con-
tinue today, when women have been granted the "domestic rights"
that nineteenth-century reformers wanted? The interdependent fam-
ily law of the nineteenth century aggregated certain behaviors and
then premised legal rights on conforming to socially acceptable
norms. That has not changed. There still continues the desire to pro-
tect and support those spouses who behave according to acceptable
norms, and the desire to keep the family intact at the expense of those
spouses who want out. Society has a strong interest in supporting
properly functioning families. They are the easiest and most efficient
way to raise children, have a smooth inter-generational transition of
property, and provide incentives for productive labor. But the ideal-
ized family, with the woman relegated to the domestic sphere and sub-
ordinated to the wishes and demands of the male breadwinner, only
functions efficiently when women accept their subordinate roles. And
that occurs only through a complex series of laws and social norms
that deny women individual rights. This is why the debates around
divorce reform are so crucial. Just as women were demanding individ-
enforced by legal rules, in the public sphere. By creating a narrative of disconnec-
tion, agency, and choice within the domestic realm, the law tries to convince women
that their acceptance of that power has no cost, and is not forbidden fruit that once
they bite into will bring death to their public lives. It is the law of the family that helps
maintain the separate spheres as interdependent realms of limited agency while si-
multaneously producing a narrative of independence and empowerment that hides
the links between the two spheres.
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ual rights to determine their own lives and that of their children, the
1857 law created an interconnected family law that denied legal rights
while it claimed to protect women's interests. And when the law con-
sistently respects the individual rights of men even if they conflict with
the welfare of their family, but refuses to recognize individual rights of
women except when they happen to correspond to the welfare of
their family, the law can be seen as critically complicit in creating and
maintaining the patriarchal family. This differential treatment is the
outcome of an interdependent family law.
While much remains to be done with the data on the early court,
it forces us to rethink the liberalization narrative about the natural-
ness of family law which unquestioningly praises its creation and con-
tinuation. In the end, I hope this data encourages us to look beyond
simple conclusions that posit the court as a benefit for women, and
instead allows us to see the court and the family law that emerged as
complex, coercive institutions that produce a particular form of family
relationships that they will protect, and that allow nonconforming
men and women to fend for themselves without the protection of the
law. To the extent that women are more likely than men to be left to
fend for themselves, we cannot claim that the weaker sex is a favorite
of our law.
[Vol. 19:211
HeinOnline  -- 19 Wis. Women's L.J. 318 2004
